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Abstract 
This thesis presents three studies on credit risk modelling. The first study 
compares the real default probabilities produced by three main structural models 
of default, Merton model, Longstaff and Schwartz model and Leland and Toft 
model, to the observed real default probabilities reported by Moody's for the 
BBB, BB and B rated bonds. We find that none of the models can accurately 
predict the default probabilities in all these cases. Merton as well as Leland and 
Toft models underpredict default probabilities. Longstaff and Schwartz model 
although it produces in some cases Expected Default Frequencies (EDFs) that are 
close to the observed ones, it tends to overestimate the default probabilities of 
riskier bonds as well as the default probabilities of bonds with the same rating 
but higher equity volatility. We also find that structural models tend to 
underestimate the default probabilities in early years. 
The second study examines whether information from equity markets, as 
summarized in the distance to default measure derived from a Merton-Moody's 
KMV (MKMV) model, provides useful additional information over accounting 
variables for predicting changes in bank credit ratings. Using a dataset of 98 
equity listed banks from 1997 to 2004, we find that distance to default measure 
has additional explanatory power for modeling current ratings, or predicting 
credit rating changes over a 6-month or 12-month horizon, but only for the 
smaller sized banks. We find no evidence that changes in distance-to- default 
have additional explanatory power for predicting rating categories, regardless of 
the size of the bank. 
The third study compares two proprietary models, Moody's KMV (MKMV) and 
BARRA models that use information from the equity and debt market 
respectively for the estimation of market implied ratings that can be updated 
continuously. We compare the empirical performance of these models in terms of 
their ability to predict in a timely fashion changes in credit quality by employing 
a sample of 4594 bonds issued by 447 firms from US for a period of 3 years. We 
find that neither model provides a close mapping to observed ratings. Both 
however are useful for prediction of credit transitions. 
13 
CHAPTER 1: General introduction 
Abstract of Chapter I 
This chapter presents an overview of the three main studies on credit risk 
modelling analysed in this dissertation. We present the objectives of the research 
and review how the three research studies contained in this thesis contribute to 
the existing literature. 
14 
1.1. Research objectives and contribution of research 
The research reported in this thesis investigates the use of structural credit risk 
models for the prediction of default and credit rating transitions. It aims to 
examine both how different specifications of structural credit risk models affect 
default predictions and the empirical performance of the most widely used 
structural credit risk model, that of Moody's KMV, in relation to other models 
using accounting and bond market data. 
The thesis contains a literature survey (Chapter 2) and three research studies. The 
objective of the first research study (Chapter 3) is to examine the differences in 
real default probabilities produced by different structural models. Three main 
structural models; Merton model, Longstaff and Schwartz model and Leland and 
Toft model, are compared. The main difference between these models is the 
different assumptions on the determination of default barrier and interest rates 
that they make. In Merton model, which is the basic structural model, default 
barrier is deten-nined exogenously and risk free interest rates are constant. 
Longstaff and Schwartz model extends Merton model by assuming stochastic 
interest rates, while Leland and Toft model assumes that the default barrier is 
determined endogenously. 
This chapter contributes to the current literature in several ways. During the last 
years, there has been considerable work on the comparison of different structural 
models in terms of the term structure of credit spreads they generate (or 
equivalently the term structure of risk-neutral default probabilities), i. e. the 
comparison of the pricing predictions of structural credit risk models. In contrast, 
aside from Leland (2004) there appears to have been no academic research on the 
comparison of the term structure of real default probabilities or Expected Default 
Frequencies (EDFs) produced by different structural models. Examining the 
ability of different structural models to generate accurate real default 
probabilities is an important contribution to current literature. Previous studies on 
structural models obtain mixed results on the ability of structural models to 
produce spreads that are in line with those observed in the market. The main 
consensus is that the structural models underpredict credit spreads. According to 
the literature reviewed in this thesis (see Chapter 2) this could be interpreted as 
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suggesting either that structural models are inadequate for measuring credit risk 
or, as suggested by recent studies, that credit risk is only one of the components 
that explain yield spreads. In our study, we investigate in a theoretical setting 
whether structural models are adequate for the prediction of actual default 
probabilities and examine whether the models themselves are sound but the 
credit spreads are determined by other factors such as tax or liquidity. 
The objective of the second study is to empirically determine whether 
information from equity markets, as summarized in the distance to default 
measure derived from Merton and similar to the one proposed by Moody's KMV 
Credit Monitor, provides useful additional information over accounting variables 
for the modelling and prediction of bank ratings and rating transitions in a 
sample of developed country banks. The use of distance to default (DD) measure 
for modelling and predicting credit ratings may have an advantage over the 
commonly used historical accounting variables: in contrast to the latter, that are 
released only annually or at best quarterly, the DD, which summarizes 
information from equity markets, can be continuously updated. For this reason, 
the distance-to-default measure is widely used by central banks, including 
European Central Bank (ECB), as an indicator of bank financial stability. 
This study (Chapter 4) is an addition to an active recent literature on the 
assessment of bank credit quality. Although the incremental value of a distance 
to default measure over accounting variables in the prediction of default and 
credit ratings has already been examined for corporates, no study has 
investigated the usefulness of a distance to default measure for the prediction of 
changes in the credit quality of banks. Our study extends work by Gropp et al 
(2006) who examined the ability of different market indicators, including a 
distance to default measure based on equity prices, to discriminate between 
banks in two categories: financial fragile or not. Answering the question of 
whether distance to default is a useful indicator of changes in banks' credit 
quality is of utmost importance, since the distance to default measure is widely 
used by central banks, including European Central Bank (ECB), as an indicator 
of bank financial stability. 
The increased importance of credit ratings in financial markets, both for 
x, aluation and for prudential regulation, has triggered the development of various 
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models to predict rating changes. Two main proprietary models have been 
developed Moody's KMV (MKMV) and BARRA models that use information 
from the equity and debt market respectively. Both models yield market implied 
ratings that can be updated continuously. This paper compares the empirical 
performance of these models in terms of their ability to predict in a timely 
fashion changes in credit quality 
In our third research study (Chapter 5), we empirically compare the predictive 
ability for credit rating changes of two leading proprietary models currently used 
by many financial institutions, Moody's KMV and BARRA models. Since the 
two models use information from the equity and bond market respectively, we 
are also comparing whether credit spreads or equity prices are better predictors of 
rating changes, subject to the restriction that these predictions are based on these 
particular proprietary models. This question is particularly important for 
practitioners. Both markets have their own advantages and disadvantages; the 
equity market may be characterized by bubbles and irrational behavior of 
investors, and the bond market suffers from low liquidity. It is therefore very 
useful to identify whether debt or equity market summarizes better publicly 
available information on firms' credit quality. 
The contributions of this third research study are therefore both academic and 
practical. Previous academic studies have compared the empirical performance 
of structural and accounting models and also the performance of different 
theoretical structural and reduced form models. To our knowledge this chapter is 
the first research study to compare market-implied ratings derived from equity 
prices with those derived from bond prices. This chapter also seeks to make a 
practical contribution, helping practitioners assess the ability of two popular 
models to timely predict changes in the credit quality of firms. 
17 
CHAPTER 2: Literature on credit risk 
modelling 
Abstract of Chapter 2 
This chapter provides an overview of the current literature on credit risk 
modelling, focusing on research in two areas of the credit risk; pricing of debt 
instruments and prediction of default. There are two main groups of models 
developed for the pricing of individual debt instruments, which are described in 
this chapter; the finn-value-based models of credit risk or structural models and 
the so called reduced-form models. These pricing models and in particular 
structural models have also been used for the prediction of default together with 
credit scoring models. 
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2.1. Introduction 
During the last decades, there has been a great interest both from researchers and 
academics for the development of credit risk modeling. Although credit risk has 
always been a major concern for banks and financial intermediaries, the recent 
increased focus on the development of new methodologies can be attributed to a 
number of factors. First of all, the recent growth of credit markets, both in size 
and complexity, by the introduction of OTC (Over the Counter) instruments led 
to a considerable interest in the development of credit risk models for the 
accurate pricing of defaultable instruments. Moreover, the introduction of the 
new Basel Accord supports the use of both external and internal ratings for 
determining regulatory capital requirements, hence creating a considerable 
interest in the development of models that predict credit ratings and rating 
transitions. 
Therefore, both the need for better credit risk management and for a better 
understanding of the new financial instruments led to the development of two 
distinct areas of research; the pricing of defaultable instruments and the 
modelling of default risk and ratings transitions. In this chapter, we provide an 
overview of the available literature on credit risk models developed for both 
these purposes. 
There are two main types of models that have been developed and used for the 
pricing of defaultable instruments; the structural models and the reduced form 
models. The structural models treat equity as an option to buy the company's 
assets and use an option pricing formula to derive the likelihood of default. In 
these models default occurs when the value of firm's assets hits an endogenously 
or exogenously specified threshold. The most widely known proprietary 
structural model is Moody's KMV Credit Monitor. The main advantage of these 
models is that they can use the latest market prices to provide an updated 
Expected Default Probability for individual companies. Their main disadvantage 
is that they become cumbersome to use for assets that have unusual capital 
structures or unusual payoffs. 
To overcome this limitation, the reduced form models have been developed. In 
reduced form models, default is not linked to the firm asset value falling below a 
19 
prespecified barrier-level as in structural models. They view the credit event as a 
perfectly unpredictable event and assume that the price of defaultable 
instruments follows a stochastic process. The price of the defaultable instrument 
is then derived by calibrating to market data. Reduced-form models are generally 
used in areas such as bond and derivative pricing rather than producing 
likelihood of default measures. 
Both these models, and especially structural models, have been developed to 
complement more traditional econometric models of default prediction. These 
econometric models are simpler in nature using either information from firms' 
financial statements or macroeconomic variables to predict default. In such 
models, the default prediction involves the estimation of a regression to identify 
the variables that are most informative in the prediction of default. Recently, the 
econometric models have evolved from the calculation of default rates to the 
calculation of rating category transition probabilities. The main drawback of the 
econometric models is that they are not forward looking, since they model 
expectations of default based on past defaults not market prices. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2, describes the literature on the 
pricing of defaultable instruments. Section 2.3, presents the literature on the use 
of structural models, proprietary models and econometric models for the 
prediction of default and transition probabilities. Section 2.4, offers an overview 
of the empirical studies that focus on the comparison of different credit risk 
models. 
2.2. Pricing of defaultable instruments 
There are two main types of models developed for the pricing of individual 
defaultable instruments; the structural models and the reduced form models. 
Uhrig-Homburg (2002) offers a detailed description of the literature on structural 
and reduced form models. In this section, we build on his study and we add 
additional studies that are related to the pricing of defaultable instruments. 
2.2.1. Structural models 
Structural or firm value based models of credit risk describe the default as the 
explicit outcome of the deterioration of the value of the finn. Corporate securities 
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are seen as contingent claims (options) on the value of the issuing firm. There are 
a number of structural models that have been developed for the pricing of debt 
instruments as well as for the assessment of default probabilities. 
2.2.1.1. Merton model 
Merton (1974) pioneered the structural credit risk approach since he was the first 
to use the option pricing theory (OPT) developed by Black and Scholes (1973) in 
the valuation of default risk spreads of fixed income instruments. His approach, 
which gave birth to a variety of models, is called structural because the default is 
triggered by the capital structure of the firm when the value of the firm's assets 
falls below its liabilities. 
At this point, it is essential to describe the assumptions made by Merton's model 
since they play a crucial role in the understanding of the derivation of the price of 
a risky defaultable bond. 
Assumption 1: Markets are frictionless, which means that there are no transaction 
costs, taxes or short-sales restrictions as well as bid-ask spreads. In addition, 
assets are perfectly divisible and are traded continuously. 
Assumption 2: There is a riskless interest rate that is known and whose term 
structure is flat and constant. 
Assumption 3: The value of the assets of the firm, denoted by Va, is assumed to 
follow the following diffusion process: 
dV, 
=, uVdt + adz 
where: 
[2.1] 
,u 
is the expected return of the finn's assets, c, is the volatility of finn's assets 
and z is a standard Wiener process. 
Assumption 4: The value of the firm is equal to the equity and a zero-coupon 
non-callable debt contract, implying that the value of the fin-n is identical to the 
value of the assets. 
Assumption 5: Managers act to maximise shareholders wealth. 
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Assumption 6: The debt contract is fixed with the initial hypothesis that the firm 
is not already at default. 
Assumption 7: Default can only happen at maturity T, if the value of the assets is 
lower than the value of debt. Hence, the lower reorganisatIon boundary of the 
finn is deten-nined exogenously. 
Assumption 8: The absolute priority rule cannot be violated. 
Taking into account the above assumptions, equity and debt payoffs can be 
represented as follows: 
EI 
= max(V, 
- 
P, 0) [2.2] 
and 
Bt 
=P- max(P 
- 
VO) [2.3] 
Hence, according to Merton's model, equity can be seen as a call option on the 
value of the firm for two reasons. First, equityholders have limited downside risk 
due to the limited liability rule. Also, they have a claim on the value of the assets 
if and only if at the maturity of debt the value of firrn's assets is higher than the 
principal value of debt, P. On the other hand, bondholder's payoff can be 
represented by a long position in the face value of debt, which is its principal 
value P, minus a put option on the value of the firrn with strike price P. 
Since both the equity and bond payoffs can be seen as options to the value of the 
firm, Black and Scholes option pricing formulas can be used to obtain the values 
of equity and risky bond respectively. Therefore, the value of equity is: 
Ve 
= 
V, * N(d, )- Pe -r(T-t) * N(d2) 
where Va is the value of assets, V, is the value of equity, T is the bond's time to 
[2.4] 
maturity, P is the debt's principal value and 
d= 
2 
In 
Va 
+r+ 
Ca (T 
- 
p2 
[2.5] 
Ca V(T-t) 
V-(T t) [2.6] 
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Furthermore, the price of a risky bond is the same as a riskless bond minus a put 
option on the value of the firm with strike price P and it is given by the following 
formula: 
B= pe -r(T-1) + VW(- dl) 
- 
Pe -r(T-I)N(- d2 )* [2.7] 
The main implication of Merton's model is that it not only enables us to derive a 
term structure of credit spreads but also to investigate the impact of changes in 
leverage, volatility as well as maturity of debt on the credit spread. Although, the 
humped shape term structure is consistent with actual data, Merton's model 
suffers from important limitations. The simplistic capital structure, the absence of 
bankruptcy costs, the unique zero coupon bond issue as well as the fact that for 
very short maturities the model produces zero spreads (at the market, spreads are 
never equal to zero) are some of its unrealistic assumptions and results. 
2.2.1.2. Extensions of Merton model 
The various shortcomings of the Merton's model as well as its inability to 
estimate credit spreads that are in line with historical observations gave birth to a 
number of theoretical models, which are extensions of the original model, 
relaxing some of its assumptions and managing to overcome some of its 
limitations. 
One of the main limitations of Merton's framework is that the risky bond is 
assumed to be a pure discount bond, despite the fact that in most cases firms 
issue coupon-paying bonds. Although for the risk-free bonds an accurate pricing 
of pure discount bonds would be sufficient to obtain the prices of coupon bonds, 
since they can be seen as a portfolio of zero-coupon bonds, this is not the case for 
risky coupon bonds. The reason is that if a firm defaults on one coupon payment 
then it automatically defaults on all subsequent payments. 
Although, Merton (1976) tried to solve the coupon problem by demonstrating 
that the perpetual risky continuous coupon bond problem is similar to the 
valuation of a European option on a stock that pays dividends at a constant rate, 
his two assumptions of perpetual maturity and continuous coupon payments were 
still unrealistic. 
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To overcome this limitation, Geske (1977) introduced a model for the valuation 
of risky coupon debt with finite maturity by using the compound option (option 
on an option) approach. He suggested that if a firm issues a bond, where there are 
T years to maturity and there are n-I individual coupon payments due before the 
principal plus interest at maturity, then the values of equity and bond at timetn-lý 
just after the final individual coupon payment, are as follows: 
Etý_, ::::: max(VT - M, O) [2.8] 
whereVT is the value of the firm at the maturity and M is the sum of the 
principal and the interest that are due at the maturity of the bond. 
B 
=V 
-E nI 'n-I -I [2.9] 
On the other hand, according to Geske's analysis, just before the final coupon 
payment at t(n-, )- the values of equity and bond are as follows: 
El(ý_, )_ :::: max(Et, 
_, 
- 
C50) [2.10] 
since shareholders will not default at the coupon payment if and only if the value 
of the equity after the coupon payment is greater than the coupon payment. 
Moreover, since E,, 
_, 
is itself an option, for all dates before the final coupon 
payment, equity can be valued as a compound option. 
Bt(ý_, )_ --,,: min(V,,, 
_, 
, 
Cl"_, Blý_, ) 
bond has compound option characteristics as well. 
Equations 2.10 and 2.11 for equity and the bond take the same form at all earlier 
coupon dates. Hence, Geske obtained an expression of the value of the risky 
bond by recursively solving the above expressions at each coupon date. 
Despite the fact that Geske (1977) managed to overcome one of the most 
important limitations of Merton's model by deriving an analytic solution for the 
price of a risky coupon bond in discrete time with finite maturity, it cannot be 
applied to bonds of very long maturities, as the calculations are cumbersome. 
Another important extension of Merton's original model is the Black and Cox 
(1976) valuation model. In this valuation framework, Black and Cox (1976) 
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challenged some of the main assumptions made in the Merton model. As 
described above, in the latter default can only occur at the debt's maturity! while 
Black and Cox (1976) allow for the possibility of early bankruptcy. Additionally, 
one of the main limitations of Merton's model for coupon bonds with infinite 
maturity is that the firm has the right to repay the coupon payments by selling its 
assets. The implication of this is that the value of assets can fall to zero prior to 
default, resulting in zero recovery rates which is unrealistic. Black and Cox 
(1976) attempted to solve this problem, by making two separate assumptions. 
First of all, they assume that default occurs when the value of the finn's assets hit 
a lower threshold point. This threshold can be determined either exogenously by 
a covenant or endogenously, allowing in this case the equity investors to 
optimally choose the time to default. Secondly, the sale of assets for the payment 
of debt is forbidden and they assume that debt as well as dividends can only be 
paid by issuing new equity. This last assumption is more realistic, since in 
practise most corporate bonds have safety covenants that do not allow asset sales. 
Specifically, they produce a valuation fon-nula for bonds with safety covenants as 
well as they examine the effect of subordination arrangements and asset sales 
restrictions on the value of the bond. They conclude that the existence of 
subordinated claims give senior bonds a higher value compared to the value that 
they would have if they were a fraction of a homogeneous bond issue. Last but 
not least, they show that it is important in the valuation of bonds to consider how 
the stockholders are allowed to raise the money to make the payments to the 
bondholders. 
In a later work, Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993), Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995) as well as Brys and Varenne (1997) manage to find closed form 
solutions for coupon paying debt by extending the Black and Cox (1976) model 
in two ways. First of all, they developed a valuation framework for risky 
corporate fixed income securities that takes into account both default and interest 
rate risk by assuming stochastic interest rates. Moreover, following evidence 
from previous work, made by Franks and Torous (1994), Eberhart, Moore and 
Roenfeldt (1990), LoPucki and Whitford (1990), Weiss (1990), Betker (1995) 
and others, they assumed that the strict absolute priority rules can be violated in 
case of default. On the other hand, like Black and Cox (1976), they assume that 
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default occurs when the value of the firm's assets reaches a constant or 
deten-ninistic point as well as they allow default to occur prior to maturity. 
Despite all these similarities, it is essential to highlight the differences between 
these models. 
Kim Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993) studied the valuation of risky non 
callable, subordinated and callable bonds. Although they developed a framework 
involving the valuation of a single debt issue, they managed to value 
subordinated debt by slightly modifying the idea developed in the Black and Cox 
(1976) paper, where the junior debt can be seen as a portfolio of suitably 
specified senior debt. Moreover, they allow for stochastic interest rates. 
The additional contribution of Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) lays on the fact 
that they derive simple closed-form solutions for the valuation of both fixed and 
floating rate debt. Additionally, they found that there is a negative correlation 
between the asset values and the interest rates, which is in line with empirical 
evidence, resulting in a reduction of estimated yield spreads. Nevertheless, as in 
Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan they found that the effect of stochastic 
interest rates on yield spreads is quite small. 
On the other hand, the main objective of Brys and Varenne (1997) paper is to 
create a valuation model that would correct some limitations of previous models 
that incorporated stochastic interest rates into their analysis. They claim that their 
valuation model ensures that the payment received by bondholders in case of 
default is not greater than the value of the firm at that time. Moreover, they make 
sure that upon maturity the assets will always be of sufficient value to match the 
face value of the debt, which was not the case in the Longstaff and Schwartz 
(1995) model. 
Another set of models that extended Merton (1974) and Black and Cox (1976) 
valuation models are models developed by Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft 
(1996). These two models extend Black and Cox (1976) valuation model by 
assuming that taxes and bankruptcy costs are not zero, since they include into 
their analysis the effect that they have on debt value. This implies that the value 
of the firrn is no longer identical to the value of the firrn's assets. In their 
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analysis, the value of the fin-n is equal to the value of the fin-n's assets plus the 
value of tax deduction minus the value of bankruptcy costs. 
Specifically, Leland (1994) introduced a model that examines the corporate debt 
values and optimal capital structure in a unified framework as well as it produces 
closed-form solutions relating their values to the firm risk, bankruptcy costs, 
taxes, bond covenants and other parameters. They assume that debt has infinite 
maturity and that the firm pays a non negative coupon continuously that is 
financed entirely by issuing new equity. The fact that in their model debt has 
infinite maturity implies that the return of the principal has no value, which 
allows them to assume time independence of cash flows of debt. This last 
assumption enables them to derive closed form solutions for risky corporate debt 
given capital structure. Last but not least, they consider an environment where 
the lower reorganisation boundary of the firm is deterinined endogenously, 
allowing equityholders optimally to choose the time to default. They argue that at 
each moment the equityholders have the choice of either make the coupon 
payment to bondholders or default their payment, leading the firm to bankruptcy. 
Since equityholders will try to maximise their value they will only meet the 
coupon payments if and only if the value of the firm's assets exceeds the default 
boundary. 
Although, Leland (1994) made a substantial contribution by deriving closed form 
solutions for equity and debt values in the case of endogenous bankruptcy, their 
assumption regarding infinite life debt is restrictive since in practice firms choose 
the maturity as well as the amount of debt. 
In their article, Leland and Toft (1996) extended Leland's model and they 
examined also the effect of debt maturity on bond values, credit spreads and the 
optimal amount of debt. To achieve this, they assume that debt is continuously 
rolled over, implying that the total outstanding debt principal as well as the 
average debt maturity will remain constant at any time as long as the firrn 
remains solvent. The main contribution of this paper is that using the assumption 
that the debt is continuously rolled over enabled them not only to keep the 
assumption of time-independence but also to solve to some extent the problem of 
infinite maturity debt which was present in Leland (1994) analysis. 
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On the other hand, recent studies by Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella- 
Barral and Perraudin (1997) go a bit further, since in their models not only is the 
default barrier determined endogenously but also they take into account the 
strategic bargaining between shareholders and bondholders. Despite their 
similarity in the sense that they both incorporate into their analysis strategic debt 
service, they have some differences that are highlighted below. 
Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) developed a framework in which equity- and 
debtholders interact strategically. They make several assumptions which are 
different from previous models. First of all, they assume that the firm undertakes 
a project that generates cash flows and that the value of firm is assumed to be 
equal to the present value of all future cash flows. Moreover, the interest 
payments are funded by the cash flows of that project and not by asset sales or 
equity issues, which was the case in previous models. Furthermore, they make 
the assumption that the firm cannot issue additional debt once the project starts. 
Last but not least, the main contribution of this paper and its main difference 
compared to the original Merton model is that they allow for renegotiations 
between equity and debtholders. Hence, their model gives the equityholders the 
ability not to pay the full amount of coupon or principal payments, even when 
the cash flows received enables them to fully meet their obligations. They argue 
that since liquidation is costly due to direct and indirect bankruptcy costs, 
equityholders can use that to their advantage. Hence, if the value of the payment 
that the bondholders receive is less than what they would get in case that the firm 
goes bankrupt, they would accept the payment regardless of the fact that it is less 
than the initial contracted amount that they should get. Anderson and Sundaresan 
(1996) found that the incorporation of strategic debt service into the analysis 
produces significantly higher default premia even at small liquidation costs. 
One of the main disadvantages of Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) model is that 
although it enables us to find the equilibrium value of debt it does not provide 
closed form solutions which will improve the speed of the debt value calculation. 
Trying to overcome this limitation, in a later article, Anderson, Sundaresan and 
Tychon (1996) extended the Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) model by building 
its continuous time equivalent. In fact, they obtained analytical closed form 
solution for the value of a perpetual bond that pays coupon continuously. 
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Another model that incorporates strategic negotiations between equity and 
bondholders is the model introduced by Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997). 
Unlike the discrete time finite debt maturity model by Anderson and Sundaresan 
(1996) they used a continuous time contingent claims asset pricing model with 
perpetual debt. They assume that equilyholders can meet their obligations by 
issuing new equity. This gives them the possibility to choose when the firm will 
go bankrupt. If there was no renegotiation, the point of default would be the same 
as in Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996). However, in this model it is 
assumed that if the value of firm's assets is less than the current value of debt, 
the bondholders will not be willing to unwind the firm and the equityholders are 
able to extract a surplus by offering debtholders a payment that is less than the 
promised amount. 
Until this point, all of the structural models described above assume that default 
never comes as a surprise. One of the assumptions made by the Merton model, 
and followed by most of its subsequent models is that the value of the firm's 
assets follows a diffusion process. The implication of this assumption is that 
default can only occur gradually and cannot be caused by a sudden loss due to an 
unpredictable event. Zhou (2001) challenged this idea by assuming that the asset 
value follows both a diffusion and jump process. This allowed him to take into 
account the possibility of sudden defaults that are caused by unforeseen external 
shocks. 
All the above models, except of Brys and Varenne (1997) model, assume that the 
capital structure of the firm remains unchanged until the maturity of debt. 
Furthermore, as mentioned before, with the exception of some cases most of the 
models assume that the value of assets follows a diffusion process. These two 
assumptions imply that as the value of assets increases over time, leverage ratios 
will be expected to decline over time, which contradicts recent empirical findings 
that leverage ratios are stationary or mean-reverting. Specifically, conducting 
empirical research at a firm level, Opler and Titman (1997) concluded that target 
leverage ratios exist within an industry. Moreover, Fisher, Heinkel and Zechner 
(1989) as well as Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001) found that a firm can 
maximize its value if its leverage ratio is within a certain band. Given these 
findings, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) introduced a dynamic 
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restructuring model that extends the original Merton model in two ways. First of 
all, they allow the firm to change its debt, and hence its capital structure, as the 
value of assets changes. This implies that the default boundary is no longer 
assumed to be constant, since it is adjusted to reflect stationary leverage ratios. 
Additionally, the model accounts for stochastic interest rates. They found that 
their model generates higher credit spreads for low leverage firms as well as in 
this case they are less sensitive to firm value changes, which is more in line with 
those observed in practice compared to other structural models. 
Another dynamic restructuring model was developed by Goldstein, Ju and 
Leland (1999). Although they do not assume stochastic interest rates as in Collin- 
Dufresne and Goldstein (2001), they assume that the firm is permitted to increase 
its debt levels. Moreover, unlike all the other structural models described above, 
they use Earnings before Interest and Tax (EBIT) as an alternative to the asset 
value variable. They concluded that by allowing the firm to increase its debt, the 
model produces yield spreads as well as optimal debt levels that are consistent 
with the empirical findings. 
Additionally, Ericsson and Reneby (2001) developed another model where the 
firm is allowed to increase its debt over time. Although the increase in total debt 
is the result of many small debt issues, it is assumed that the growth in debt can 
be approximated by a continuous increase. In their model, the default barrier is 
determined by equityholders as in Leland and Toft (1996) model. The main 
difference is that in Ericsson and Reneby (2001) model the default barrier grows 
exponentially with time along with the total nominal amount. 
2.2.1.3. Testing of structural models 
All the models described above aim to derive closed form solutions for the price 
of debt and equity as well as to calculate the yield spreads. Although, as 
mentioned before, there are some authors who compared the spreads generated 
by their models with observed credit spreads, there have been other studies that 
intend to compare a variety of these models in terms of how well they predict 
yield spreads. 
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Merton model was tested empirically by Jones et al. (1984), implemented 
Merton's model on US corporate bond yields. They found that Merton's model 
produces credit spreads significantly lower than the observed credit spreads. 
Wei and Guo (1997) compared Merton's model with Longstaff and Schwartz 
(1995) model. Using a limited sample of Eurodollar futures, they concluded that 
Merton's model outperforms Longstaff and Schwartz's model in terms of the 
credit spreads they produce. Lyden and Saraniti (2000) test the same two models 
and they conclude that both models overprice bonds. 
Anderson and Sundaresan (2000) compared the perpetual coupon bond models of 
Merton (1974), Leland (1994) and Anderson, Sundaresan and Tychon (1996). 
Using aggregate yield data for the US corporate bond market, they estimate the 
spreads generated by these models for AAA, AA and BBB bonds. They found 
that the models of endogenous bankruptcy produced by Leland (1994) and 
Anderson, Sundaresan and Tychon (1996) generate spreads that are more in line 
with historical observations. 
More recently, Eom, Helwege and Huang (2002) test the performance of five 
structural models: Merton (1974), Geske (1977), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), 
Leland and Toft (1996) and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001). They found 
that structural models do not systematically underpredict credit spreads. They 
conclude that Merton (1974) model predicts low spreads. Nevertheless, they find 
that the newer structural models tend to overpredict spreads for the debt of firms 
with high volatility or high leverage. Except of Leland and Toft (1996) model, 
these models tend to underpredict spreads of safer bonds. 
Therefore, despite previous studies (Jones, Mason and Rosenfeld; 1984), which 
showed that the original Merton model produces yield spreads that are below 
those that are historically observed, the results by Anderson and Sundaresan 
(2000) and Eom, Helwege and Huang (2002) produce mixed results on the 
performance of structural models of credit risk, since they show that in some 
cases the models with endogenous default boundaries can produce Yield spreads 
that are in line with historical credit spreads. Similarly, other empirical studies, 
which were described above (Longstaff and Schwartz; 1995, Anderson and 
Sundaresan; 1996, Leland; 1994, Leland and Toft, 1996, Zhou-, 2001), show that 
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their models can generate credit spreads that are higher compared to those 
generated by the original Merton model. 
Despite the fact that these studies produce encouraging results regarding the 
future of structural models of credit risk, they do not conclude, at least for bonds 
with low maturities, that the credit spreads generated by their models are exactly 
the same as the historical observations. Until recently, many researchers argued 
that this is a strong evidence that the models are wrong. However, the yield 
spreads in all of the above mentioned studies where calculated using models that 
account only for the credit risk of bonds. Hence, these studies do not take into 
account the fact that credit risk is only one of the factors that explain the yield 
spread between risky and non-risky bonds. Therefore, using credit risk models to 
explain the yield spread will result by definition in lower yield spreads than the 
historical observations. 
Recent studies by Delianedis and Geske (2001), Ericsson and Renault (2000) and 
Ericsson and Reneby (2002), Yu(2003) support the idea that the bond yield 
spreads are determined, apart from credit risk, by a number of non credit risk 
factors such as liquidity and tax. 
Recently, Huang and Huang (2003) adopted that idea and attempted to calculate 
the fraction of yield spreads that is due to credit risk. For investment grade and 
junk bonds they calibrated the models of Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), a 
model that incorporates elements by Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), Mella- 
Barral and Perraudin (1997) and Anderson, Sundaresan and Tychon (1996), as 
well as the stationary leverage model of Colin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) by 
standardizing the default probabilities, recovery rates and equity risk premiums 
for different leverage ratios for different credit ratings according to historical 
default loss experience. With empirically reasonable parameter choices, they 
showed that credit risk accounts for only a small fraction of the observed yield 
curves for investment grade bonds. Moreover, they showed that for this category 
of bonds the fraction explained by credit risk is even smaller for short maturity 
bonds. What is more, they found that, in the case of junk bonds, credit risk 
accounts for much higher fraction of the observed yield spreads. Last but not 
least, they showed that different structural models, which in theory can predict 
different credit spreads, in practice produce fairly similar spreads. This result 
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however is in contrast to the Eom, Helwege and Huang (2002) findings, since 
they concluded that different structural models produce relatively different credit 
spreads. 
One conclusion suggested by this review of the literature is that testing of 
structural models is likely to be difficult, since they can under- or over-predict 
credit spreads depending on the particular modelling assumptions and on whether 
other determinants of credit spreads are introduced. This in turn suggests that it is 
important to look not just at credit spreads but also at other predictions of these 
models such as default probabilities or consistency with rating changes, issues 
which are explored in the present thesis. 
2.2.2. Reduced form models 
This approach assumes that the firm's default time is unpredictable and is driven 
by an exogenous variable. The main disadvantage of reduced form models as 
opposed to the structural models is that they lack of clear economic rationale for 
defining the nature of default process. Nevertheless, they are able to model 
complex financial instruments due to their mathematical tractability. 
In particular, in reduced form models, default probability occurs according to an 
exogenous hazard rate, or intensity rate, process that represents the frequency of 
defaults that can occur in a specific time interval. In this setting, default follows a 
jump process. 
There is a large literature on reduced form models that includes Jarrow and 
Turnbull (1995), Jarrow, Lando, and Turnbull (1997), Das and Tufano (1996), 
Madan and Unal (1998), Lando (1998) and Duffle and Singleton (1999). The 
main difference between these models is the specification of the hazard rate, with 
models going from the most simple hazard rate to hazard rate that is linked to the 
to the risk-free rate or the recovery rate at default. I 
2.2.2.1. The application of the hazard rate process 
In the reduced form models, the time t price of a defaultable zero coupon bond 
with maturity t can be represented as follows: 
I The analysis provided in this Section is based on the Uhrig-Homburg (2002) literature survey. 
For more detailed analysis of the reduced form models refer to Uhrig-Homburg (2002) and 
Cossin and Pirotte (2000). 
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u(t, T) = p(t, TXV + (I 
- 
ýo)Q(r >- T)) [2.12] 
where p(t, T) is the price of an otherwise identical default-free zero coupon bond 
and 
((p + (o)Q(z- > T)) is the expected payment at matunty, with (p being the 
recovery rate and 
(Q(z- >- T)) being the n sk neutral survival probability. 
To price the risky coupon bond, the default time -c needs to be specified. Since, 
reduced form models assume that default is a surprise event, to model the default 
time T, an adequate "jump" process needs to be specified. 
Default time comes after the first jump N(t) 
--:: lfr! s; tl. N(t) can be represented as 
follows: 
t 
N(t) 
= 
M(t) + fA(S)ds 
0 
[2.13] 
where M(t) is a martingale under the risk-neutral measure Q and A(t) is a non 
negative predictable stochastic process called intensity. 
As mentioned before, reduced form models differ in their assumptions 
concerning the default intensity. 
Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) model use the simplest specification, since they 
assume that the default intensity A is constant. In this case, the default time'r can 
be interpreted as the first jump of a Poison process with parameter A. In their 
model, they use default-free and defaultable term structures to obtain unique risk 
neutral and martingale default probabilities. One main disadvantage of Jarrow 
and Turnbull (1995) model is that they do not allow the credit quality of the 
bonds to change up to the default event. This limitation led to the development of 
new models. 
Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997) provide an extension of the Jarrow and 
Turnbull (1995) model, since they consider different credit classes and allow for 
both worsening and improving credit quality. The transition from one rating class 
to another is described by a stationary Markov chain. The main advantage of this 
model rests in its great flexibility to calculate the parameters to observable data. 
Nevertheless, due to the assumption of deterministic default intensity for a given 
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rating together with the assumption of constant recovery rates, under this model 
changes in the credit spreads are only due to changes in ratings, even if evidence 
suggests that there is highly volatility in credit spreads of given rating classes. 
One way to overcome this problem is to assume stochastic recovery rates as Das 
and Tufano (1996) and Madal and Unal (1998). The main advantage of these 
models is that credit spreads can change over time even if the rating remains 
constant. Nevertheless, these models are more complex to implement. 
One of the most crucial assumptions of these reduced forin models is the 
independence between the interest rate risk and timing risk of default. Although, 
due to this assumption, a more mathematically tractable model is obtained, the 
correlation between the interest rate risk and default is important. Lando (1998) 
relaxes the assumption of independence between default time and evolution of 
default free interest rate and presents a general modeling fTamework in which the 
default time is modeled through a Cox process. A second reduced form model 
that deals with correlations is the model by Duffle and Singleton (1999). They 
assume that the intensity parameter A depends on the level of interest rates across 
time. 
2.2.2.2. Testing of reduced form models 
Some of the academic literature deals with the testing the performance of 
reduced form models to explain prices and the ten'n structure of credit spreads. 
Monkkonen (1998) compares six variations of reduced form models using the 
basic model of Jarrow and Tumbull as the benchmark model. The alternative 
models allow the default probability to depend on the risk free interest rate or 
they assume a stochastic recovery rate or both. He finds that results are similar 
only for short maturity bonds. Moreover, he shows that for investment grade 
bonds results remain almost the same across the different models, regardless of 
the assumptions for the relationship between default time, recovery rate and risk 
free interest rate. 
Duffee (1999) provides an empirical study of reduced form models. He finds that 
the parameters based on Duffie and Singleton (1997) model change dramatically 
when they are calibrated to firms with different credit ratings. 
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2.3. Prediction of default and transition probabilities 
Up to this point, in the above review of previous theoretical and empirical studies 
the focus has been on the use of reduced form and structural models for the 
calculation of prices for defaultable bonds and the prediction of yield spreads. 
Nevertheless, the accurate prediction of default and transition probabilities has 
become an increasingly important issue to regulators, investors and financial 
institutions. While the core measure of credit quality remains the ratings 
provided by rating agencies, like Moody's and Standard & Poors, agency ratings 
are adjusted only slowly in response to changes in firms' financial situation and 
business performance. Ratings have also proved quite inadequate for prediction 
of the collapse of several large companies, like Enron and Parmalat. These 
acknowledged weaknesses underpin the widespread interest in models that aim to 
timely predict changes in agency credit ratings. This Section provides an 
overview of the academic and industry models for the prediction of default and 
transition probabilities. 
Delianedis and Geske (1999) attempted to compute risk neutral probabilities of 
default using the diffusion models of Merton and Geske. They argued that risk 
neutral probabilities of default might be more accurate than the actual 
probabilities of default due to the fact that they do not require an estimate of the 
firm's drift. The results were quite encouraging since they found that rating 
migrations or defaults can be detected months in advance. 
One main disadvantage of this approach is that the risk neutral probabilities 
cannot be directly compared with historical default probabilities recorded by 
Moody's, since the latter represent real probabilities of default. Therefore, it is 
difficult to test the accuracy of these estimated risk neutral default probabilities. 
Taking a different approach, Leland (2004) estimates the real default 
probabilities produced by different structural models. He compares the 
exogenous default boundary model of Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) with the 
endogenous default boundary model of Leland and Toft (1996) in terms of the 
Expected Default Frequencies (EDFs) they produce. The aim of the study is to 
compare the two models and ultimately to determine the difference in the 
Expected Default Frequency (EDF) if an endogenous default boundary is 
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introduced. He showed that the endogenous default boundary model produces 
real default probabilities which are in line with the historical default 
probabilities, at least for long maturity bonds. For short maturity bonds, however, 
the model underestimates the historically observed default probabilities. 
2.3.2. Proprietary models 
Apart from Leland's (2004) work, who applied different theoretical structural 
models to calculate Expected Default Frequencies (EDFs), the increased interest 
in the prediction of default probabilities lead to the development of popular 
proprietary models, such as the Moody's KMV (MKMV) and BARRA models. 
2.3.2.1. KMV model 
This model has been developed by KMV Corporation, which is now part of 
Moody's, and its main purpose is to produce a firm specific Expected Default 
Frequency (EDF TM ) based on the structural approach. It is argued, that the main 
advantage of this model is that it produces EDF TM that is a forward looking 
measure of actual default probability, since apart from balance sheet data they 
use the firm's equity price in order to predict firm's default probability. 
According to KMV, the calculation of EDF TM can be summarized into the 
following three steps: 
STEP P Estimation of the asset value and volatilitE using an option price base 
approach. 
KMV model is based on Merton's (1974) structural model, where default is 
triggered by the capital structure of the firm. As an extension of Merton's model, 
KMV assumes a more realistic capital structure which is constituted of long term 
debt (infinite maturity), short-term debt (instantaneous maturity), convertible 
preferred shares and common stock. In this case, default occurs when the value 
of the firm's assets falls below an ad hoc default trigger level K, which is defined 
as follows: 
K= Short-tenn debt + 1/2Long-tenn debt [2.14] 
Following the Merton model, KMV methodology estimates the value and 
volatility of assets from the market value and volatility of equity using an option 
pricing base approach (equity is viewed as a call option on the firrn's assets with 
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strike price K). To estimate the value and the volatility of assets two approaches 
can be followed. 
According to the first approach, the following two equations (2.15 and 2.16) can 
be solved simultaneously and using an iterative technique the value and volatility 
of assets can be calculated: 
1ý 
= 
Tý N(d, )_ Ke -rT N(d2) [2.15] 
Ue 
= 
N(d, ) 
Va 
,a [2.16] Ve 
where: 
Va is the value of finn's assets, V, is the value of finn's equity, r is the risk-free 
rate, ca is the volatility of firm's assets, T is the time to maturity and 
d1= 
U2 
log V' +r+"T K2 [2.17] 
l7a 
-ýT 
d2 
= 
d, 
- 
Ca 
-ýT [2.18] 
Nevertheless, due to the fact that the second equation holds instantaneously 
MKMV proposes another procedure to extract the value and volatility of a firm's 
asset. Using a complex iterative procedure, MKMV uses only equation 2.15 for 
the estimation of the unknown parameters. 
STEP 2: Calculation ofDistance to Default LýQD) 
At this stage, taking as inputs the value and the volatility of assets, the distance to 
default measure can be calculated. The distance to default is the number of 
standard deviations that the firm's asset value is away from default. 
In 
Va 
+ua2T 
K2 
DD 
= VýT- 
where U is the expected return of the finn's assets. 
[2.19] 
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STEP 3: Calculation of ýMected default fre! yuencv (EDE) 
Instead of calculating default probabilities using N(-DD), as in the Merton case, 
KMV takes an alternative approach in order to correct for any biases that might 
result from the use of Merton model. Based on historical default and bankruptcy 
frequencies, using a huge database of more than 250,000 firms and 4,700 
incidents of default, they calibrate the EDFs to match historical default data. This 
is done by estimating the proportion of firins with a given DD that actually 
TM defaulted in the past and use that proportion as the corresponding EDF 
Although KMV Corporation claims that this model can actually predict default 
months in advance as well as that it can be applied with the same success in other 
countries apart from US, there is no independent study until now that tested the 
validity of that statement. This is due to the fact that MKMV model calculates 
EDF TM using a huge historical default database, which is not available for public 
use. 
2.3.2.2. BARRA model 
An alternative to the MKMV model is the use of debt market information in the 
estimation of credit risk, which may be more informative since bond spreads 
directly reflect the compensation required by investors for the risk due to credit 
rating changes and default. Although both structural and reduced form models 
can be used to obtain estimates of default probabilities from bond market data we 
present one of the most widely used, the proprietary model of BARRA that 
derives market implied ratings using the information from bond spreads. 
This model is based on the assumption that on average the agency ratings are 
informative. It develops a mapping between observed bond spreads and ratings. 
From this mapping those issuers with implied ratings that differ markedly from 
their actual agency rating can be identified. This then leads to predictions of 
rating changes. The main advantage of this model, as in MKMV model, is that 
the ratings can be derived on a continuous basis and are taking advantage of the 
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infonnation regarding the credit quality of the firm that is already reflected in 
bond prices. 
The BARRA model uses option-adjusted spreads for the derivation of market 
implied rating. Moreover, it uses issuers rather than individual bond issues. The 
spread of an issuer is computed as the average of the spreads of the issuer's 
outstanding bonds. Then, using the average spread per issuer, a distribution of 
the average issuer spreads over different rating categories is constructed. 
BARRA shows that the resulting distribution of issuer average spreads exhibits 
large overlaps between individual ratings sub-distributions, observing a wide 
range of different ratings for the same average spread. The BARRA model does 
not try to explain these differences, rather it tries to use them to develop an 
implied classification and hence predict future ratings changes. The main 
estimation challenge in computing the implied ratings is to determine a sequence 
of spreads bAAA/AA, bAA/A, bA/BBBetc. that correspond to the boundaries between 
rating classes. Thus for example any issuer with an average spread sj that lies 
between bAAA/AAand bAA/Awill have an implied rating of AA; any issuer with an 
average spread bAA/Aand bA/BBBwill have an implied rating of A; etc. 
More formally we can write these thresholds for the implied ratings as the vector 
b which can be represented as follows: 
b= (b', b', b', b', b', b' 
-0-I-2-3-4-5 
- 
(b, b2 
, 
b3 
, 
b4 
, 
b5 
, 
b6 
) 
[2.20] 
= 
(bAmlAA, bAAI 
A, 
bAlBBB, bBBB / BB, 
bBBIB, bBICCC) 
To determine the vector b, the model minimises a penalty function that measures 
the gap between the observed spread sj and the rating class boundaries, for any 
issuer j whose implied classification is different from its actual agency 
classification. The penalty function can be represented as below: 
P(b) wj * (sj 
- 
bi(j) wj (b, -. ( i j) - sj [2.21] 
where: 
agency rating index of issuer J 
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sj : spread of issuer j 
bj- : lower threshold for implied rating index I 
bj+ : upper threshold for implied rating index I 
total number of issuers in the universe 
NI number of issuers with rating I 
N 
Wj 
-- Ni(j) weight which is chosen to equalize the contribution of each rating 
bucket to the total penalty function. 
The "plus" signs at the end of each parenthesis mean that the term is taken into 
account if and only if it is positive, i. e. only if the observed credit spread is 
respectively above or below the range of spreads consistent with the agency 
rating i6) of issuerj. 
The values of vector b that minimize the penalty function are the implied 
classification thresholds. 
The main drawbacks of BARRA model is that it assumes a flat credit spread 
yield curve. However, they address the issue and show that even if one splits the 
sample for similar maturity bonds or for bonds in different industries the results 
obtained do not change substantially. 2 
2.3.2. Econometric models 
Econometric models, or credit scoring models, are traditional models used for the 
prediction of default. They are quantitative models that rely on mathematical and 
statistical tecfmiques. 3 
Fisher (1936) introduced the concept of discriminant analysis and Durant (1941) 
used discriminant analysis to separate good and bad consumer loans. 
A full description of BARRA model can be found on the paper "Market implied ratings", by 
Breger, Goldberg and Cheyette published in BARRA website: 
(www. barra. com/sui)poi-t/libraly/credit/market implied ratin2s. nd 
The paper has also been published at Risk Magazine, July 2003. 
3 This Section provides an overview of the econometric techniques developed for the prediction 
of default. For a more detailed review of the credit scoring models refer to De Servigny and 
Renault (2004). 
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Beaver (1967) created bankruptcy prediction models and Altman (1968) 
introduced multiple discriminant credit scoring analysis. He developed a credit 
scoring system, called Z-score- The model uses a list of accounting ratios and 
multiple discriminant analysis to distinguish the accounting ratios that are more 
useful in the prediction of default. In principle, discriminant analysis estimates a 
function which can assign an observation to the correct population. Historical 
accounting and economic data are used to derive the discriminant function that 
will discriminate firms by placing them in one of the two populations. 
Martin (1977), Ohlson (1980) and Wiginton (1980) were the firsts to introduce 
logit analysis for bankruptcy prediction. 
Currently, the most widespread credit scoring techniques are: the logit/probit 
model, and the multiple discriminant analysis models. However, since Martin 
(1977) demonstrated that the discriminant analysis is just a special case of logit 
analysis, most of the current studies use the multinomial logit model for the 
prediction of default. 
2.4. Empirical comparison of different models 
The increased interest in credit risk modelling necessitates the empirical 
comparison different models on their performance in predicting bond and default 
probabilities. Sections 2.1,2.2. and 2.3. provide an overview of the current 
literature on the testing of structural and reduced form models respectively. 
Although these empirical studies provide guidance on the performance of 
theoretical structural and reduced form models separately, they do not answer the 
question on which type of model is better for the derivation of corporate bond 
yields or the prediction of default probabilities. In this section we offer a 
description of the current studies on the comparison of different models. 
Hillegeist et al (2004) compare the Altman's Z-Score and OhIson's O-Score to 
the market based Merton/Black and Scholes model in terms of their ability to 
accurately predict corporate bankruptcy. They conclude that the market based 
structural default measure has more infon-nation relative to the traditional 
statistical measures for the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. 
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Du and Suo (2003) investigate the empirical performance of credit rating 
prediction based on Merton's (1974) structural credit risk model. They conclude 
that the distance to default measure, calculated by Merton's model, is not 
sufficient for the accurate prediction of credit ratings. They also find that a 
simple reduced fon-n model outperforms Merton's model. 
Bharath and Shurnway (2004) study compares a simple Merton model with the 
hazard model of Shurnway (2001). They conclude that the hazard rate model 
performs slightly better than the Merton model for the prediction of defaults. 
Arora, Bohn and Zhu (2005) empirically compare two structural models; the 
basic Merton model and Vasicek-Kealhofer model with the Hull and White 
(2000) reduced form model based on their ability to discriminate defaulters from 
non defaulters. They find that Vasicek-Kealhofer and Hull and White models 
outperform the simple Merton model. 
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CHAPTER 3: Structural models and the 
prediction of default probabilities 
Abstract of Chapter 3 
In this chapter, three main structural models of default, Merton model, Longstaff 
and Schwartz model and Leland and Toft model, are compared in terms of the 
expected default frequencies (EDFs) they produce. We compare the EDFs 
produced by these models to the observed actual default probabilities reported by 
Moody's for the BBB, BB and B rated bonds. We find that none of the models 
can accurately predict the default probabilities in all cases. Merton as well as 
Leland and Toft models underpredict default probabilities in all cases. Longstaff 
and Schwartz model although it produces in some cases EDFs that are close to 
the observed ones, it suffers from important limitations. The model tends to 
overestimate the default probabilities of riskier bonds as well as the default 
probabilities of bonds with the same rating but higher equity volatility. 
Consistent with previous studies, it is found that structural models tend to 
underestimate the default probabilities in early years. 
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3.1. Introducfion 
In this chapter, we examine the differences in expected default frequencies 
(EDFs) produced by different structural models. Three main structural models; 
Merton model, Longstaff and Schwartz model and Leland and Toft model, are 
compared. 
As described in Chapter 2, during the last years, there has been considerable 
work on the comparison of different structural models in terms of the tenn 
structure of credit spreads they generate (or equivalently the term structure of 
risk-neutral default probabilities) i. e. the comparison of the pricing predictions of 
structural credit risk models. In contrast, aside from Leland (2004) there appears 
to be have been no academic research on the comparison of the term structure of 
real default probabilities or Expected Default Frequencies (EDFs) produced by 
4 different structural model S. 
There are two reasons why this question is of interest. First of all the prediction 
of default is of at least as much interest as the use of structural models for 
pricing. Default probabilities and associated rating transition probabilities are 
central to the calculation of credit value at risk, as in CreditMetrics or KMV 
Credit Monitor framework. With the new Basel Accord, banks will be able to use 
internal models to assign default probabilities on individual borrowers and hence 
to internally assess their economic capital. Therefore, there is a great need for the 
empirical testing and validation of the existing credit risk models in order to 
assess their ability to adequately help banks model default and credit rating 
changes. 
Secondly previous studies of structural models of credit risk pricing obtain mixed 
results on the ability of structural models to produce spreads that are in line with 
those observed in the market. 5 The main consensus is that the structural models 
4 The term real default probability is used to indicate that we estimate real-world default 
probabilities as opposed to risk-neutral default probabilities. Real world default probabilities are 
calculated from historical data while the risk neutral default probabilities are backed out from 
bond prices. We focus on real world default probabilities since they are comparable to the actual 
default probabilities reported by Moody's. For the rest of the paper the terms default probability, 
real default probability and expected default frequencies are used interchangeably. 
5 Anderson and Sundaresan (2000) compared the perpetual coupon bond models of Merton 
(1974), Leland (1994) and Anderson, Sundaresan and Tychon (1996) and they found that the last 
two models that define the default boundary endogenously are generating spreads that are more 
in line with historical observations compared to the original Merton model. Lyden and Saraniti 
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underpredict credit spreads. 6 This could be interpreted as suggesting either that 
structural models are inadequate for measuring credit risk or, as suggested by 
recent studies, or that credit risk is only one of the components that explain yield 
spreads 
.7 If structural models provide to be adequate for the prediction of actual 
default probabilities, then this gives greater credence to the view that the models 
themselves are sound but that credit spreads are determined by other factors such 
as tax or liquidity. 
Two other types of models 
- 
apart from the structural credit risk models 
- 
have 
been proposed in the literature for the prediction of default and migration 
probabilities. The first approach is the so called 'accounting based' approach, 
pioneered by Altman (1968) in his use of discriminant analysis. There are other 
types of accounting based models include logit and neural network models. In 
these cases only past accounting data of the firm is used in order to calculate the 
default probability of a firm. 
The more recent groups of credit risk measurement models are the reduced-form 
models and the finn-value-based models or structural models. The former set of 
models calculates the risk-neutral probability of default using information from 
the bond prices. 8 In the latter set of models default is triggered by changes in 
asset values and hence captured in the capital structure of the firm. Merton 
(1974) pioneered the structural credit risk models. He used the option pricing 
theory developed by Black and Scholes (1973) in the valuation of default risk 
spreads of fixed income instruments. Many of the models now used by the 
practitioners, such as KMV model and CreditMetrics, are variants of the original 
Merton model. Each approach has advantages and disadvantages. Reduced form 
models can more easily account for the observed credit spreads, especially at 
(2000) implement Merton and Longstaff and Schwartz model. They find that both models 
underpredict credit spreads. Eom, Helwege and Huang (2003) compare Merton, Geske, Longstaff 
and Schwartz, Leland and Toft as well as Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein. They conclude that 
Merton and Geske model underpredict credit spreads. Contrary to previous research, they 
conclude that the rest of the models considerably overpredict credit spreads. 
6 See Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001), Huang and Huang (2000), Collin-Dufresne, 
Goldstein and Martin (2001), Ericsson and Renault (2001), Perraudm and Taylor (2002). 
Houweling, Mentink and Vorst (2002), and Yu (2003). 
7 Elton, Gruber. Agrawal and Mann (2001), Huang and Huang (2000), Collin-Dufresne, 
Goldstein and Martin (2001), Ericsson and Renault (2001). Perraudin and Taylor (2002), 
Houweling, Mentink and Vorst (2002). Yu (2003). 
8 Duffie and Singleton (1997), Duffee (1999), Das and Tufano (1996), Jarrow, Lando, Turnball 
(1997), Madan and Unal (1998), Duffle and Lando (2001) are some of the reduced-fomi models. 
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short-maturities, but calibration from risk-neutral to actual default probabilities 
remains a challenge. Structural approaches produce direct estimates of default, 
but as explored in this paper the standard structural models have difficulty 
explaining some features of default. 
In this chapter, we focus on the comparison of the default predictions of different 
structural models and we build on Leland's (2004) work. 9 In his study, he 
compares the EDFs produced by Longstaff and Schwartz (LS) and Leland and 
Toft (LT) models for A, BBB and B rated bonds. He allows the models to differ 
only in ten-ns of the default barriers they assume, by choosing common inputs 
(including asset volatility) across models. He finds that in all rating categories 
the endogenous default boundary model of Leland and Toft produces real default 
probabilities which are in line with the historical default probabilities at least for 
long maturity bonds. For LS model, he concludes that when its exogenous 
default boundary is chosen so as it matches the recovery rate of the endogenous 
default boundary of LT model, the model can also accurately predict the 
observed long-term default probabilities. Nevertheless, Leland (2004) shows that 
both Leland and Toft and Longstaff and Schwartz models tend to underestimate 
the short-term default probabilities. 
Although, Leland's (2004) study provides useful insights on the impact of the 
different default boundaries (exogenous or endogenous) on the predicted EDFs, 
it does not answer what is arguably the more important question, of how well 
these different models perform as predictors of default, given available 
observable data on equity values and equity volatility. The main contributions of 
this study relative to Leland's are as follows. First, we examine how well the LT 
and LS models predict actual default frequencies when asset volatility differs 
across the models (whereas Leland (2004) imposes the same asset volatility in all 
models). For each model, we compute the unobserved asset values and volatility 
based on observable leverage, equity values and volatility, using an iterative 
method to obtain the implied parameters. Leland (2004) instead estimates the 
asset volatilities per rating class by finding the asset volatilities that best match 
9 Since this study has been completed, a paper by Tarashev (2005) has evaluated the empirical 
performance of six structural credit risk models by comparing the probabilities of default they 
deliver to ex post default rates. He concludes that the probabilities of default implied by some of 
the models match well the ex post default rates. 
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the actual default probabilities (apparently at a 10 year horizon). He, then, uses 
these estimated levels of asset volatility per rating class as common inputs to 
both LT and LS models for the estimation of default probabilities. His estimated 
asset volatilities for BBB, A and B rated bonds match the estimated asset 
volatilities of Schaefer and Strebulaev (2004). 10 
Despite the fact that the asset volatilities used by Leland (2004) are empirically 
reasonable, as explained they have been calibrated on the LT model to match 
empirical default over a 10 year horizon, a fair comparison with other models 
(e. g. LS) would require that the asset volatility for other models are calibrated 
separately in a similar fashion, something which Leland (2004) does not do. We 
allow the models to differ in terms of the asset volatility they produce (since 
asset volatility is unobservable) and calibrate to the observed equity volatilities 
for each rating class (see below Section 3.5 for a quantitative comparison). The 
choice of asset value and volatility is particularly critical for the LT model, since 
the default barrier is endogenous and depends on asset volatility. 
A second contribution of our study compared to Leland (2004) is that we 
examine the sensitivity of the models' predictions to different levels of equity 
volatility within the same credit rating. This is of interest since equity volatility 
varies considerably over time. It is therefore worthwhile assessing the sensitivity 
of the models to changes of the equity volatility as a further key element that 
affects default probabilities. 
The analysis then answers two main questions: 
1. How different and accurate are the Expected Default Frequencies (EDFs) 
produced by different models assuming data input (equity volatility and 
market value leverage appropriate for BBB, BB and B rated bonds), as 
we move from the original Merton model to more sophisticated models 
that incorporate more realistic economic considerations and define the 
value of assets, volatility of assets and default barrier in a different way? 
2. How do different assumptions about equity volatilities within each rating 
class affect the level and accuracy of EDFs produced by different 
10 Schaefer and Strebulaev (2004) use an empirical sample and estimate asset volatilities for 
different rating classes. 
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models? Here we focus on the LS model, since it turns out that the EDFs 
of the LT model are not very sensitive to equity volatilities. 
The analysis of the paper is arranged as follows. The following section describes 
the models that are used in the comparison (with further technical details 
provided in Appendix B). Section 3 describes the formulas used for the 
estimation of the real default probabilities as well as the iterative technique used 
to estimate the two unobservable variables, the value and the volatility of assets. 
The estimation of these variables is vital for the prediction of default 
probabilities. Section 4 provides the parameter values that will be used for the 
estimation of the real default probabilities for the three models, including the 
mapping from the different rating categories. Section 5 shows the results and 
compares the term structure of EDFs produced by the models with the observed 
real default probabilities reported by Moody's for the BBB, BB and B rated 
bonds. Moreover, it presents the change in the term structure of EDFs produced 
by Longstaff and Schwartz model using different assumed equity volatilities to 
all rating categories of bonds. Finally, Section 6 summarises and concludes, 
discussing limitations of the analysis as well as routes for further research. 
3.2. Theoretical framework 
Throughout the chapter, except in Merton case which assumes a zero-coupon 
bond issue so that default can only occur at bond maturity, the firm is assumed to 
issue coupon paying finite maturity bonds. Moreover, we will assume that one 
firm has one risky bond. This implies that the firm has only one class of risky 
debt. Although this is an unrealistic assumption, it helps us to focus on the 
questions mentioned above and not on the issues arising from the seniority of 
bonds. The assumption of the discrete time does not allow us to use in the 
comparison some other continuous time models such as Anderson, Sundaresan, 
Tychon or Mella-Barral Perraudin. Hence, we restrict the comparison to three 
models: Merton model, Longstaff and Schwartz (LS) model and Leland and Toft 
(LT) model. 
The original Merton model assumes that default can occur only at the date of 
maturity if and only if the value of assets is lower than the face value of debt. 
Merton (1974) model for coupon bonds would be more appropriate for the direct 
49 
comparison with the LS and LT models but it cannot be used due to its 
assumption of infinite maturity debt. Although, we cannot eliminate the fact that 
the original Merton model assumes that default can only occur at maturity, we 
can use a modified Merton model in the calculation of default probabilities in 
order to allow for the estimation of real default probabilities. 
As in the original Merton case, in this model, we assume that equity is a call 
option on the value of assets with strike price the default point. In addition, the 
default point is determined exogenously and is assumed to be the principal value 
of debt, P. 
The finn's equity value can be represented as follows: 
Tý 
= 
V,, N(dj) 
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Pe -, T N(d2) 1 
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U2 
log V' +r+"T p2 
d, 
- 
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= 
d, 
- 
Ca 
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where V, is the value of assets, Pis the total value of debt, T is the time to 
maturity and 07a is the asset volatility. 
The point where this modified Merton model is differentiated with respect to the 
original model is the way the Expected Default Frequency is calculated. As 
explained later in the chapter, instead of calculating the probability of default as 
N(-d2), the real default probability for this model is calculated using the Distance 
to Default (DD) measure that includes the actual drift ýt (equals the asset risk 
premium plus the risk-free interest rate) instead of the risk-free interest rate. This 
allows us to derive real default probability instead of a risk neutral default 
probability estimate. 
Longstaff and Schwartz model extends the original Merton model in two ways. 
First of all, they derive a closed fonn solution for the valuation of risky coupon 
bond with finite maturity. Moreover, they relax the assumption of constant 
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interest rate and they assume that interest rates are stochastic. In this model. 
default occurs when the value of assets hits a lower threshold point, which is a 
fraction of the total value of debt. Moreover, the default barrier is determined 
exogenously and is equal to a fraction of the face value of debt. In our analysis, 
the fraction will be assumed to be 0.60 as in Huang and Huang (2003). " 
In Leland and Toft model although the interest rate is assumed to be constant, the 
default barrier is determined endogenously. Default occurs when the asset value 
falls below that barrier. This model is an extension of Black and Cox (1976) and 
Leland (1994) models, which assume perpetual debt, but this model assumes that 
debt is continuously rolled over. This assumption implies that the average debt 
maturity remains constant, which allows us to compare this model with the other 
models of finite maturity debt. 
Moreover, as described in the literature review in this model the decision not to 
pay the contracted amount and hence to default is made by managers, who try to 
maximize equity value. The decision to default or not default is at the 
equityholder's hands since they can meet coupon payments by additional equity 
contributions even if asset values are low. Hence, the default barrier is 
determined endogenously and it is the point that maximizes both the value of the 
equity and the value of the firm subject to the limited liability of equity. 
Appendix B offers a detailed description of Longstaff & Schwartz as well as 
Leland and Toft models. 
3.3. Calculation of real default probabilities 
The objective of this chapter is to calculate the real default probabilities produced 
by the three structural models. For the modified Merton model, the real default 
probability is given using the following equation. 
11 In their paper, Longstaff and Schwartz assume that that the default boundary is the face value 
of debt. Nevertheless, it is argued that this assumption is not reasonable since many firms 
continue to operate even after the asset value falls below the face value of debt. We follow Huang 
and Huang (2003) and assume that the Longstaff and Schwartz's default boundary is a fraction of 
the face value of debt, which is assumed to be 0.60. This is an empirically reasonable assumption, 
given empirical findings of recovery rates and bankruptcy costs for senior bonds (see for example 
Duffie and Singleton (2003) Figure 6.1). 
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where VO is current value of assets, and 15 is the payout rate. 
It is worthwhile to mention that this model differs from the original Merton 
model in the way the Expected Default Frequency is calculated. Instead of 
calculating the probability of default as N(-d2), the real default probability for 
this model is calculated using the Distance to Default (DD) measure that includes 
the actual drift ýt (equals the asset risk premium plus the risk-free interest rate) 
instead of the risk-free interest rate. This is crucial, since failure to include the 
actual drift g, will result in a risk-neutral probability of default. 
For the Longstaff and Schwartz as well as the Leland and Toft model the default 
probability can be determined as follows 12 : 
EDF 
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where b= In 
La 
and Vb will denote the default boundary level. Vb 
The reason why we cannot use the above equation for the Merton model is 
because the above equation denotes the cumulative default probability and as it is 
12 Refer to Leland (2004). 
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explained before Merton model does not give the possibility of default before the 
maturity day. 
It is clear that in order to determine the EDFs, except of the parameter values 
given in the previous section we need to calculate three more parameters: the 
default boundary, the value of assets, the volatility of assets. 
3.3.1. Calculation of default barrier 
For Merton and LS models the determination of the default barrier value is 
straightforward as described in Section 2. For the LT model the default barrier is 
determined endogenously and will be calculated together with the value and the 
volatility of assets. This is summarized in the following Table 1.13 
Table 1: Default barriers for Merton, Longstaff and Schwartz and Leland and Toft models 
Merton-KMV Face value of debt, P 
Longstaff and Schwartz Fraction of face value of debt: 0.6*P 
Leland and Toft (Clr)(AI(rT) 
- 
B) 
- 
API(rT) 
- 
zC x1r V * 
L T+ 
ac 
- 
a)B 
3.3.2. Calculation of value and volatility of assets 
As it is described above, the tenn structure of EDFs produced by the three 
models for three categories of firms, BBB, BB and B rated will be calculated. 
Additionally, within each rating category we investigate two cases of equity 
volatility. This means that there are six cases: BBB firms with 25% equity 
volatility, BBB finns with 30% equity volatility, BB rated finns with 35% equity 
volatility, BB finns with 40% equity volatility, B rated finns with 45% equity 
volatility and B rated bonds with 50% equity volatility. 
Due to the fact that Merton model does not allow for an early bankruptcy, since 
default can only happen at maturity, the value and the volatility of assets will be 
estimated in each case 10 times, for this model. Hence, each point in the graphs, 
for the Merton model, will represent the probability that a zero-coupon bond with 
maturity t=I to t= 10 will default. This is not the case for the LS and LT 
13 Refer to Appendix B for a detailed description of Leland and Toft model. 
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models, where the value and volatility of assets is estimated once for each case 
assuming a ten year debt maturity. This reason together with the fact that we are 
using different formulas for the calculation of Merton's and LS-LT's default 
probabilities, explain why EDFs produced by Merton model are not directly 
comparable to the EDFs produced by LS and LT models. 
The estimation of the value and the volatility of assets can be done by solving the 
following equations simultaneously: 
Ist equation: The function for the value of equity. This is calculated using 
equation 3.1 for Merton model and for LT and LS models as follows: 
V,, 
-B, [3.6] 
where B is the value of a risky bond and is defined differently between the two 
structural models. The computations for the risky bonds and equity values are 
presented analytically in Appendix B for LS and LT models. 
2 nd equation: From Ito's lemma, we can extract a formula that connects volatility 
of equity to the volatility of assets. Hence, the second equation used is: 
Ce = 07 
a* 
Va Ve 
[3.7] 
Ve Va 
It is clear that in the above fonnula the partial derivative of the value of equity to 
the value of assets will be different across models and will be calculated from the 
first equation. For the special case of Merton model, since the value of equity can 
be represented by a call option, the partial derivative of the value of equity to the 
value of assets is equal to the N(dj), where d, is given by equation 3.2. 
3 rd equation: The default barrier equation for LT model. As described above this 
is due to the fact that in LT model the default barrier is determined 
endogenously. 
In the case of Merton and LS models we have two equations and two unknowns 
and in LT model we solve three equations with 2 unknowns. In all cases, having 
as inputs all the parameter values described in the following section, the value 
and the volatility of assets are calculated using an iterative technique in Matlab. 
In particular, Newton 
- 
Raphson iterations are used in order to derive these 
values. The results ftom the iterative technique are provided at the end of the 
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paper in Appendix A, while the tables and figures of the estimated probabilities 
of default are given in Section 5 together with their interpretation. 
3.4. Parameter and input values 
At this point it is useful to determine the values of the parameters and assumed 
input values needed for the calculation real default probabilities. Our aim is to 
select empirically reasonable parameter values, where possible consistent with 
those typical of those observed for companies within each rating category. Since, 
the term structure of EDFs produced by the models will be compared with the 
default probabilities provided by Moody's for bonds over the period of 1970- 
1997, the chosen parameter values should represent those that applied over that 
period. In most of the parameter choices, we follow Huang and Huang (2003) 
and Leland (2004) papers. 14 For several of these parameters a range of values is 
observed within each rating class. Our goal has been to select representative 
values for three rating classes (BBB, BB, B) and also to explore the sensitivity to 
changes in these values, especially to changes in equity volatility. 
Consider first those parameters and inputs that are common to all three models: 
Value of equity, Ve: The value of equity for all cases is taken to be 100. 
This is simply a non-nalization, although lower rated firms tend to be 
smaller than higher rated firms, the default predictions of the various 
models depend only leverage and volatility measured as a proportion of 
the market value of equity. 
2. Riskless interest rate, r. - this is assumed to be 8%, which is the historical 
average of Treasury bills for the period of 1973-1998. 
3. Asset risk premium, A. - This is assumed to be 4%, as in Leland (2004). 
Alternatively it would be possible to derive the asset risk premium is 
derived from the equity risk premium, which can in turn be expected to 
differ according to rating category (lower rated firms might for example 
have greater correlation with market). We could have assumed different 
14 Data for the observed real default probabilities has been collected from Moody's Investor 
Services: "Historical default rates of corporate bond issuers, 1920-1997", Special Comment, 
1998. 
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asset risk premiums for the BBB, BB and B rated bonds basing these on 
an equity pricing model. 
4. Volatility of equity, Ce : There is no standard information on the equity 
volatilities of an average fin-n in different credit ratings. In order to be 
able to choose reasonable parameters for the equity volatility, daily equity 
prices of 20 BB rated US bonds and 16 B rated US bonds that are 
currently traded have been collected from Bloomberg. All these bonds are 
non perpetual non convertible and non callable bonds, with fixed coupon. 
In the majority of the firms, daily prices for the last seven years have 
been collected. Using these daily prices, the annualized volatility is 
calculated using the standard deviation approach and the Exponential 
Moving Average approach. The advantage of the latter approach is that it 
places geometrically declining weights on past observations, thus 
assigning importance to recent observations. By doing this, it produces 
smoother time series than the moving average approach. The following 
formula has been used: 
2= Aat2 A)C2 
at-I 
-1 +(1 t- where 
The results of using the two different methods for the calculation of the 
annualized volatility are very similar, as shown on Table I and Table 2 in 
Appendix A. The estimates in Tables I and 2 of Appendix A are based on 
a relatively short time series, not necessarily representative of the period 
1970-1998 for which we have average default information. We want to 
allow for some variation relative to the values reported in these tables. 
Hence, for BBB bonds we investigate 25% and 30% equity volatility, for 
BB bonds we investigate 35% and 40% equity volatility and in the case 
of B rated bonds we investigate 45% and 50% equity volatility. 
5. Expected return on assets, u: 12%, which is the sum of risk-free rate and 
the asset risk premium. 
6. Payout rate, (5: Is assumed to be 6% as in Huang and Huang (2003) 
paper. 
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7. Face value of debt, P. - In our analysis, we use the average leverage ratios 
reported by Huang and Huang (2003) for BBB, BB and B rated, which 
are 43.3%, 53.53% and 65.70% respectively. This leverage ratio is the 
ratio of the market value of debt divided by the market value of assets. It 
is useful to highlight the fact that the most adequate measure of the face 
value of debt would be the average book value of liabilities for each 
rating category, or alternatively a ratio of the face value of debt divided 
by the market value of assets. Although this is a limitation in our analysis, 
data on the average book value of liabilities is not publicly available and 
these parameter values are reasonable to assume. Hence, the face value of 
debt is assumed to be 43.3,53.53 and 65.70 in the case of BBB, BB and 
B rated bonds. 
8. Debt maturity, T- We will work with bonds with 10 years to maturity 
(with the exception of the Merton where bond maturity will vary from I 
to 10 years, since EDF at time t in this case is the default probability of a 
zero-coupon bond maturing at time t) 
Other parameter values are required for only one or two models. 
9. Coupon, C: The coupon is calculated for each rating category as a 10% of 
the principal value. This variable is used in Leland and Toft model. 
10. Corporate tax rate, Z' 
.- 
15%, as in Leland (2004). This variable is used in 
Leland and Toft model. 
11. Fraction of default costs, a: 30% as in Leland. This variable is needed 
for the Longstaff and Schwartz and the Leland and Toft models. 
12. Stochastic interest rate parameters, a, P, 172 
, 
p: These parameters are 
taken to be equal to 0.06,1,0.001 and 
-0.25 respectively, as in Longstaff 
and Schwartz paper. These variables are used only for the Longstaff and 
Schwartz model. 
3.5. Results 
Table 2 and Figure I present results for the case of BBB bonds with equity 
volatility of 25%. All three models underestimate the observed EDFs. At the 
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shortest time horizons, of one to three years, the models predict effectively zero 
default, whereas actual default rates are in the range 0.12-0.75%. At medium 
term time horizons of four to seven years, default rates continue to be very low in 
all three models. 
The Leland and Toft model continues to predict very low default rates, even at 
much longer time horizons. The default predictions from the Merton and 
Longstaff and Schwartz models are very similar, rising to over 1% at an eight 
year horizon and to nearly 2% at ten year; however these long-horizon default 
rates are still less than half those observed in the Moody's data. 
Table 3 and Figure 2 present the equivalent results, also for BBB bonds, with the 
higher 35% equity volatility. Comparing with Tables 2 and 3 it is apparent that 
the default predictions of the Longstaff and Schwart (LS) model increase a lot in 
response to an increase in equity volatility, the Merton model default predictions 
also increase but by somewhat less than LS, whereas the default predictions of 
the Leland and Toft model change very little. There are in other words striking 
differences in the sensitivity to observed equity volatility. 
All three models continue to substantially underestimate the observed EDFs, at 
shorter and medium term time horizons. Over one to three years, the three 
models predict very low default rates, still effectively zero for the Merton and LT 
models, and even the predictions of LS are well below the actual default rates are 
in the range 0.12-0.75%. At medium time horizons of four to seven years the 
predictions of the LS model are in line with the data while both the Merton 
model and especially LT underpredict. At the longest time horizons Longstaff 
and Schwartz (LS) model overestimate the EDFs, the Merton model is in line 
with the data and Leland and Toft (LT) model still underpredicts the Moody's 
real default probabilities. 
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Table 2: Real default probabilities for BBB bonds with equity volatility 25% 
BBB rated bonds, 25% equity volatility 
EYear 
Merton Longstaff and Schwartz 
Leland and 
Toft 
Observed 
data 
(Moody's) 
1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.12% 
2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.39% 
3 0.01% 0.02% 0.00% 0.75% 
4 0.05% 0.08% 0.00% 1.26% 
5 0.22% 0.23% 0.01% 1.70% 
6 0.40% 0.46% 0.03% 2.19% 
7 0.62% 0.77% 0.06% 2.74% 
8 1.16% 1.13% 0.11% 3.29% 
9 1.49% 1.53% 0.16% 3.91% 
10 1.81% 1.95% 0.22% 4.53% 
Figure 1: Comparison of the term structure of EDFs produced by the different structural models 
with the term structure of real observed default probabilities reported by Moody's: case of BBB 
bonds with 25% equity volatility 
BBB bonds, 25% equity volatility 
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Table 3: Real default probabilities for BBB bonds with equity volatility 30% 
BBB rated bonds, 30% equity v latility 
Year Merton 
Longstaff 
and 
Schwartz 
Leland 
and Toft 
Observed 
data 
(Moody's) 
1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.12% 
2 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.39% 
3 0.06% 0.24% 0.00% 0.75% 
4 0.35% 0.78% 0.02% 1.26% 
5 0.72% 1.62% 0.07% 1.70% 
6 1.58% 2.65% 0.16% 2.19% 
7 2.20% 3.80% 0.29% 2.74% 
8 2.83% 5.00% 0.46% 3.29% 
9 4.32% 6.21% 0.65% 3.91% 
10 5.02% 7.41% 0.86% 4.53% 
Figure 2: Comparison of the term structure of EDFs produced by by the different structural 
models with the term structure of real observed default probabilities reported by Moody's: case 
of BBB bonds with 30% equity volatility 
BBB bonds, equity volatility 30% 
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Tables 4-5 and Figures 3-4 present results for bonds with BB characteristics. For the 
BB rated bonds when the volatility of a firm is 35%, LS model produces a term 
structure of default that is quite closely in line with the observed one (Table 4 and 
Figure 3). Only in the first years does it underpredict the default probabilities. 
Increasing the equity volatility to 40% the LS models then overpredicts EDFs for 
horizons of three years and over (Table 5 and Figure 4). The Merton model provides 
an accurate prediction only for the ten year horizon, at shorter horizons it 
underpredicts. Finally the LT model substantially underpredicts probabilities of 
default at all time horizons. 
The reason why LT model produces such low probability of defaults (PDs) is that the 
endogenous default boundary is well below the face value of liabilities. The default 
rates predicted by the LT model do not alter greatly as we increase the equity 
volatility. This is due to the fact that the asset volatility increase generated by the 
model is offset by the decrease in the default barrier. The default barrier, chosen 
optimally by the firm, is reduced in order to provide greater protection against the 
volatility of assets. Hence, the net effect on the predicted default probability is quite 
small. In contrast, an increase in the volatility causes the term structure of EDFs 
produced by LS and Merton models to increase substantially, leading to an 
overprediction of default probabilities. The increase is larger in the LS model because 
it any case yields relatively higher asset volatility. 
We cannot directly compare the default probabilities shown in these Tables and 
Figures. In Merton case each point at the graph represents the probability that a zero 
coupon bond will default at time t. In this model a bond can default at time t and at 
time t only. For the remaining two models default can happen earlier than t. The 
predicted default frequency at any given time horizon represents the probability that a 
bond does not default at any earlier period 1 to t- I and then does default at period t. If 
the Merton model were instead applied to one-period bonds, with companies that 
avoid default rolling their bond issue over to each successive period, it would produce 
lower predicted default frequencies at longer time horizons than shown in these 
tables. This is because, in this situation of bond rollover, bonds could not default in 
more than one period. In effect there is an element of double-counting in the results 
reported here for the Merton model. 
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Table 4: Real default probabilities for BB bonds with equity volatility 35% 
BB rated bonds, 35% equity volatility 
Year Merton 
Longstaff 
and 
Schwartz 
Leland 
and Toft 
Observed 
data 
(Moody's) 
1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.34% 
2 0.08% 0.93% 0.00% 3.71% 
3 0.71% 3.31% 0.00% 6.21% 
4 1.68% 6.42% 0.14% 8.77% 
5 3.37% 9.68% 0.36% 11.44% 
6 5.59% 12.84% 0.67% 13.72% 
7 7.04% 15.80% 1.04% 15.53% 
8 8.25% 18.54% 1.47% 17.44% 
9 10.89% 21.07% 1.92% 19.19% 
10 13.50% 23.38% 2.39% 20.88% 
Figure 3: Comparison of the term structure of EDFs produced by the different structural models 
with the term structure of real observed default probabilities reported by Moody's: case of BB 
bonds with 35% equity volatility 
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Table 5: Real default probabilities for BB bonds with equity volatility 40% 
BB rated bonds, 40% equity vo atility 
Year Merton 
Longstaff 
and 
Schwartz 
Leland 
and Toft 
Observed 
data 
(Moody's) 
1 0.01% 0.12% 0.00% 1.34%_ 
2 0.30% 2.31% 0.01% 3.71% 
3 1.62% 6.50% 0.09% 6.21% 
4 84% 3. 11.18% 0.33% 8.77% 
5 
- 
6.80% 15.69% 0.75% 11.44% 
6 8.84% 19.83% 1.30% 13.720% 
7 12.20% 23.56% 1.95% 15.53% 
8 15.10% 26.91% 2.64% 17.44% 
9 16.70% 29.94% 3.36% 19.19% 
10 19.75% 32.67% 4.08% 20.88% 
Figure 4: Comparison of the term structure of EDFs produced by the different structural models 
with the term structure of real observed default probabilities reported by Moody's: case of BB 
bonds with 40% equity volatility 
BB bonds, 40% equity volatility 
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Our final set of results are shown in Tables 6-7 and Figures 5-6, for bonds with the 
features of B rated bonds. The LS model now overpredicts EDFs from year three 
onwards, for the case of both low equity volatility (45%) and high equity volatility 
(50%). The Merton and LT models, on the other hand, underpredict default at all time 
horizons. Once again the LT model predicts exceptionally low default rates. The 
Merton model however comes fairly close to actual default probability at the longest 
time horizons of eight to ten years. 
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Table 6: Real default probabi-lities for B bonds with equity volatility 45% 
B rated bonds, 45% equity volatility 
Year Merton- KMV 
Longstaff and 
Schwartz 
Leland 
and Toft 
I 
Observed 
data 
(Moody's) 
1 0.05% 2.04% 0.00% 6.78% 
2 1.40% 10.84% 0.03% 13.19% 
3 4.57% 19.84% 0.24% 19.13% 
4 10.60% 27.37% 0.74% 24.11% 
5 12.54% 33.54% 1.46% 28.59% 
6 16.65% 38.65% 2.32% 32.56% 
7 20.68% 42.94% 3.25% 35.91% 
8 24.36% 46.60% 4.20% 38.62% 
9 27.94% 49.76% 5.15% 41.02% 
31.41% 
T52.52% 
6.07% 43.85% 
Figure 5: Comparison of the term structure of EDFs produced by the by the different structural 
models with the term structure of real observed default probabilities reported by Moody's: case 
of B bonds with 45% equity volatility 
B bonds, 45% equity volatility 
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Table 7: Real default probabilities for B bonds with equity volatility 50% 
B rated bonds, 50% equity volatility 
Year Merton 
Longstaff 
and 
Schwartz 
Leland 
and 
Toft 
Observed 
data 
(Moody's) 
1 0.17% 4.20% 0.00% 6.78% 
2 2.56% 16.58% 0.04% 13.19% 
3 7.72% 27.35% 0.33% 19.13% 
4 12.85% 35.74% 0.95% 24.11% 
5 17.68% 42.34% 1.82% 28.59% 
6 23.62% 47.66% 2.85% 32.56% 
7 28.03% 52.04% 3.94% 35.91% 
8 31.97% 55.72% 5.05% 38.62% 
9 35.95% 58.87% 6.14% 41.02% 
10 39.52% 61.58% 7.20% 43.85% 
Figure 6: Comparison of the term structure of EDFs produced by the by the different structural 
models with the term structure of real observed default probabilities reported by Moody's: case 
of B bonds with 50% equity volatility 
B bonds, 50% equity volatility 
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Comparing our results to the findings of Leland (2004), we arrive at a different 
conclusion concerning the ability of the LT and LS models to accurately predict 
default probabilities. As mentioned in the previous sections, the main difference 
between our study and Leland's work is that we use different approaches in 
estimating asset volatilities. While, Leland (2004) estimates asset volatilities per 
rating class by estimating the asset volatility that best matches the actual default 
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probabilities and refers to the study of Schaefer and Strebulaev (2004) to confirm his 
findings, we estimate asset volatilities per rating class from observable data on equity 
volatility and leverage. Hence, we allow the asset volatility to differ across the 
models. This difference in the estimation is one of the causes of the difference 
between our findings and Leland's. Leland (2004) assumes that the asset volatility of 
a BBB bond is 23% while the asset volatility of aB rated bond is 32%. Using our 
estimation technique we find that for BBB bonds the estimated asset volatility by the 
LS model is on average 25% while for LT model is 19%, i. e. for both models we 
obtain asset volatilities that are fairly close to that assumed by Leland (2004). But we 
obtain much more different asset volatilities for B rated bonds, where our estimated 
asset volatility for LS model is around 45% while for LT model it is around 24%. 
3.5.1. Term structure of EDFs under different observed 
equity volatilities 
In the first part of this section, we showed that from the three structural models, 
Longstaff and Schwartz is the one to produce EDI's that are more in line with the 
observed ones. Nevertheless. ) except of Leland and Toft model, that produces quite 
stable EDFs using the different equity volatility assumptions, the other models and 
especially Longstaff and Schwartz model produce quite volatile EDFs, depending on 
the equity volatility assumption. 
This is in line with structural models theory, where equity volatility should correlate 
with credit ratings. Although, this correlation is desirable, high sensitivity of EDFs 
produced by structural models to small changes in equity volatility may lead to 
inaccurate internal ratings. 
In this section, using Longstaff and Schwartz model, we assume that the equity 
volatility for all categories of bonds, from AA to B, can vary from 30% to 50% (as 
shown in Figures 3-6, the EDFs predicted by the Merton model exhibit a similar 
sensitivity to equity volatility and Longstaff and Schwartz, but those of the LT model 
are almost unaffected). Figure 7, presents the resulting tenn structure of EDFs for AA, 
A and BBB rated bonds and demonstrates that the generated default probability is 
greatly affected by different equity volatilities of rated bonds especially in the long 
tenn. Similar is the result from Figure 8, where the ten-n structure of EDFs for BBB, 
BB and B rated bonds is presented. 
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Figure 7: Term structure of EDFs of AA, A and BBB bonds using Longstaff and Schwartz model 
EDFs of AA, A and BBB rated bonds under different equity volatilities 
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Figure 8: Term structure of EDFs of BBB, BB and B bonds using Longstaff and Schwartz model 
EDF-s--of BBB-, 
-BB 
and 13-rated bonds under different equity volatilities 
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3.6. Conclusions and further research 
This paper has examined the ability of three structural models of corporate bonds to 
predict Expected Default Frequencies (EDFs). We compare the default predictions of 
the Merton model, the Longstaff and Schwartz model and the Leland and Toft model. 
In Merton's model default occurs when the asset value of the firm equals the total 
exposure. Longstaff and Schwartz model accounts for stochastic interest rates and 
default occurs when the asset value of the firm falls to a lower threshold point that is a 
fraction of the total value of debt. Leland and Toft model account for the effect of 
taxes and bankruptcy costs. In this model, default occurs where asset value falls 
below an endogenously specified barrier which is calculated so as to maximize equity 
value. 
We find that none of the models can accurately predict the default probabilities for all 
time horizons and all rating classes. As reported by Leland (2004) we find that no 
structural model predicts well over short time horizons, possibly because of jumps in 
asset values over shorter time horizons. Longstaff and Schwartz model produces 
default predictions in line with observed data for a time horizons of over three years, 
but only for the case of BB bonds with 35% equity volatility. The model however, 
tends to overestimate the default probabilities of riskier bonds as well as the default 
probabilities of bonds with the same rating but higher equity volatility. 
On the other hand, Merton and Leland and Toft model tend to always underpredict the 
EDFs in almost all cases. The main problem with Leland and Toft model is that the 
estimated endogenous default boundary is well below the face value of liabilities.. 
Moreover, unlike Longstaff and Schwartz model, Leland and Toft model does not 
generate highly different term structures as we increase the equity volatility keeping 
all other variables constant. This is due to the fact that the asset volatility increase 
generated by the model is offset by the decrease in the default barrier, producing a 
quite small net effect. 
We conclude that structural models have difficulty in predicting default rates, 
especially at short time horizons, similar to the observed ones. This finding is in line 
with the earlier literature showing that structural models are not adequate for 
explaining observed credit spreads. While observed credit spreads might be explained 
by special features such as taxes and liquidity, these alternative explanations cannot 
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explain the poor performance of structural models in predicting real default 
probabilities. 
A further finding from this study is that structural models, especially Longstaff and 
Schwartz model, are highly sensitive to changes in the equity volatility. This is an 
important result since it suggests that banks should be cautious on the use of structural 
models for the calculation of their capital. The high sensitivity of the models to 
changes in the equity volatility will result on a high volatile assessment of the 
regulatory capital. This also suggests that predicted default rates will vary 
substantially over the business cycle, since in economic downturns both equity values 
and equity volatility can rise; however we do not explore this aspect of the models 
further since none of the models predict well over very short time horizons. 
This study could be extended in several ways. First we agree with Leland (2004) that 
allowing for jumps in the asset values, would be useful in order to improve the 
performance of structural models in the prediction of real default probabilities over 
shorter time horizons. Another possible extension of our study would be the inclusion 
of a model of stochastic asset volatility e. g. as in GARCH specification, into a basic 
structural model. Also, since these are non-linear models, it would be appropriate to 
run simulations based on a joint distribution of parameter values rather than sample 
averages since this could increase average predicted EDFs. An attractive feature of 
the Leland and Toft model is that its default predictions are less sensitive with respect 
to observed equity volatilities, but the default rule appears to be much too tightly 
specified. Some generalization of their model with an endogenous default barrier that 
depends also on market conditions such as liquidity and hence generates higher EDFs 
may merit further study.. 
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Appendix A 
Appendix: Table 1: Average equity volatility of BB rated bonds collected from Bloomberg, using 
standard deviation and exponential moving average approaches. 
BB rated bonds 
Firms Standard deviation Exponential Moving Average 
FMC Corporation 31% 31% 
Fresenius Med 44% 44% 
Corning Inc 56% 54% 
Hasbro 39% 41% 
Starwood hotels 40% 38% 
Hercules 35% 36% 
JLG Industries 54% 54% 
Millipore Corporation 37% 38% 
NVR Inc 38% 38% 
PEP boys 47% 47% 
Potlatch Corporation 27% 27% 
Pope and Talbot 39% 39% 
RJ Reynolds 46% 42% 
_Ryland 
Group 29% 31% 
_Smithfield 
foods 41% 42% 
_Saks 
Inc 48% 48% 
Solectron Corporation 56% 56% 
_Service 
Corp Int 56% 57% 
_Tenet 
Healthcare 42% 37% 
Avista Corporation 36% 38% 
_ 
_Average 
41% 40% 
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Appendix: Table 2: Average equity volatility of B rated bonds collected from Bloomberg, using 
standard deviation and exponential moving average approaches. 
B rated bonds 
Firms Standard deviation Exponential Moving Average 
Am kor Tech Inc 86% 92% 
Building material 
corporation 54% 54% 
Continental Airlines 55% 50% 
Great Atlantic and Pacific 41% 40% 
JMC Global Inc 40% 40-/o 
I nterface 62% 60% 
Northwest Airlines 55% 54% 
_ 
Owens-111 49% 50% 
_ 
Pioneer Standard 53% 53% 
Rite Aid Corporation 59% 60% 
_ 
Shopko StOres 47% 45% 
Solutia 47% 54% 
_ 
Williams Cos 53% 45% 
Xerox Corp 51% 51% 
_ 
CMS Energy 28% 2670 
_ 
El Paso 41% 36% 
Average (excluding Amkor) 51% 50% 
Average (including Amkor) 54% 53% 
_ 
Average total 51% 51% 
_ 
_Average 
total (excl Amkor) 49% 48% 
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Appendix: Table 3: Iteration results of Merton model in case of BBB bonds 
Value and volatility of assets for Merton 
model: case BBB bonds with 25% 
equity volatility 
Value and volatility of assets for Merton 
model: case BBB bonds with 30% equity 
volatility 
Years Value of 
assets 
Volatility of 
assets 
Years Value of 
assets 
Volatility 
of assets 
1 134 18% 1 140 21% 
2 137 18% 2 137 22% 
3 134 19% 3 134 22% 
4 132 19% 4 131 23% 
5 129 19% 5 129 23% 
6 127 20% 6 127 24% 
7 125 20% 7 125 24% 
8 123 20% 8 123 24% 
9 121 21% 9 121 25% 
10 119 21% 10 119 25% 
Appendix: Table 4: Iteration results of Merton model in case of BB bonds 
Value and volatility of assets for Merton 
model: case BB bonds with 35% equity 
volatility 
Value and volatility of assets for Merton 
model: case BB bonds with 40% equity 
volatility 
Years Value of 
assets 
Volatility of 
assets 
Years Value of 
assets 
Volatility 
of assets 
1 149 23% 1 149 27% 
2 146 24% 2 146 27% 
3 142 25% 3 142 28% 
4 138 25% 4 139 29% 
5 136 26% 5 135 30% 
6 133 27% 6 132 30% 
7 130 27% 7 128 31% 
8 128 27% 8 127 32% 
9 125 28% 9 125 32% 
10 123 29% 10 123 33% 
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Appendix: Table 5: Iteration results of Merton model in case of B bonds 
Value and volatility of assets for Merton 
model: case B bonds with 45% equity 
volatility 
Value and volatility of assets for Merton 
model: case B bonds with 50% equity 
volatility 
Years Value of 
assets 
Volatility of 
assets 
Years Value of 
assets 
Volatility 
of assets 
1 161 28% 1 161 31% 
2 156 29% 2 156 32% 
3 151 30% 3 151 34% 
4 147 31% 4 146 35% 
5 143 32% 5 142 36% 
6 139 33% 6 138 38% 
7 135 34% 7 134 39% 
8 132 35% 8 131 40% 
9 129 36% 9 127 41% 
10 126 37% 10 
T124 
42% 
Appendix: Table 6: Iteration results for the value and volatility of assets for LS and LT models in 
case of BBB bonds 
BBB rated bonds, 25% equ ty volatility BBB rated bonds, 30% volatility 
Value of Volatility of Default Value of Volatility of Default 
assets assets barrier assets assets barrier 
Longstaff 
and 
Schwartz 107 2370 107 28% 
Leland and 
Toft 139 18% 36 1 140 21% 34 
Appendix: Table 7: Iteration results for the value and volatility of assets for LS and LT models in 
case of BB bonds 
BB rated bonds, 35% equity volatility BB rated bonds, 40% volati it 
Value of Volatility of Default Value of Volatility of Default 
assets assets barrier assets assets barrier 
Longstaff 
and 
Schwartz 107 33% 107 37% 
_ 
Leland and 
Toft 150 22% 42 150 24% 41 
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Appendix: Table 8: Iteration results for the value and volatility of assets for LS and LT models in 
case of B bonds 
B rated bonds, 45% equity olatility B rated bonds, 50% volatilit 
Value of Volatility of Default Value of Volatility of Default 
assets assets barrier assets assets barrier 
Longstaff 
and 
Schwartz 107 42% 107 47% 
_ 
Leland and 
Toft 162 24% 50 162 25% 49 
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Appendix B 
Longstaff and Schwartz model 
According to Longstaff and Schwartz model, the price of a risky discount bond is: 
B(X, r, T) = D(r, T) 
-a* D(r, T) * Q(X, r, T) ý 
where a is the recovery rate, X is the ratio of the value of assets to the default barrierý 
r is the risk-free rate, T is the maturity date and D(r, T) is the value of a riskless 
discount bond and can be represented by the following expression: 
D(r, T) 
= exp(A(T) - B(T) * r) 
, 
where 
A(T) 
= 
77 
2aT+ 172 a (exp(-, g T) 
- 
1) 
- 
772 (exp(- 2 *, 8 * T) 
- 
1) 
2 *#2 8 #3 
'82 4* 
p3 
and 
B(T) 
= 
exp(-, 6 
where a, 0, q2, and p are stochastic interest rate parameters 
In order to derive the solution of a risky discount bond, Q should also be defined. 
Hence, 
Q(X, r, T, n) qi 
where 
N(al), 
i-I 
qi N(ai) 
- 
(qj N(bij)), 
where i=2,3 
. ........ 
n 
ai 
10) 
- 
M(iT n, T) 
VS(iT n) 
- 
S(jT n) 
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ij _ 
M(jTln, T)-M(iTIn, T) 
, 
FS(iT / n) 
- 
S(j *T/ n) 
and where, 
M(t, T) a- 00777 q2a2t+ '00.77+ 
q2 
exp(-, BT)(exp(, gt) 
- 
1) 
,gg22g22*, 8' 
a 77' 172 
- 
exp(-)Ut)) p2 + (I - exp(-, 8t)) -- exp( 
,g32 
*#3 
and 
SO 
= 
0077+17 
2 
+9 2t+ 
00'77 
+ 
217 2 (1 
- 
exp(-, 8t)) + 2ý (I 
- 
exp(- 2#t)) 
,8 
#2 g2 #3 2# 3 
The value of a risky coupon bond will be the sum of discount bonds. 
Leland and Toft 
In Leland and Toft model, the valuation of a risky coupon bond as well as the formula 
for the endogenously determined default barrier is determined as follows: 
The value of a risky coupon bond is: 
D= c+ p- C I-e 
-rT 
- I(T) + 
((I 
- 
a)Vb- C J(T) 
rr rT r 
Where a is the fraction of the assets that will be lost in case of bankruptcy, C is the 
coupon, r is the risk free rate, Vb is the default boundary, T is the maturity date 
and 
I(T)= I (G(T)-e -rT F(T)) 
rT 
and 
-a+z -a-z 
J(T) v N(q, (T))*q, (T)+ V N(q2(T)) * q,, (T) Vb Vb 
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where, 
F(t) 
= 
N(h, (t)) 
-2a v 
N(h2 Vb 
-a+z -a--- 
G(t) 
-V N(q, (t)) +v N(q Vb Vb 
where, 
b-z o7't) 
U-J 
au't) 
U, \[t- 
_g_( 072 /2)) 
Cr 2 
(- b+ za't). q2 (t) =- 
071t 
(-b+a 072t) 
h, (t) 
=. 
a. \ft- 
In 
Va 
Z= 
[(a 
072)2 +2ro72 
Vb a2 
Therefore, in this model the value of debt equals the discounted expected value of the 
coupon flow plus the expected discounted value of the repayment of the principal plus 
the expected discounted value of the fraction of the assets which will go to debt with 
maturity t, if bankruptcy occurs. 
The default barrier is determined endogenously and it is the point that maximizes both 
the value of the equity and the value of the fin-n subject to the limited liability of 
equity. Hence it is defined as: 
(Clr)(AI(rT) 
- 
B) 
- 
API(rT) 
- 
vC x1r Vb 
=I+ 
coc 
- 
(I 
- 
a)B 
where, 
2 2e -rT 
A= 2ae -rT N(acVT)- 2zN(zu. \fN-) n(zuVT)+ -n(auVT)+ (z - a) UJT UJT 
and 
-(2- +2 N(zuVT 
2- 
n(. ZUVT)+(7-a)+ 
zu"T UVT za-T 
Last but not least the value of equity can be detennined as follows: 
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U 
-D, 
where 
'C 
a U 
-V 
L 
-aVb 
Va 
which is the total value of the finn. It is a+ 
r Vb Vb 
apparent from the equation that equals the asset value plus the value of tax benefits 
less the value of bankruptcy costs. 
Note that x=a+z. 
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CHAPTER 4: Distance to Default as a 
predictor of bank credit ratings 
Abstract of Chapter 4 
This chapter examines whether information from equity markets, as summarized in 
the Distance-to 
-Default measure derived from Merton-MoodysKMV (MKMV), 
provides useful additional information for predicting changes in bank credit ratings. 
We use the BankScope banking accounting database together with Bloomberg to 
build a dataset comprising 98 equity listed banks, from 8 English-speaking and 
Scandinavian countries, with annual accounting, daily ratings and equity price data 
from 1997 to 2004. We divide bank ratings into four broad credit rating classes. We 
then build an ordered probit model of the current credit rating class, incorporating 
both accounting ratios and a Merton-type measure of distance to default. We find that 
distance to default has additional explanatory power for modeling current ratings, or 
predicting credit rating changes over a 6-month or 12-month horizon, but only for the 
smaller sized banks. We find no evidence that changes in distance-to-default have 
additional explanatory power for predicting rating categories, regardless of the size of 
the bank. 
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4.1. Introduction 
This work addresses the usefulness of 'distance to default' as a measure of bank credit 
quality. The objective is to determine whether a 'Merton' style measure of distance to 
default, similar to the one proposed by the widely used Moody's KMV Credit 
Monitor, can improve the modeling and prediction of bank ratings and rating 
transitions in a sample of developed country banks. Bank supervisors are very 
interested in the use of such market based indicators as early warnings of bank 
fragility, especially in situations where accounting variables are available only after a 
long delay or are thought not provide a complete picture of the financial strength of an 
institution. But many questions remain unresolved. In particular are such indicators 
best regarded as convenient summaries of information on the soundness of a financial 
institution, information which could be obtained from the study of bank accounting 
statements or do they contain independent information not contained in accounting 
statements? 
This analysis reported here extends work by Gropp et al (2006) who examined the 
ability of different market indicators, including a distance to default (DD) measure 
based on equity prices, to discriminate between banks in two categories: financial 
fragile or not. They assume that a bank is financial fragile if there has been a 
downgrade of its FitchlBCA individual rating to category C or below, which indicates 
a severe concern. They conclude that distance to default is a useful predictor of bank 
fragility either when used on its own, or when combined with an accounting based 
model. 
This work examines instead whether the same indicator (DD) provides incremental 
value over accounting variables when the goal is modeling and prediction of external 
bank credit ratings and rating changes rather than bank fragility. Our findings suggest 
that DD contains only limited information that is not already available in company 
accounts. 
The reason for focusing on banks' rating rather than on bank fragility can be 
summarized in the following. First, in the developed countries bank default is a rare 
event (in fact we have no defaults in our sample at all). Second, the new Basel Accord 
promotes the use of both external and internal ratings for deten-nining regulatory 
capital requirements, hence creating a considerable interest in both corporate and bank 
credit ratings and rating transitions. While ratings are proN, ided by rating agencies, 
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like Moody's and Standard & Poors, their recent failure to timely signal the collapse 
of several large organizations, including Enron and Parmalat, has raised interest in the 
modeling and prediction of rating changes. 
Moreover, the use of distance-to-default for modeling and predicting credit ratings 
may have an advantage over the commonly used historical accounting variables: in 
contrast to the latter, that are released only annually or at best quarterly, the DD, 
which summarizes information from equity markets, can be continuously updated. For 
this reason, the distance-to-default measure is widely used by central banks, including 
European Central Bank (ECB), as an indicator of bank financial stability. 
We use the BankScope data base, together with equity market data, to construct a data 
sample of 98 equity listed banks from US, Canada, UK, Ireland and Scandinavian 
countries for a period of 6 years, from 1997 to 2004. We divide our observations into 
four broad credit rating classes, with approximately equal numbers of observations in 
each class, running from the weakest class I (B-BBB), through 2 (Al), 3 (A2-A3), to 
the strongest class 4 (AA I 
-AAA). " 
First, as a preliminary test of whether DD is able to predict the "healthiness" of a 
bank: we split our bank's population into two sub-samples (banks above BBB 
- 
i. e. 
our rating classes 2-4; and below or equal to BBB our rating class 1) and examine 
whether there is a significant difference in the magnitude of DD for banks that 
migrate from classes 2-4 into class 1. This was done in order to confirm some of the 
findings of Gropp et al., verifying that in our dataset also DD measure has some 
power as a predictor of bank fragility. 16 
Then, we test the added value of DD in predicting credit rating and rating changes 
between our four classes, relative to a model based solely on accounting variables. To 
do so we develop an ordered probit model of bank credit ratings, which combines a 
number of accounting variables, taken from individual banks' financial statements, 
with a "distance-to-default" measure calculated using the structural Merton model. 
We eliminate a number of accounting variables and examine whether, in our preferred 
model, distance to default provides useful additional information about credit ratings, 
either relative to current or to "stale" (i. e. six month old) accounting data. Our results 
15 The classification is fully described at Section 4. 
16 Note that in Gropp et al, financial fragility is detennined by a downgrade of the bank's F, tchIBCA 
individual rating to C or below. 
82 
show that the additional value of DD with respect to normal accounting info is 
limited. However, if we eliminate from the sample the bigger and healthier banks and 
concentrate on the smaller ones, the added value provided by the DD with respect to 
standard accounting variables is statistically significant. We check the model validity 
of the resulting ordered probit model for the prediction of current rating by 
conducting out-of-sample specification tests. 
Finally, we repeat our tests by focusing on the change in DD rather than the DD Itself: 
the same model and data-set was used to examine whether changes in distance-to- 
default are useful as predictors of ratings changes. However, our results showed that 
for both small and big banks the added value provided by the change in DD with 
respect to accounting information is negligible. 
The chapter is arranged as follows. Section 2 discusses the previous literature and the 
choice of the distance-to-default as an indicator of banks' ratings. Section 3 presents 
our econometric specification. Section 4 discusses the data employed in this paper and 
provides a variety of descriptive statistics and charts. Section 5 presents the estimation 
results. Section 6 concludes. 
4.2. Previous literature 
During the last decades, the assessment of banks' credit quality has become 
increasingly important not only to banks but also to regulators and investors. The 
importance of the accurate and timely prediction of bank credit quality generated a 
vast literature of papers that focus on modeling bank default. 
There have been numerous studies that tried to identify the causes of bank failure 
using econometric models 17 
. 
Most of these studies deal with bank insolvency so the 
dependent variable of the econometric model is binary. Much of the methodology is 
borrowed from the literature on corporate bankruptcy, where firm is either solvent or 
not. In case that the outcome is binary the two econometric methods commonly used 
are discriminant or logit/probit analysis. Early work on corporate bankruptcy made 
use mainly of discriminant analysis. However, since Martin (1977) demonstrated that 
17 Apart from the quantitative studies, there have been some qualitative studies that tried to define the 
determinants of bank failure. Poor management of assets, managerial problems, and fraud are some of 
the identified ones. 
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discriminant analysis is just a special case of logit analysis, most of the studies use the 
multinornial logit model. 
In this literature it is possible to distinguish three main approaches, according to the 
different types of variables used to model bank fragility; the microeconomic 
approach, the macroeconomic and a hybrid approach 18 
. 
The microeconomic approach 
focuses on the use of bank specific accounting data for the prediction of bank default. 
One variation of the microeconomic approach examines the usefulness of US 
supervisor CAMEL scores for predicting bank default. CAMEL is the well known 
scorecard system employed by US bank supervisors to monitor the financial 
soundness of a bank. CAMEL ratings are constructed by supervisors using 
information from banks' financial statements as well as subjective valuations. 
CAMEL is a composite of five separate perfon-nance scores, covering Capital 
adequacy (C), Asset quality (A), Management or Administration (M), Earnings (E) 
and Liquidity (L). Most of these studies are concerned with the examination of 
whether CAMEL ratings have useful information on the ability of the banks to stay 
solvent and have reported mixed results on the link between CAMEL ratios and bank 
defaults. 
Barker and Holdsworth (1993) showed that CAMEL ratings are useful in predicting 
bank failures, while Cole and Gunther (1998) found that although CAMEL ratings are 
useful in the prediction of bank defaults, as time passes their predictive power decays. 
On the other hand, Hirtle and Lopez (1999) reported these supervisory ratings are 
merely useful for monitoring the bank condition, while Gilbert, Meyer and Vaughan 
(1999,2002) in a comparison of on site and off site examinations found that the 
CAMEL ratings that are used to the off site examination have higher predictive power 
than the on site examinations. 
Another variation of the microeconomic approach focuses on the relationship between 
accounting ratios of the kind entered into CAMEL score and bank default. Lane et al. 
(1986), Berger, King and O'Brien (1991), Gibert (1993), Hempel, Simonson and 
Coleman (1994) as well as Gunther and Moore (2000) suggest as components of 
CAMEL the ratios of Equity/Total assets, Loan loss reserves/Non-performing loans, 
18 References regarding this distinction can be found in Shen & Hsieh (2004). Shen & Hsieh (2004) and 
Heffernan (2005) provide an excellent review of literature related to prediction of bank failure. 
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Non-interest expense/Total assets and ROA that best determine the capital adequacy, 
asset quality, management and earnings. 
Other studies, examine a wider set of firm specific variables to examine the 
determinants bank failure. Measures of profitability, liquidity, capital adequacy, loan 
quality and loan growth rates were found to be significant in several studies. Among 
the measures of capital adequacy, Capital/Assets appears to be significant in most 
studies, while among the measures of loan quality, Reserve for possible loan losses/ 
Total loans, appears to be the most significant. Martin (1977), found three ratios to be 
significant for the prediction of bank default; the Net Income/Total Assets, 
Commercial Loans/Total Loans, Capital/Risky assets. Espahbodi (1991), finds that 
Loan revenue/Total income, Interest income/Total operational income, Interest paid 
on deposits/Total operating income are important predictors of band failure. Hwang et 
al. (1997) find that equity, profitability, liquidity and past due loans increase are 
important for any prediction of bank distress. 
A similar microeonomic approach is used by Moody's in its proprietary accounting 
based model, RiskCalc, for privately held banks 19 
. 
RiskCalc uses 7 categories of 
ratios to assess the credit quality of the banks; profitability, leverage, growth, 
efficiency, loan portfolio composition and concentration, liquidity and asset quality. 
The macroeconomic approach uses macroeconomic variables for the prediction of 
bank fragility. This approach is based on the observation that changes in 
macroeconomic variables precede banking crises. This research has focused on the 
role of macroeconomic variables in triggering banking crises in emerging markets. 
Gavin and Hausman (1996) as well as Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) found that 
lending booms preceded banking crises in Latin America. This result was reinforced 
by the work done by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). Calvo (1996) found that the ratio 
of broad money to foreign reserves is useful in explaining the Mexican 1994 crisis. 
Additionally, Honohan (1997), found that a higher loan to deposit ratio, a higher 
foreign borrowing-to-deposit rate and a higher growth rate in credit are correlated 
with banking crisis, using a sample of 24 countries. Additionally, Demirgilq-Kund and 
Detragiache (1998) showed that banking crises tend to erupt when the 
macroeconomic environment is weak and particularly when growth is low and there is 
19 Moody's KMV has developed a RiskCalc model for private companies as well as for private held 
banks. Due to the context of the paper, we only refer to the one concerned with privately held banks. 
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high inflation. Rossi (1999) suggested that liberalization decreases the likelihood of 
banking crisis. Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) found that the rapid domestic credit 
growth, the large ratio of M2 and foreign reserves and the deposit rate control are the 
robust causes of banking crises. 
All the above studies focused on the determination of either the microeconomic or the 
macroeconomic variables that cause banking crises. This approach, although it gave a 
good insight on the usefulness of the different variables in the prediction of bank 
distress, has a main disadvantage. Increasing evidence suggests that banking failure is 
the result of the changes in both microeconomic and macroeconomic factors. 
Banking failure may be the result of the changes in both microeconomic and 
macroeconomic factors. This problem has been addressed by some researchers, 
combining both micro and macro data (a hybrid approach) into their analysis 
(Gonzalez-Hen-nosillo (1999), Berger, Kyle and Scalise (2000), Heffeman (2003), 
Shen and Hsieh (2004)). These studies point to the general conclusion that both 
microeconomic and macroeconomic factors matter in bank default. 
Apart from the econometric studies, there is an interest in establishing whether 
continuously updated measures of bank credit quality derived from equity or debt 
markets can be used to improve forecasts of bank default or a rating change. Some 
studies in the banking sector focused on the equity returns or the level of the equity 
prices prior to the banking crisis. Curry et al (2001) conclude that stock prices tend to 
decrease two years before a CAMEL downgrade. Berger et al (2000) examine the 
relationship between supervisory information and a number of market indicators 
including abnormal stock returns and other equity indicators. They find that 
supervisory assessments and equity indicators are not able to predict each other. 
The study most similar to our own is the one by Gropp et al. (2006). They analyzed 
the ability of the distance to default measure, as given by Merton-MKMV, and 
subordinated bond spreads to signal bank fragility. Using a sample of EU banks they 
find that both distance to default and bond spreads are useful indicators of banks' 
fragility. 
In this study, the choice of the distance-to-default, derived using option-pricing theory 
from the equity market data, was motivated by Gropp et al. (2006). They argue that 
the di stance-to 
-default measure, (taken with a minus sign i. e. the negative of distance- 
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to-default) is a market indicator with two good properties: it is complete, which means 
that is capable of capturing the major elements affecting default probability, and it is 
unbiased, which means that it is aligned with supervisors' interests. 20 Thus this 
indicator is preferred over biased direct equity price-based measures. Our aim is to 
follow the study by Gropp et al. (2006) and to try to assess whether the DD can also 
be useful to modeling and prediction of bank credit rating and rating changes, by 
providing additional information with respect to the bank accounting variables. A 
separate issue, which we do not address, is whether other information can usefully 
supplement banking accounting variables in predicting rating changes e. g. 
macroeconomic conditions. We note that the rating agencies themselves claim that 
these ratings are "through the cycle" i. e. they should not be affected by 
macroeconomic conditions but that there is evidence that macroeconomic conditions 
are a significant determinants of bank default probabilities (refer to Chapter 2, De 
Servigny and Renault). 
4.3. Econometric model 
To investigate the predictive power of the DD indicator, we use an econometric model 
combining a number of different accounting ratios, taken from each bank's financial 
statements, with a distant-to-default measure calculated using Merton's structural 
model. The dependent variable is both discrete and associated with a number (four in 
our case) of ordered outcomes. Hence, an appropriate estimation technique is the 
ordered probit or logit model. 21 
The ordered probit or logit model is specified as follows. Suppose that there are N 
banks (1=1,.... N) and that banks' credit rating quality can be represented by the value 
of an unobserved continuous variable Di 
. 
with higher values of Di representing 
higher credit rating. This credit rating quality, Di 
, 
is a linear function of K factors 
20 According to Gropp et al (2006) an indicator of bank fragility is called complete if it reflects three 
major determinants of default risk: market value of assets, leverage and volatility of assets. Moreover, 
an indicator of bank fragility is unbiased if it is decreasing in the earnings expectations and increasing 
in the leverage and asset risk. 
21 Ordered probit or logit models are more efficient for the modelling of multiple rating categories than 
the multinomial probit or logit models, commonly used for modelling multiple discrete outcomes. 
Multinomial probit or logit should be used only when there is no inherent ordering of the different 
choices. For a more detailed description of ordered probit/logit models refer to Greene (2000, Ch. 19). 
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whose values for individual i areXik . where k=K. Hence, the credit rating 
quality can be represented using a latent regression: 
K 
Di 3kXik +6i = Zi +6i 
k=l 
[4.1] 
is the coefficient associated with the kth variable, ei is the randomly where A 
distributed error and 
K 
ZI 
18kXik 
k=l 
[4.2] 
As in every regression, Di is unobservable. What we observe is an integer ordinal 
variable Yj that can be associated with the different credit rating categories, such that 
=I if the bank has low credit quality, etc and belongs to f 1,2,3,4 1. The 
categorisation of each bank in tenns of credit rating depends on the values of Di in 
conjunction with the threshold values 15,, (52, (53 such that 
Yj 
=1 
...... 
if 
..... 
Di :! ý 91 
Y2 
=2..... if 
..... 
c5l :5 Di !! ý 
g2 
Yj 
=4..... if 
..... 
Di ý! g3 
[4.3] 
The threshold values 9i are unknown parameters and have to be estimated along with 
We assume that all threshold values are above zero. A bank's classification in 
terms of its credit class depends on whether or not its credit score Di crosses a 
threshold. Hence, the probabilities of Yj taking the values I to 4 are given by: 
Pr(Yj 
= 
1) Pr(Z, + ,i !ý 91) = Pr(,, i !: -ý 51 - Zj) 
Pr(Yj 
= 
2) Pr(c5, 
.5 Zi + ,i:! ý, 92) = Pr(45, - Zi !ý Ei !ý 152 - Zj) 
.............................. . ................... 
Pr(Yi 
= 4) = Pr(Z, + ei = Pr(ei ýý t53 - Zi) 
where 5, 
--< 5, -< 45, 
[4.4] 
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To fully specify the model, it is necessary to select a probability distribution for the 
error term, Ej. We assume that Ej is normally distributed across observations. This 
22 
assumption yields the ordered probit model 
. 
Following this assumption, the 
probabilities of Yj taking the values I to 4 can be expressed as follows: 
Pr(Y, = 1) (D(JI 
- 
Zj) 
Pr(Yj = 2) (D(452- Zj) 
- 
(D((51 
- 
Zj) 
Pr(Y, 
= 
4) 
=I- (D(o53 -Zi) 
[4.5] 
where (D(x) = Pr(ej -< x) is the cumulative standard normal probability distribution of 
the error terms. As mentioned before, our aim is to estimate the threshold values 
45i along with, 8k 
. 
The nonlinearity of the ordered probit model implies that the use of 
algebraic expressions for the parameters' estimation is not possible. Instead, to 
estimate the required parameters the maximum likelihood estimation is used. The 
maximum likelihood estimation consists of specifying the probability of obtaining 
each observation as a ftinction of the unknown parameters. We forrn the likelihood of 
observing the sample as the joint probability of obtaining all observations and can be 
expressed as follows: 
L= [Pr(Yi = 1)]NI [Pr(Yi = 2)]N2 [Pr(Yi =3 
)]N3 [Pr(Yi 
= 
4)]N4 
[4.6] 
where N, are the banks with credit rank Iý N2 with credit rank 2 and so on. 
The parameter values are estimated using an iterative procedure and are those that 
maximize the likelihood function. The ordered probit model provides max, mum 
likelihood estimates of both the parameter weightings (the parameter vector P) and the 
ordered sequence of thresholds between the different ratings (61,62,63, 
..., 
etc. ). 
Using the estimated )6k allows us then to estimate a value of Zi for each bank. These 
estimated values together with the estimated thresholds, provide, for each bank, the 
probability of being in each credit rank. 
22 The model can also be estimated using the logistic distribution for the error term. This assumption 
would yield the ordered logit model. In practice, the difference on the estimated values of the 
parameters from the use of the ordered probit or ordered logit model is trivial (refer to Greene (2000), 
Borooah (2001)). 
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4.4. Variables and data description 
In order to perform our analysis, different accounting variables as well as the 
distance-to-default measure has been used. This section offers a detailed description 
of accounting and distance-to-default measures. 
4.4.1 Accounting-based variables 
All our accounting data is taken from the Bureau Van-Dyck "Bankscope" database. 
This database includes a large number of different accounting variables that can be 
employed for the modelling of bank credit quality. Our choice of accounting variables 
follows the specifications used in a number of previous studies, including Lane et al 
(1986), Berger, King and O'Brien (1991), Gilbert (1993), Hempel, Simonson and 
Coleman (1994) and Gunther and Moore (2000). 
These choices can be discussed within the overall "CAMEL" framework. Even 
though we do not compute a CAMEL score for each bank (our preferred specification 
incorporates several accounting ratios, not a single summary statistic), we wished to 
ensure that we include variables in our specification that correspond to all five 
dimensions of the CAMEL classification, "C"= Capital adequacy, "A" = asset 
quality", "M"= management quality, "E"= earnings quality, and "L"= liquidity. The 
variables we use to measure these five dimensions are as follows: 
In previous studies the most widely employed measure of capital adequacy is the ratio 
of EquitylTotal assets. To this ratio we add three additional measures, the ratio of 
EquitylNet loans and the Basel weighted Total Capital ratio and Tier I ratio. For all 
these ratios, we expect that the higher the value, the higher will be the capital of the 
bank hence the lower will be the default probability of the individual bank. 
The ratio of Loan loss reserveslNon performing loans has been employed by Berger, 
King and O'Brien (1991), Gilbert (1993) and Gunther and Moore (2000) to measure 
the quality of assets. There is uncertainty around the impact of this ratio to the credit 
quality of the bank. On the one hand it can be argued that a high ratio can show low 
credit risk since it means that the bank has sufficient capital to write off bad debt and 
on the other hand that it might increase the credit risk since it is an indication that in 
the future there will be an increase in bad loans. We prefer to use Impaired 
loanslLoan loss reserves due to the fact that data on non-perfon-ning loans was 
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incomplete in Bankscope. We also include Impaired loanslGross loans as an 
additional measure of asset quality. 
Non interest expensesITotal assets is the most widely used accountancy ratio used as a 
proxy for the Management component of CAMEL. The sign of this ratio will be 
expected to be negative, since the lower this ratio is the lower the probability of 
default and hence the higher the anticipated rating. 
ROAA (Return on Average Assets), which is equal to Net incomelAverage assets, can 
be used as a proxy for earnings. The higher the ratio is the higher is the credit rating 
since the profitability of the bank increases. We also include two other indicators 
commonly used by practitioners to measure earnings performance, ROAE (Return on 
Average Equity) and Net Interest Margin. 
We include two liquidity ratios that offer an indication of the liquidity on the asset 
and liability side respectively. These are the ratios of Liquid assetsITotal assets and 
Short-term borrowing/Total assets. 
Finally we include into the analysis a measure of bank size, In(Total Assets). Larger 
banks are expected to be at lower risk of default because of the benefits of 
diversification across several markets and sources of revenue. 
4.4.2 Distance to Default 
The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce an equity based measure, the distance 
to default, into an accounting-based model of bank credit ratings and rating 
transitions. This measure is calculated using Merton's structural model of default. 
This model has already been discussed in Chapter 2 of the thesis, but for reasons of 
continuity we restate the main model here. 
The original Merton model assumes that default occurs only at the date of maturity 
and if and only if the value of assets is lower than the face value of debt. The main 
advantage of this model is that equity markets can be used so as to estimate two 
unobserved variables: the market value and the volatility of the bank's assets. Such 
unobserved values may help explain for example why some finns with the same 
accounting ratios default and others stay solvent. Advocates of structural models 
claim that asset volatility plays a key role at the determination of default since a firm 
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with the same leverage as another and higher asset volatility has higher probability of 
default. 
As in the original Merton case, the model applied in this chapter assumes that equity 
is a call option on the value of assets with strike price the default point. In addition, 
the default point is determined exogenously and is assumed to be the principal value 
of debt, P. 23 
Hence, the value of equity is represented as follows: 
Ve 
= 
V, N(dj) 
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where V is the value of assets, P is the total value of debt, T is the day to maturity a 
andUa is the asset volatility. 
It is clear that the value and the volatility of the assets are unknown. These parameters 
can be estimated by solving the following two equations simultaneously: 
Istequation: V, 
=TýN(d, )-Pe -, T N(d2) [4.10] 
7nd equati . on: From Ito's lemma, we can extract a formula that connects volatility of 
equity to the volatility of assets. Hence, the second equation used is: 
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[4.11] 
After value and the volatility of assets is estimated the distance-to 
-default measure 
(DD) measure, which denotes how many standard deviations is the market value of 
assets away from the default barrier, can be derived. 
The formula used for the calculation of DD measure is the following: 
23 The actual measurement of variable P using banking data is described in Section 4.3. 
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4.4.3 Data description and descriptive statistics 
For the purposes of this study, data from 98 bank institutions from US, UK, Canada, 
Ireland and Scandinavian countries has been collected from the BankScope database 
and from Bloomberg. Table I provides a description of the different types of banks 
included in our sample together with their respective frequency. For a bank to be 
included in our sample, the following criteria should be satisfied: to be rated by at 
least one major rating agency in the years from 1997 to 2004, to have available 
accounting information for all or some of the years between 1997 to 2004 and to be 
publicly traded within the same period. The choice of the countries included in our 
sample has been made based on the relative uniformity of their banking sector. 
The credit ratings of the banks have been collected from 1997 to 2004 from 
Bloomberg. We note one limitation of this approach. Morgan (2002) argues that bank 
credit ratings are more noisy signals of creditworthiness than corporate ratings, due to 
the greater bank opacity. We use the credit ratings provided by the rating agencies as 
the only available measure of bank credit quality. We restrict credit rating changes to 
those announced by three major credit rating agencies: Moody's, S&P and Fitch. In 
each case, a credit rating change is determined when there was a change in the credit 
rating of the senior unsecured debt of the bank, which approximates the issuer rating. 
Mainly, Moody's has been used for the reporting of the credit rating changes, while 
information from S&P and Fitch has been employed when Moody's did not provide 
the required rating. Credit ratings are grouped into 4 categories. The choice of the 
rank categories has been made so as we have a relative uniforin number of 
observations in each category. Table 2 shows the distribution of the ratings among the 
different categories. Tables 3 and 4 show the number of downgrades and upgrades per 
rating class per year. In total, there are 23 upgrades and II downgrades in our sample. 
Year 2001 is the year with the highest number of upgrades and downgrades. 
All accounting ratios have been calculated from the Bankscope database for the 
period of 1997 to 2004. We removed a few outliers that may affect the regression 
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results, for all accounting variables as well as distance to default measure so as the 
standard deviation and kurtosis of the distribution of each individual variable to be 
closer to a normal distribution. Descriptive statistics of the variables before and after 
24 the adjustment for outliers are presented on Tables 5 and 6 respectively 
Regarding the distance-to-default measure, as mentioned before, there are five 
variables that are necessary for the estimation of the unobserved value and volatility 
of assets: banks' face value of debt, market capitalization or "value of equity", equity 
volatility, time horizon and risk free interest rate. 
Total liabilities that represent banks' face values of debt are collected from financial 
statements available in Bankscope. Although data is available from 1996 onwards, 
our sample is from 1998 to 2004 since most of the banks started having their shares 
publicly traded only after 1997. The length of the sample includes the recession 
period starting in 2001 when bank ratings and also equity prices and hence distance to 
default declined. 
Monthly market capitalization data have also been collected when available from 
Bankscope database for the same period of time. In cases that the data have not been 
available in Bankscope, data on the number of outstanding shares and equity prices 
have been collected from Bloomberg. These two variables have then been used for the 
calculation of market capitalization. 
In order to calculate the equity volatility, daily equity price data have also been 
collected from Bloomberg for the period between 1997 and 2004. The reason for 
collecting one additional year of equity data is due to the fact that we use a 12-month 
window in equity volatility calculations using standard deviation. Table 7 shows the 
evolution over time of the mean and standard deviation of the equity volatility for the 
banks in our sample. The mean value of equity volatility is increasing from 28.93% in 
1998 to 40.55% in 2001 indicating the reaction of the equity market during the 
recession. In 2004, it is returning to 23.24%. 
As a proxy for the nsk-interest rate, we use 3-month Treasury bills or 3-month 
interbank rate. The data for this has been derived from the national banks of the 
24 Note that by comparing the results of the regression before and after the adjustment of the Outliers we 
concluded that the reported trends are fully robust to the treatment of outliers. 
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respective countries in our sample. The time horizon T is set to I year, which is used 
in the literature as benchmark. 
To calculate the Distance-to-Default measure, the value and the volatility of assets is 
first estimated and an iterative process is applied using equations [4.10] and [4.11 ]. 
Figure 1, shows the evolution of Distance-to-Default over time for different groups of 
banks. The sharp decrease in the Distance-to 
-Default in 2001 mainly reflects the 
increase in the equity volatility during that period (refer to Table 7). Additionally, 
commercial banks exhibit more stable Distance-to 
-Default measures compared to the 
bank holding institutions and mortgage banks. One possible explanation is that most 
of commercial banks are outside US and non-US banks behave differently than those 
in US. 
4.5. Estimation of credit ratings 
This chapter examines whether information from equity markets, as summarized in 
the distance-to-default measure derived from Merton-MKMV, has incremental value 
over the accounting variables for modeling and predicting bank credit ratings. We 
consider a number of different hypotheses about the predictive value of distance to 
default, differing in terms of the timing of accounting data, the availability of distance 
to default and the measurement of the credit rating. We first examine whether distance 
to default provides useful additional information about current credit ratings, either 
relative to current or to "stale" (i. e. six month old) accounting data. The reason that 
we test for the usefulness of distance to default six months after the release of the 
accounting statements is that the information in the accounting data should decay as 
time passes. Then, we test whether distance to default has incremental value over 
accounting variables for the prediction of future credit ratings and rating changes. 
Additionally, we test whether the change in DID rather than the DID itself is a useful 
predictor of future ratings and rating changes. Table 8, summarises all these 
hypotheses. 25 
25 Note that we tested a number of related hypotheses that are not reported in this paper, since the 
results were similar to the ones reported in the paper. Among others, we tested v., hether DD alone has 
any explanatory power in predicting future ratings. We found that even when used alone, DD has no 
explanatory power. 
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Before presenting the econometric results from testing our different hypotheses (refer 
to Table 8), we conduct a preliminary test of whether DD is able to predict the 
"healthiness" of a bank: we split our bank's population into two sub-samples (banks 
above BBB 
- 
i. e. our rating classes 2-4; and below or equal to BBB our rating class 1) 
and examine whether there is a significant difference in the magnitude of DD for 
banks that migrate from classes 2-4 into class 1. This was done in order to confirin the 
findings of Gropp et al., and to verify that also in our dataset DD measure has the 
power to predict bank's fragility. 26 
Table 9, presents the results of a simple mean comparison test that we conduct to 
assess whether DD was able to detect weaker banks, i. e. banks with a tendency to 
downgrading equal or below rating class 1. We conclude that in our sample, under the 
assumption of unequal variances 27 
, 
the difference between the two means is 
statistically different at the 5% and 10% significance level both for 12 and 24 months 
prior to downgrade. This result indicates that also in our sample distance to default is 
a potentially useful indicator of bank fragility. 
Then we investigate whether DD measure has incremental value over accounting 
variables for the prediction of credit ratings. In other words, we test whether an 
"extended" model that includes DID together with accounting variables has better 
predictive power compared to a "simple" accounting variables only model. To test 
this assumption we use a number of different hypotheses that differ in terms of the 
timing of accounting data, distance to default and credit rating (refer to Table 8). First, 
we test whether at the release of accounting statements DID measure has incremental 
value over accounting data for the prediction of current rating. Our second hypothesis 
is that distance to default has predictive power relative to stale accounting data (six 
months old). The reason that we test for the usefulness of distance to default six 
months after the release of the accounting statements is that in theory the information 
in the accounting data should decay as time passes. Apart from these two hypotheses 
that focus on the usefulness of DD in predicting the current rating, we examine three 
26 Note that Groop et al (2006) measures financial distress as the event of downgrading of FjtchIBCA 
individual rating to category C or below. 
27 We tested on our sample the hypothesis that the variances of the two samples are equal. We found 
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the variances are equal. Nevertheless, due to the lo,, ýý number 
of observations of the downgraded banks we believe that the probability of rejecting the hypothesis was 
low. We hence make the assumption of unequal variances in order to decrease the Type 11 error when 
testing for equal means. 
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more hypotheses that focus on the incremental value of DD at predicting future rating. 
In our third hypothesis we investigate whether one year lagged DD measure has 
incremental value at the prediction of bank credit ratings. Finally, for our last two 
hypotheses we focus on the change in DD rather than the DD itself and its ability in 
terms of predicting future rating. The main difference between the last two hypotheses 
is the timing of the accounting data. Our fourth hypothesis uses current accounting 
data at the release of the financial statements while the last hypothesis uses stale 
accounting data. 
Before testing all these hypotheses, it was necessary to reduce the number of 
accounting variables used in the credit ratings model. There were two criteria for this 
reduction. The first criterion was to include variables used in previous studies of bank 
credit rating and credit quality. Since our objective is to examine the additional 
contribution of distance to default in an accounting model of credit ratings, we wanted 
to choose accounting variables that were representative of previous studies that built 
accounting models of bank credit quality or bank failure. Our literature review has 
revealed a very large number of different accounting variables used in this way. Given 
the high correlation among certain of the variables, we then reduce the number of 
accounting variables, that correspond to all five dimensions of the CAMEL 
classification (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings quality and 
Liquidity), so that we work with a more parsimonious model that still retains most of 
the information in the accounting variables regarding the modeling of ratings. 
Table 10 reports the correlation among the accounting variables. The table shows 
there are high correlations amongst certain groups of variables, suggesting that not all 
need to be included in the model. As expected, variables belonging to the same 
classification group are most highly correlated. In particular, ROAA and ROAE are 
highly correlated as well as Total Capital ratio and Tier I ratio. To decide which 
variables to keep, we first ran a regression including all variables using the current 
credit rating as a dependent variable and all the years from 1998 to 2004. Then 
looking at their individual statistical significance as well as considering their 
economic interpretation and the correlation among them we created our preferred 
model. This includes the following accounting variables: Tier I ratio, Net loans! 'Total 
assets, Impaired Loans/Gross Loans, ROAE. Net Interest Margin, Non-Interest 
Expense/average Assets, Short-term Borrowing/Total assets. 
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For the prediction of current rating (Hypotheses I and 2), we split the sample so as we 
can test for the robustness in our results by performing an out-of-sample test. We use 
years from 1998 to 2003 for the in sample parameter estimation and year 2004 is used 
for the out of sample test. Due to the fact that we only have seven years of sample 
data, we only perform out of sample tests to test the ability of distance to default to 
predict the current rating. For the prediction of future rating (Hypotheses 3 to 5), we 
use the full sample for an in-sample estimation. 
Table 11, presents the in sample estimated coefficients and the z-values of the 
parameters for the different regressions that correspond to the different tested 
hypotheses. 28 The results of regressions indicate that all variable coefficients, except 
of the Tier I ratio and interest margin, have the expected sign. The negative sign of 
the Tier I ratio is in contrast with the standard theory, that the higher the capital a 
bank holds the higher the credit rating. It seems that there is an endogeneity issue; the 
rating is driving the ratio rather than the other way around. This finding is important 
since it shows that banks that are not near default may not hold as much capital 
relative to their risk adjusted assets as the ones that they are at the lower credit rating 
categories. 
For the first three hypotheses (Tale II columns 1-3), where we investigate whether 
DD has incremental value for the prediction of current or future rating, we note that 
there are a number of statistically significant accounting variables. Our results show 
that amongst these accounting variables size is the most significant variable for the 
prediction of current or future rating. It is worthwhile to mention that the ratio of Non- 
interest expenses/Average assets, while it is statistically significant for the prediction 
of current rating, becomes less significant for the prediction of future credit ratings. 
In contrast to many of the accounting variables, the distance to default measure is 
statistically insignificant (i. e. we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the regression 
coefficient of distance to default is not statistically different from zero when the other 
accounting variables are in the model). This conclusion is supported both by 
likelihood ratio tests for comparing the model with and without DID and by the z- 
statistic for the DID variable. To test the incremental value of including the distance to 
28 The z-statistic is a test statistic for the null hypothesis that an Individual predictor's regression 
coefficient is zero, given that the rest of the predictors are in the model. 
98 
default into the different regressions, we use the likelihood ratio test. Using the 
likelihood ratio test we examine whether the difference between the log likelihood 
produced by the model that combines the accounting variables and the distance to 
default (extended model) and the log likelihood produced by the model with 
accounting only variables (simple model) is statistically significant. As shown on 
Table 11, the log likelihood ratio is not significant for 1%, 5% and 10% confidence 
level on all regressions, indicating that the distance to default adds little additional 
value for the prediction of credit ratings. This result is in line with the reported z- 
values for distance to defaults which are also statistically insignificant. 
Our second hypothesis (Table II column 2) is that distance to default has predictive 
power relative to stale accounting data, reported six months previously. This 
hypothesis corresponding more closely to the practical situation facing supervisors 
where accounting information will only be available some months after market data. 
Here we find that while the log likelihood of the regression, unsurprisingly, has fallen 
(from 
-294.2. to -301.8) the current distance to default remains again statistically 
insignificant. 
Our third hypothesis (Table II column 3) is that distance to default has incremental 
value over accounting variables for the prediction of future credit rating. This 
hypothesis aims to investigate whether DD measure is useful at the prediction of 
future credit rating. As in previous cases, we conclude that although most of the 
accounting variables are statistically significant the DD measure is statistically 
insignificant. 
Additionally, when testing for the last two hypotheses (Table 11, columns 4-5), where 
we focus on whether the change in DID indicator is important for the prediction of 
future credit ratings. We note that, as in the case of the first three hypotheses, there 
are a number of statistically significant accounting variables. Our results show that 
amongst these accounting variables size is again the most significant variable. We 
conclude that as in the case of DID measure, the change in distance to default indicator 
is once more not statistically significant, even at the 10% confidence level for the 
prediction of future rating. 
It is also worth examining whether DID affects the predictive ability of the model. 
Since logistic regression does not have an equivalent of R-squared one should be 
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cautious on the test statistics used. We do this in two ways, first reporting different in 
sample prediction (goodness of fit) measures and then by reporting the mean 
probabilities of estimating a rating category using our different models. For in-sample 
goodness of fit measures we report the Prob>chi2 and McFadden's pseudo R-squared. 
The Prob>chi2 (or p-value) is the probability of getting a likelihood ratio test statistic 
as extreme as the one observed under the null hypothesis where we assume that all of 
the regression coefficients of the model are equal to zero. In all regressions the small 
p-values lead us to conclude that at least one of the coefficients in each of our models 
is different from zero. We also report the pseudo R-squared. Since, in the logistic 
regression the pseudo R-squared statistic does not mean what the R-squared means in 
OLS (the proportion of variance for the response variable explained by the predictors) 
we prefer not to draw any conclusions. As an additional test of the predictive power 
of our different models Tables 12 to 16 present the mean probabilities of estimating a 
rating category using our different models. In all cases, using our proposed model one 
has the highest probability at predicting the correct rating. We compare these results 
with the accounting only model results and we find that the inclusion of distance to 
default, as suggested by the likelihood ratio test, does not substantially improve the 
prediction power of the model. 
Next, we split our sample to "big" and "small" banks to investigate whether distance 
to default has a statistically significant role in the prediction of the current rating of 
either smaller or larger equity-listed banks. The split between "big" and "small" banks 
have been made so as we leave roughly the same observations in each category. 
Tables 17 and 18 present the in sample estimation results for the small and big banks 
respectively. As Table 17 shows, distance to default becomes significant at 5% 
confidence level when used for the prediction of current rating using both current and 
44stale" accounting data. This result is confirmed by the likelihood ratio test, which 
indicates that the difference between the "extended" and "simple" model is 
statistically significant at 5% confidence level. For the prediction of future ratings 
using the change in the distance to default, Tables 17 and 18 (columns 4-5) show that 
the split between small and big banks did not affect the statistical significance of 
distance to default. Tables 19 and 20 confirm that for small banks using the "extended 
model" for the prediction of current rating using current and stale accounting data, the 
probability of predicting the correct rating is substantially increased compared to the 
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46simple" model. Tables 21 and 22 show that for big banks this is not the case. The 
DD becomes statistically insignificant and its inclusion does not add to the predictive 
power of the model. 
To test the validity of our in sample estimation we conduct out of sample tests using 
year 2004 data 
- 
which was not used for estimation 
- 
to examine the hypotheses I and 
2 only. Tables 23 to 27 present the results of the out of sample tests for the prediction 
of current ratings. The out of sample estimation confirms our in sample estimation 
results. The inclusion of distance to default does not increase the predictive power of 
the model. However, when we use only the small banks the addition of the distance to 
default appears to be useful. 
Finally we note that there is a problem of bias in the standard errors. This is possible 
for several reasons. We do not include year dummies (this is appropriate since our 
focus is on prediction). There may be further correlation of errors due to country or 
regional effects not included in the specifications. As a result the standard errors of 
our estimated variables are likely to be upwards biased, further weakening any 
inferences that can be drawn about the usefulness of DD for prediction. 
Our finding that DD is not a useful indicator for the prediction of bank credit ratings 
(except for small banks) stands in sharp contrast to the conclusion of Gropp et al 
(2006) that DD is a useful indicator for the prediction of bank fragility. This 
difference can be attributed to several differences between our study and that of 
Gropp et al (2006). First, we use a different data set of mostly US banks, whereas 
their data is for European banks. Second, we use a dataset of 98 banks consisting of 
annual observations from 1998 to 2004, while Gropp et al (2006) uses a dataset of 84 
banks consisting of monthly observations from 1991 to 2001. Moreover, Gropp et al 
(2006) examine whether DD provides incremental value over accounting variables 
when the goal is prediction of bank fragility as measured by a division of bank ratings 
into two categories (fragile and not fragile). Our study generalizes by examining the 
predictive power of DD for the modeling and prediction of a set of four ordered 
external bank credit ratings and of changes between these ratings. For comparison 
with Gropp et al (2006) we also conduct a mean comparison test of distance to default 
DD, but restricted to two ratings classes (our class I which is the most fragile against 
classes 2,3, and 4 which are not fragile) finding a statistically significant difference, 
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i. e. the DD measure used on its own seems to be useful as a predictor of bank 
fragility. 
4.6. Conclusion 
We have investigated a number of different ordered probit models of bank credit 
ratings, combining distance to default with bank accounting infori-nation. Despite an 
extensive specification search and the examination of several alternative hypotheses 
about the predictive ability of distance to default, we find that distance to default, 
when used for the modeling and the prediction of credit ratings for banks has 
relatively little incremental value over the accounting variables. We find that much 
the most important variable both for the prediction and the modeling of ratings is the 
size, as measured by the log of total assets. We find several other accounting variables 
are also statistically highly significant. We find distance to default is statistically 
significant only for small banks, for modeling current ratings, or predicting credit 
rating changes over a 6-month or 12-month horizon. We find no evidence that 
changes in distance-to-default have additional explanatory power for predicting rating 
category, either for small or large banks. 
Our work complements that of Gropp et. al. (2006), who find that distance to default 
is a useful predictor of bank fragility when used on its own, as well as in the context 
of an accounting model. Our results indicate that distance to default, while it may be a 
useful summary statistic for bank supervisors and others monitoring financial sector 
stability, certainly does not supplant more traditional approaches to credit analysis 
when used for the prediction of credit quality of banks. As stated, we find that it is 
only for smaller banks that distance to default can help with the prediction of credit 
quality, relative to accounting variables. This could be either because accounting 
information is of lower quality or because the credit standing of small banks is driven 
by other factors (such as industry or country developments) that are not captured by 
accounting statements but are reflected in equity prices. For both these reasons, and 
because if (as is likely) supervisors are able to devote relatively less resources to a 
fully accounting based credit analysis for smaller institutions distance to default 
appears to be most useful for monitoring smaller banks. For larger banks, at least 
within the countries covered by our data, distance to default appears to be, at best, one 
of a range of indicators helpful to supervisors. 
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This study might be extended by the inclusion of lagged rating changes into the 
regressions. Bangia et al (2002) show that rating changes are serially correlated to 
certain extent. Hence, it would be useful to investigate whether the inclusion of 
lagged rating changes into the regression might even further reduce the predictive 
power of DD. 
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Tables and ftures 
Table 1: Type of banks included in the sample and their frequency 
Bank type Frequency 
Bank holding and holding Company 71 
Commercial Bank 19 
Non Banking Credit Institutions 2 
Real Estate/Mortgage bank 4 
Savings bank 2 
This table presents the number of banks split in different bank types. Data on the bank types has been 
collected Erom Bankscope. 
Table 2: Categories of ranks in credit ratings 
Category Rating 
Number of observations 
of a specific rating 
category 
Number of 
observations 
I B 7 180 
BB 34 
BBB 139 
2 Al 129 129 
3 A2 86 184 
A3 98 
4 AAI 90 165 
AA2 53 
AA3 8 
AAA 14 1 
This table presents the number of observations in each rating class. Data on credit ratings has been 
collected from Bloomberg. 
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Table 3: Number of downgrades per rating class per year 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
AAA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AA 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 
A 0 1 1 2 1 0 5 
BBB 0 0 2 1 0 2 5 
BB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Total 01 11 3 4 1 2 11 
This table presents the number of downgrades per year in each rating class. Data on credit ratings has 
been collected firom Bloomberg. 
Table 4: Number of upgrades per rating class per year 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
AAA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AA 1 1 5 1 2 1 11 
A 0 2 4 1 1 0 8 
BBB 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 
BB 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
B 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 1 4 11 2 3 2 23 
This table presents the number of upgrades per year in each rating class. Data on credit ratings has been 
collected from Bloomberg. 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics of independent variables before accounting for outliers 
Variable N p25 p50 p75 Mean Sd Skewness Kurtosis 
Equity/Total 
assets 722 5.84 7.69 9.42 10.06 23.68 12.03 165.29 
Total Capital 
Ratio 654 11.10 12.10 13.40 12.62 3.42 6.92 107.07 
Tier I Ratio 653 7.90 9.00 10.80 9.66 3.27 8.96 152.46 
_ 
EquityiNet Loans 720 10.02 12.77 15.67 15.05 12.51 5.83 49.78 
impaired 
Loans/Loan Loss 
Reserves 645 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 10.98 127.56 
Impaired 
Loans/Gross 
Loans 645 0.46 0.74 1.40 1.16 1.41 5.94 56.29 
ROAA 722 0.80 1.17 1.47 1.19 0.75 
-0.20 20.48 
ROAE 722 12.58 15.55 19.06 15.50 7.80 
-1.62 22.98 
Interest Margin 722 2.41 3.60 4.26 3.47 1.44 1.63 11.50 
Non-Interest 
Expenses/Average 
Assets 725 2.63 3.45 4.22 4.03 3.18 3.35 17.90 
Liquid 
Assets/Total 
Assets 784 2.87 5.96 12.12 9.03 9.55 2.25 10.21 
Short-terrn 
Borrowing/Total 
Assets 784 71.82 79.22 84.62 70.48 24.95 
-1.96 5.64 
ln(Total Assets) 717 23.36 24.38 25.92 24.68 1.76 0.70 3.31 
Distance 605 2.79 3.36 4.10 
. 
3.43 0.84 0.15 2.65 
Distance 6 months 596 2.80 3.42_ 4.08 
_ 
3.46 0.87 1.02 10.92 
This table presents the standard statistics of the different variables. N refers to the number of 
observations, while p25, p50 and p75 refer to the 25h, 50th and 75 th quantile. The mean, standard 
deviation (denoted by sd) and kurtosis are also reported. 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics of independent variables after accounting for outliers 
Variable N p25 p50 p75 Mean Sd Skewness Kurtosis 
Equity/Total 
assets 713 5.83 7.67 9.34 7.75 2.57 0.76 4.97 
Total Capital 
Ratio 646 2.42 2.49 2.60 2.52 0.16 1,48 7.62 
Tier I Ratio 652 7.90 9.00 10.80 9.57 2.35 1.26 5.02 
Equity/Net Loans 720 2.30 2.55 2.75 2.56 0.49 0.97 6.90 
Impaired 
Loans/Loan Loss 
Reserves 637 
-5.74 -5.26 -4.73 -5.21 0.75 0.34 3.01 
Impaired 
Loans/Gross 
Loans 645 
-0.79 -0.31 0.34 -0.23 0.82 0.28 3.39 
ROAA 709 0.81 1.17 1.45 1.19 0.55 0.92 6.04 
ROAE 708 12.67 15.61 19.04 15.78 5.48 0.21 5.08 
Interest Margin 710 2.39 3.56 4.24 3.36 1.16 0.25 2.33 
Non-Interest 
Expenses/Average 
Assets 684 2.57 3.34 4.06 3.42 1.55 0.95 5.16 
Liquid 
Assets/Total 
Assets 724 1.24 1.88 2.57 1.85 0.99 0.38 3.03 
Short-term 
Borrowing/Total 
Assets 668 75.65 80.64 85.57 80.05 7.41 0.85 4.05 
ln(Total Assets) 692 23.34 24.32 25.73 24.51 1.52 0.27 2.13 
Distance 599 2.78 3.35 4.09 3.42 0.81 0.03 2.16 
Distance 6 months 595 2.80 3.41 4.07 3.45 0.81 0.01 2.30 
This table presents the standard statistics of the different variables after accounting for the outliers. N 
refers to the number of observations, while p25, p50 and p75 refer to the 25th, 50'h and 75 th quantile. 
The mean, standard deviation (denoted by sd) and kurtosis are also reported. 
Table 7: Mean and standard deviation of the equity volatility from 1998 to 2004. 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Mean 28.93% 37.97% 35.99% 40.55% 31.69% 33.76% 23.24% 
Standard Deviation 5.84% 9.08% 7.92% 8.45% 13.02% 11.65% 6.52% 
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Table 9: Ability of distance to default to predict downgrades 
Status Nobs Mean (DD) t-test p-value 
12 months 0 71 3.059 3.938** 0.015 
1 3 2.239 
24 months 0 71 3.086 2.873** 0.032 
1 1 3 2.290 1 
This table presents the results of the mean comparison test. Status I represents the financial fragile 
banks while 0 represents the financially healthy banks. We present the number of observations 
(denoted by Nobs), the mean, t-test and p-value. Note that ** indicate statist1cal significance at 
5% confidence level. 
Table 10: Correlation matrix among the variables 
Imp. Non- 
Total Equity/ Imp. Loans/ Interest Liquid ST 
Variabl Equity/ Capital Tier I Net Loans/ Gross Int. Exp/ A Assets/ Borrow Ln 
e TA Ratio Ratio Loans LLR Loans ROAA ROAE Margin A TA ing/TA (TA) DD 
Equity/ 
TA 
Total 
Capital 
Ratio 0.392 1 
Tier I 
Ratio 0.453 0.797 1 
Equity/ 
Net 
Loans 0.599 0.431 0.515 1 
Imp. 
Loans/ 
LLR 
-0.402 -0.112 -0.227 -0.319 1 
Imp. 
Loans/ 
Gross 
Loans 
-0.221 -0.100 -0.233 -0.063 0.825 1 
ROAA 0.617 0.095 0.156 0.395 
-0.361 -0.249 1 
ROAE 
-0.070 -0.170 -0.147 -0.060 -0.017 -0.052 0.656 1 
Int. 
_M Urin 
0.612 0.130 0.2 13 0.250 
-0.476 -0.279 0.496 0.044 1 
Non _ 
Interest 
Exp/A 
A 0.553 0.064 0.114 0.467 
-0.314 -0.083 0.440 -0.003 0.539 1 
Liquid 
TA 
-0.002 0.119 0.019 0.277 -0.025 0.063 0.021 0.070 -0.076 0.070 
ST 
Borrow 
T F-T A 
-0.051 0.156 0.262 -0.053 -0.210 -0.281 -0.072 -0.098 0.162 -0.036 -0.245 
1 
-Lnil 
ý) 
-0.339 -0.305 1 -0.454 1 -0.063 0.302 1 0.426 1 -0.124 
0.146 
-0.339 -0.064 0.117 -0.510 1 
. 
L-2-D 
- 
0.0 13 0.066 1 0.097 1 
-0.053 -0.218 
1 
-0.192 
1 0.046 
, 
0.010 0.108 
-0.015 -0.175 0.077 -0.064 1 
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Table 11: Regression results using ordered probit model, total data 
HI H2 H3 H4 H5 
-0.165 -0.173 -0.183 -0.148 -0.182 
Tier I Ratio (-3.70) (-3.93) (4.06) (-3.50) (4.09) 
Equity/Net 1.002 1.237 1.193 1.388 1.183 
Loans (4.01) (4.70) (4.49) (5.41) (4.49) 
impaired 
Loans/Gross 
-0.384 -0.509 -0.513 -0.504 -0.516 
Loans (-4.17) 
-5.41) (-5.40) (-5.28) (-5.46) 
0.073 0.079 0.079 0.088 0.081 
ROAE (5.52) (5.94) (5.92) (6.54) (5.96) 
-0.373 -0.382 -0.382 -0.344 -0.377 
Interest Margin (4.63) (4.73) (4.67) (4.35) (4.62) 
Non-Interest 
Expenses/Avera 0.140 0.162 0.126 0.070 0.129 
ge Assets (2.17) (2.51) (1.96) (1-09) (2.00) 
Short-term _ 
BorrowMg/Tota 0.042 0.056 0.055 0.059 0.056 
1 Assets (3.39) (4.39) (4.27) (4.69) (4.34) 
1.111 1.151 1.156 1.218 1.162 
Injotal Assets) (13.83) (14.02) (14.02) (14.31) (14.04) 
Distance-to- 0.044 0.046 0.013 0.034 0.111 
Default (0.49) (0.53) (0-15) (0.33) (0.93) 
Number of obs 375 383 379 386 379 
Log Likelihood 
-294.181 -301.777 -291.723 -298.244 -291.303 
Log Likelihood 
(accounting 
only model) 
-294.300 -301.915 -291.734 -298.297 -291.733 
LR ch12 
(extended vs 
accounting 
model) 0.238 0.276 0.022 0.106 0.86 
d. f I 1 1 1 1 
Prob>chi2 
(extended vs 
accounting 
model) 0.626 0.599 0.882 0.745 0.354 
Prob>ch12 
(extended vs 
null model) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.427 0.425 0.436 0.431 0.437 
H 1: Current di stanc e-to 
-default helps explain current rating relative to current accounting data 
H2: Current distance-to-default helps explain current rating relative to stale accounting data 
HI Current distance-to-default helps explain future rating relative to current accounting data 
144: Recent change in distance-to-default helps predict future rating, when accounting data is current 
145: Recent change in distanc e-to-de fault helps predict future rating, when accounting data is stale 
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Table 12: Predict current rating in samnle- total datq 
Usi ng DD for current ra ing Accounting only model 
Ratings Mean 
(p 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
Mean 
(p 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
0.661 0.218 0.104 0.017 0.655 0.220 0.103 0.022 
2 0.293 0.375 0.284 0.049 0.334 0.368 0.257 0.041 
3 0.054 0.202 0.477 0,267 0.058 0.207 0.475 0260 
4 0.008 0.042 0.289 0.661 0.008 0.042 0.288 
This table reports the in sample prediction of the mean probabilities of estimating a rating category 
using the model to test Hypothesis 1. Comparison of accounting only model and "extended" model that 
includes DD together with the accounting variables. 
Table 13: Predict current 6 month rating in samDle. total data 
Using D D for 6 month current rating Accountin only mode l 
Ratings Mean 
(p 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
Mean 
(P 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
1 0.644 0.216 0.115 0.025 0.649 0.224 0.107 0.020 
2 0.282 0.380 0.289 0.049 0.319 0.371 0.267 0.042 
3 0.051 0.198 0.456 0.295 0.053 0.198 0.456 0.293 
4 0.008 0.042 0.279 0.671 1 0.008 0.042 0.278 0.671 
This table reports the in sample prediction of the mean probabilities of estimating a rating category 
using the model to test Hypothesis 2. Comparison of accounting only model and "extended" model that 
includes DD together with the accounting variables. 
Table 14: Future ratins! prediction: usin2 DD, total data 
Usin DD Accounting only model 
Ratings Mean 
(p 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
Mean 
(p 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
1 0.675 0.213 0.097 0.015 0.693 0.208 0.087 0.012 
2 0.283 0.379 0.287 0.051 0.329 0.365 0.259 0.047 
3 0.049 0.197 0.467 0.287 0.055 0.204 
-- 
0.469 0.271 
4 0.009 0.045 0.276 0.671 0.009 0.047ý 0.285 0.660 
This table reports the in sample prediction of the mean probabilities of estimating a rating category 
using the model to test Hypothesis 3. Comparison of accounting only model and "extended" model that 
includes DD together with the accounting variables. 
Table 15: Predict future rating using the difference of the DD rating 1999=distancel999- 
distance6m 1998- total data 
Using DD Accounting only model 
Ratings 
Mean 
(p 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
Mean 
(p 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
1 0.633 0.228 0.122 0.017 0.632 0.231 0.117 0.020 
2 0.282 0.357 0.308 0.053 0.319 0.356 0.282 0.043 
3 0.056 0.194 0.454 0.297 0.054 0.189 0.458 0.299 
4 0.007 0.034 0.244 0.715 0.007 0.034 0.251 0.708 
This table reports the in sample prediction of the mean probabilities of estimating a rating category 
using the model to test Hypothesis 4. Comparison of accounting only model and "extended" model that 
includes DID together with the accounting variables. 
III 
Table 16: Predict future rating using the difference of the DD 6 months after release 
ratin2 1999=distance6ml998-distance 1998. total data 
Using DD Accounting only model 
Ratings 
Mean 
I 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
Mean 
(P 1) 
Mean 
_(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
1 0.674 0.213 0.099 0.015 0.693 0.208 0.087 0.012 
2 0-8 .28-5 0.379 0.286 0.050 0.329 0.365 0.259 0.047 
3 0.049 0.196 0.468 0.287 0.055 0.204 0.469 0.271 
4 0.008 0.044 0.276 0.672 0.009 0.047 0.285 0.659 
This table reports the in sample prediction of the mean probabilities of estimating a rating category 
using the model to test Hypothesis 5. Comparison of accounting only model and "extended" model that 
includes DD together with the accounting variables. 
Table 17: ReEression results usiniz orderedDrobit model- smali banks oniv 
HI H2 H3 H4 H5 
-0.059 -0.062 -0.111 -0.040 -0.103 
Tier I Ratio (1.12) (-1.18) (-2.00) (-0.80) (-1.86) 
0.131 0.305 0.571 0.535 0.541 
Equity/Net Loans (0.40) (0-91) (1.65) (1.64) (1.57) 
Impaired 
-0.507 -0.664 -0.672 -0.569 -0.675 
Loans/Gross Loans (-3.77) (4.81) (4.86) (4.38) (4.89) 
0.052 0.066 0.071 0.073 0.074 
ROAE (2.56) (3.2.5) (3.47) (3.76ý (3.64) 
-0.402 -0.369 -0.401 -0.283 -0.387 
Interest Margin (-3.84) (-3.58) (-3.4) (-2.93) (3.60) 
Non-Interest 
Expenses/Average 0.184 0.209 0.137 0.106 0.132 
Assets (2.44) (2.74) (1.80) (1.43) (1.74) 
Short-tenn 
Borrowing/Total 0.011 0.037 0.038 0.028 0.036 
Assets (0.65) (2.10) (2.17) (1.61) (2.08) 
1.57 1.608 1.150 1.474 1.485 
Injotal Assets) (9.55) (9.77) (9.21) (9.49) (9.21) 
Distance-to- 0.265 0.270 0.181 
-0.041 0.068 
Default (2.21) (2.31) (1.49) (-0.31) (0.44) 
Number of obs 213 219 210 217 210 
Log Likelihood 
-154.852 -159.576 -154.202 -176.005 -155.216 
Log Likelihood 
(accounting only 
model) 
-157.328 -162.283 -155.31 -176.055 -155.314 
LR ch12 (extended 
vs accounting 
model) 4.952 5.414 2.216 0.100 0.196 
d. f I I I I I 
Prob>ch12 
(extended vs 
accounting model) 0.026 0.020 0.137 0.752 0.658 
Prob>ch12 
(extended vs null 
model) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 1 0.401 1 0.408 0.401 0.350 
0.397 
Ll I- r--+ A; ý+-, _ +ý A, Faiilt i-vnlnin r-ilrrpnt rntina rf-. Iqtivf-. to current accounting d ata 
H2: Current distance-to-default helps explain current rating relative to stale accounting data 
HI Current distance-to-default helps explain future rating relative to current accounting data 
H4: Recent change in distance 
-to- default helps predict future rating, when accounting data is current 
H5: Recent change in di stanc e-to-de fault helps predict future rating, when accounting data is stale 
Note: Small banks, Banks that their In(Total Assets) is less than 25 
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Table 18: Regression results using ordered probit model, big banks onlv 
HI H2 H3 H4 H5 
-0.339 -0.381 -0.223 -0.316 
-0.235 
Tier I Ratio (-2.60) (-2.81) 
-1.9 (-2.77) (-2.22) 
2.117 2.422 1.847 2.414 1.834 
Equity/Net Loans (4.27) (4.70) 
. 
83 (4.75) (3.90) 
Impaired 
Loans/Gross 
-0.314 -0.405 -0.365 -0.633 -0.356 
Loans (-1.81) (-2.22) (-2.11) (3.51) (-2.21) 
0.107 0.119 0.109 0.116 0.112 
ROAE (4.83) (5.15) 
. 
81 (5.27) (5.03) 
-0.795 -0.934 -0.809 -0.819 -0.798 
Interest Margin (-3.79) (4.29) 9) (-3.96) (-3.81) 
Non-Interest 
Expenses/Average 0.397 0.467 0.456 0.275 0.463 
Assets (2.12) (2.44) 
. 
45 (1.52) (2.54) 
Short-terin 
Borrowing/Total 0.084 0.078 0.068 0.084 0.070 
Assets (3.89) (3.66) (3.24) (3.92) (3.36) 
1,220 1.099 0.976 1.027 0.987 
Injotal Assets) (6.25) (5.70) 
. 
52 (5.43) (5.56) 
Distance-to- 
-0.091 -0.011 -0.138 0.162 0.183 
Default (-0.54) (-0.06) 
-0.08 (0.78) (0.88) 
Number of obs 162 164 169 169 169 
Log Likelihood 
-108.748 -110.327 -115.542 -102.849 -115.154 
Log Likelihood 
(accounting only 
model) 
-108.892 
-110.329 -115.545 -103.158 -115.545 
LR chi2 (extended 
vs accounting 
model) 0.288 0.004 0.006 0.618 0.782 
d. f I I I I I 
Prob>ch12 
(extended vs 
accounting 
model) 0.592 0.950 0.938 0.432 0.377 
Prob>chi2 
(extended vs null 
model) 0.000 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.303 1 0.306 0.274 0.321 0.276 
H 1: Current di stance 
-to -default helps explain current rating relative to current accounting data 
H2: Current di stanc e-to 
-default helps explain current rating relative to stale accounting data 
III Current distance-to-default helps explain ftiture rating relative to current accounting data 
H4: Recent change in distance-to-default helps predict ftiture rating, when accounting data is current 
H5: Recent change in distance 
-to-de fault helps predict future rating, when accounting data is stale 
Note: Big banks; Banks that their Injotal Assets) is more than 25 
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Table 19: Predict current ratint! in samvle, small banks 
Using DD for current ra ing Accountin only model 
Ratings Mean Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
- 
Mean 
(p 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
-Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
1 0.671 0.219 0.075 0.034 0.657 0.226 0.079 0.038 
2 0.236 0.411 0.278 0.075 0.295 0.401 0.245 -0.597 
3 0.027 0.161 0.529 0.283 0.027 0.169 0.524 0.278 
4 0.004 0.026 0.202_] 0.767 0.006 0.026 0.195 0.773 
This table reports the in sample prediction of the mean probabilities of estimating a rating category 
using the model to test Hypothesis I- Comparison of accounting only model and "extended" model that 
includes DID together with the accounting variables using the subsample of "small" banks. 
Table 20: Predict current 6 mouth rating in sample, small banks 
Using D D for 6 month current rating Accounting only model 
Ratings Mean 
(PI) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
Mean 
(p 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
1 0.653 0.212 0.093 0.042 0.646 0.231 0.089 0.033 
2 0.224 0.420 0.292 0.064 0.273 0.405 0.269 0.052 
3 0.0236 0.159 0.533 0.284 0.024 0.159 0.531 0.286 
4 0.005 6 0.222 0.746 0.006 0.026 0.214 0.754 
This table reports the in sample prediction of the mean probabilities of estimating a rating category 
using the model to test Hypothesis 2. Comparison of accounting only model and "extended" model that 
includes DD together with the accounting variables using the subsample of "small" banks. 
Table 21: Predict current rating in sample, big banks 
Us ing DD for current ra ing Accounting only mod el 
Ratings Mean 
(p 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
Mean 
(p 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
1 0.842 0.082 0.069 0.006 0.847 0.0739 0.069 0.009 
2 0.571 0.194 0.201 0.033 0.614 0.178 0.178 0.030 
3 0.175 0.151 0.373 0.301 0.192 0.149 0.365 0.294 
4 0.029 0.033 0.225 0.713 1 0.028 0.033 0.225 0.713 
This table reports the in sample prediction of the mean probabilities of estimating a rating category 
using the model to test Hypothesis 1. Comparison of accounting only model and "extended" model that 
includes DD together with the accounting variables using the subsample of "big" banks. 
Table 22: Predict current 6 month ratine in sample, bi2 banks 
Using DD for 6 month current rating Accounting only model 
Ratings Mean 
(p 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
_ 
Mean 
(p4) 
Mean 
(p 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4)_ 
1 0.80 0.101 0.084 0.011 0.821 0.094 0.074 0.010 
0.516 0.222 0.221 0.042 0.556 0.204 0.198 0.042 
3 0.158 0.152 0.340 0.349 0.163 0.150 0.339 0.348 
4 0.020 0.035 0.214 0.730 0.020 0.035 0.214 0.730 
This table reports the in sample prediction of the mean probabilities of estimating a rating category 
using the model to test Hypothesis 
-2 - Comparison of accounting only model and "extended" model 
that 
includes DID together with the accounting variables using the subsample of "big" banks. 
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Table 23: Prediction of current ratine out of samvle. total data 
Using DD for current prediction Accounting only model 
Ratings Mean 
(PI) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
- 
Mean 
(p 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
1 0.478 0.332 0.179 0.012 0.4925 0.328 0.169 0.010 
2 0.296 0.369 0.305 0.030 0.310 0.368 0.294 0.028 
3 0.042 0.202 0.481 0.275 0.046 0.211 0.480 0.263 
4 0.003 0.033 0.282 0.683 0.003 1 0.035 0.289 0.672 
This table reports the out of sample prediction of the mean probabilities of estimating a rating category 
using the model to test Hypothesis 1. Comparison of accounti that 
includes DD together with the accounting variables. 
ing only model and "extended" model 
Table 24: Prediction of current ratin2 out of sample, small banks 
Using DD for cu rent prediction Accountin only mod el 
Ratings Mean 
(P 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean (p4) Mean 
(P 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
1 0.370 0.391 0.225 0.013 0.445 0.380 0.167 0.008 
2 0.208 0.381 0.332 0.078 0.278 0.374 0.280 0.067 
3 0.008 0.118 0.505 0.368 0.016 0.165 0.509 0.309 
4 0.000 0.011 1 0.166 0.823 0.001 1 0.018 0.204 0.776 
This table reports the out of sample prediction of the mean probabilities of estimating a rating category 
using the model to test Hypothesis 1. Comparison of accounting only model and "extended" model that 
includes DID together with the accounting variables using subsample of "small" banks. 
Table 25: Prediction of current ratin2 out of sample, bi2 banks 
Usin DD fore rrent prediction Accountin only model 
Ratings Mean 
(p 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
Mean 
(p 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
1 0.758 0.137 0.099 0.006 0.739 0.142 0.111 0.008 
2 0.633 0.194 0.164 0.009 0.616 0.199 0.174 0.011 
3 0.185 0.183 0.372 0.260 0.169 0.176 0.376 0.277 
4 0.017 0.046 0.284 0.653 1 0.014 1 0.276 0.276 0.668 
This table reports the out of sample prediction of the mean probabilities of estimating a rating category 
using the model to test Hypothesis 1. Comparison of accounting only model and "extended" model that 
includes DID together with the accounting variables using subsample of "big" banks. 
Table 26: Predict current 6 mouth rating out of sample 
Using DD for 6month current rediction Accountin only model 
Ratings Mean 
(p 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
Mean 
(p 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
1 0.481 0.324 0.181 0.013 0.490 0.328 0.171 0.011 
2 0.318 0.366 0.282 0.034 0.293 0.368 0.305 0.034 
3 0.036 0.193 0.477 0.294 0.043 0.204 0.466 0.287 
4 0.003 0.033 0.253 0.712 
, 
0.003 0.034 0.271 0.693 
This table reports the out of sample prediction of the mean probabilities of estimating a rating categorý, 
using the model to test Hypothesis 2. Comparison of accounting only model and "extended" model that 
includes DID together with the accounting variables. 
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Table 27: Predict current 6 month ratin2, out of sample, small banks 
Using DD for 6mont h current rediction AccountinIZ only model 
Ratings Mean 
(p 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
Mean 
(p 1) 
Mean 
(p2) 
Mean 
(p3) 
Mean 
(p4) 
0.387 0.384 0.221 0.008 0.444 0.382 0.169 0.004 
2 0.225 0.394 0.313 0.067 0.256 0.373 0.323 0.047 
3 0.006 0.110 0.533 0.351 0.015 0.161 0.523 0.301 
4 0.001 0.014 0.188 0.797 0.001 0.018 0.213 
This table reports the out of sample prediction of the mean probabilities of estimating a rating category 
'son of accounting only model and " using the model to test Hypothesis 2. Compari extended" model that 
includes DD together with the accounting variables using subsample of "small" banks. 
Figure 1: The evolution of the mean of Distance-to-Default from 1998 to 2004 for the 
entire sample and for the bank holding banks, commercial banks and mortgage banks. 
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CHAPTER 5: Are equity prices better 
predictors of rating changes than debt 
prices? A comparison of the Merton/KMV 
and BARRA models 
Abstract of Chapter 5 
This study compares the perfon-nance of two widely used proprietary models of 
corporate credit quality Moody's KMV (MKMV) and BARRA. These models use 
pricing information, from the equity and debt market respectively, to calculate market 
implied ratings, measures of credit quality that can be updated continuously along 
with movements in market prices. We employ a sample of 4594 bonds issued by 447 
firms from US for a period of 3 years to compare the ability of these models to mimic 
observed ratings and predict changes in credit ratings. We find that neither model 
provides a close mapping to observed ratings. Both however are useful for prediction 
of credit transitions. We find some evidence, from comparison of receiver operator 
characteristic (ROC) curves that MKMV is a more powerful predictor of downgrades 
than BARRA. 
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5.1. Introduction 
The last decades have seen rapid growth of the credit markets 
, 
increased interest in 
credit as an investment class, and development of risk-sensitive procedures for 
assessing prudential capital requirements. As a result measures of credit quality have 
become increasingly important to regulators, investors and financial institutions. 
While the core measure of credit quality remains the ratings provided by rating 
agencies, like Moody's and Standard & Poors, these agency ratings are adjusted only 
slowly in response to changes in firms' financial situation and business performance. 
Ratings have also proved quite inadequate for prediction of the collapse of several 
large companies, like Enron and Parmalat. These acknowledged weaknesses underpin 
the widespread interest in models that aim to timely predict changes in agency credit 
ratings. 
The objective of this work is to compare two widely used practitioner models, used to 
extract implied credit ratings from market data. These models are Moody's KMV 
(which obtains distance to default and by implication credit ratings from equity price 
data) and BARRA (which obtains ratings predictions directly from bond credit 
spreads). These models are estimated on a data set combining equity price and option- 
adjusted bond spreads, for 447 US firms, from January 2000 to December 2002. 
Since these two models use information from the equity and bond market 
respectively, we are also comparing whether credit spreads or equity prices are better 
predictors of rating changes, subject to the restriction that these predictions are based 
on these particular proprietary models. Both markets have their own advantages and 
disadvantages. On one hand the equity market may be more affected by bubbles and 
irrational behavior of investors, which weakens the relationship between equity prices 
and credit performance. On the other hand the bond market suffers from low liquidity 
and hence (although the recent rapid growth of credit default swap markets since 2002 
are making credit markets much more liquid than in the past. ) 
These are several other approaches to modeling ratings transitions and defaults, which 
will not be addressed in this study. Three main broad categories of default and ratings 
prediction are found in the literature; accounting models, structural models and 
reduced-form models 
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The accounting approach identifies accounting variables that can be used for the 
prediction of corporate default and rating changes. This approach includes the 
qualitative judgment by experienced credit professionals, which remains a central part 
of rating agency methodologies and a large variety of statistical models of rating 
changes and default based on accounting data. 
Although, the accounting approach is informative it has many drawbacks. Financial 
statements are published at best quarterly, and for smaller firms only annually, and are 
backward looking. Accounting models of transition and default are also relatively 
difficult to operate and maintain. Concern about the stability of estimated 
relationships requires the regular updating of data and re-estimation as a check on 
model reliability. These models also do not offer any natural procedure for capturing 
default correlations and hence are relatively difficult to use for modeling distributions 
of portfolio credit returns. 
These limitations explain the practitioner interest in using inforination from either 
equity or debt market to produce "market implied" ratings, and hence Yield 
predictions of transition and default 
. 
The academic literature has proposed a large 
number of such models, adopting both structural and reduced form approaches to 
modeling credit risk. A number of proprietary models used by banks, have now been 
developed, broadly based on one of these two approaches, in order to predict ratings 
and default. 
The two models compared here are the most widely used proprietary models of this 
kind. These are the Moody's KMV credit monitor (MKMV) and the BARRA 
mode, 29. MKMV model is a structural model based on the Merton (1974) model of 
corporate default that views equity as a call option on the underlying assets of the 
firm. It uses the volatility and the value of equity extracted from the equity market to 
predict the distance to default (DD) and the expected default frequency (EDF). The 
most widely used practitioner model using debt prices for prediction of default and 
29 BARRA is now merged with Morgan Stanley Capital International Inc and operates under the name 
MSCI BARRA. 
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rating transition is that of BARRA. This can be viewed as a reduced form type model 
relating option-adjusted spreads to market implied ratings. 30 
There are a number of previous studies examining the predictive perfon-nance of 
different models of credit risk 
.31 This literature includes comparisons of accounting 
models with structural models and of different structural and reduced-form 
specifications. For instance, Hillegeist et al (2004) find that structural models contain 
more information than accounting models (Altman's Z-Score or OhIson's O-Score) 
for the prediction of firm default. 
Other studies suggest that structural models are too restrictive and reduced form 
specifications can improve predictions of default or rating transition. Du and Suo 
(2003) find that distance to default measure is not sufficient for the prediction of 
credit quality, when used alone. They conclude that, when distance to default is used 
together with the firm market value, has higher power for predicting credit ratings 
than when distance to default is used on its own. 
There do not appear to have been any previous studies which directly compare the 
predictive performance of implied ratings drawn from equity and from bond markets 
32 for corporates 
. 
The relationship between market prices and credit ratings is however 
addressed in a another related literature, investigating the impact of credit ratings and 
credit rating changes on stock returns and on bond spreads (rather than as in this study 
the effectiveness of bond or equity prices as predictors or credit rating changes). 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hand et al (1992) and Dichev and Piotroski (2001) 
observe negative abnormal returns after a review for a downgrade but there is no 
significant abnormal equity return reaction following upgrades. Goh and Ederington 
(1999) conclude that the negative reaction to downgrades is stronger for downgrades 
to and amongst speculative grade (BB or lower) firms compared to downgrades 
within the investment grade category. 
30 A ftill description of BARRA model can be found on the paper "Market implied ratings", by Breger, 
Goldberg and Cheyette published in BARRA website: 
(www. barra. com/sui)port/libraLiL/credit/market 
- 
implied ratjngýi. pdf). 
The paper has also been published at Risk Magazine, July 2003. 
31 Refer to Chapter 2 for a more detailed description of studies on the comparison of different credit 
risk models. 
32 Gropp et al (2006) examine the ability of both equity and bond market indicators (distance to default 
and bond spreads respectively) to signal bank fragility. Their study though focuses on banks while our 
study focuses on corporates. 
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Examining bond price reactions to rating changes, Katz (1974) and Grier and Katz 
(1976) conclude that in the industrial bond market there was some anticipation before 
decreases but not increases. Hand et al. (1992) find strong negative effect of 
downgrades on bond returns during the period just before and after the announcement. 
Wansley et al. (1992) find a linkage between significant abnormal returns and 
changes in credit ratings. Nevertheless, both Hite and Warga (1997) and Dynkin et al. 
(2002) find that bond prices reaction is stronger for downgrades to and amongst 
speculative grade (BB or lower) compared to downgrades within the investment grade 
category. Hull, Predescu and White (2004) examined the relationship between credit 
default swaps changes and credit rating changes. They find evidence that the credit 
default swap market anticipates downgrades, while the impact of upgrades is lower. 
Other studies examined the relationship between credit ratings and credit spreads. 
West (1973) and Liu and Thakor (19 84) show that on average bond spreads and credit 
ratings are negatively correlated, with a higher spread associated with higher default 
risk and hence a lower credit rating. Nevertheless, this relationship is not close. Taylor 
and Perraudin (2001) showed that on individual spreads even after accounting for 
liquidity and tax effects, are highly variable within credit rating classes. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of Moody's 
KMV equity price based model 
- 
including the estimation of "market" implied ratings 
using a Merton/MKMV model 
- 
and the BARRA credit spread model. Section 3 
describes the data set and provides summary statistics. In Section 4, we present the 
empirical results, while in Section 5 we conclude. 
5.2. Description of the two models 
This section describes the two proprietary models compared in this work, Moody's 
KMV and BARRA, and explains how implied credit ratings and hence predictions of 
rating changes can be obtained from these two models. Both these models have 
already been discussed in Chapter 2 of the thesis, but for reasons of continuity we 
restate the main models here. 
Both MKMV and BARRA models can be used to derive market implied credit ratings 
using market data for a single day. Thus, in contrast to accounting based models, they 
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can be updated on a continuous basis and have the potential to provide timely 
information on changes in credit quality. 
5.2.1. Moody's KMV model 
Moody's KMV (MKMV) model is based on the structural credit nsk Merton model. 
Merton (1974) pioneered the structural credit risk models since he was the first to use 
the option pricing theory (OPT) developed by Black and Scholes (1973) in the 
33 
valuation of default risk spreads of fixed income instruments. 
As in the original Merton model, MKMV assumes that the firm's market value of 
assets follows a log-normal stochastic process. MKMV uses the same option-pricing 
formula for the value of equity as the Merton model. The value of equity Ve is seen as 
a call option on the value of assets V, with strike price the default barrier P and is 
expressed using Black and Scholes option pricing formula: 
pe -rT N(d 
,, 
N(dl) 
where 
07 
2 
log V' +r+T p2 
07a 
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d2 
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2 
log V' +r- 
p2 
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VT 
[5.1] 
[5.2] 
[5.3] 
and V, is the market value of assets, a, is the volatility of assets, P is the default 
barrier, r is the risk-free rate and N(-) is the cumulative standard normal ftinction. 
Moody's KMV model uses an ad hoc formula for the calculation of the default 
barrier. While in Merton's case the default barrier is equal to the firrn's book value of 
total liabilities in MKMV model is cletennined as the sum of short-term liabilities and 
half of the long-ten-n debt: 
33 Merton's model has been thoroughly d1scussed In Chapters 2 and 3 of the thes1s. 
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P= ShortTerm_ Liabilities +I LongTerm- Liabilities [5.4] 2 
The reason for this adjustment is that, in practice, many firms do not default when 
their market value of assets reaches their total liabilities, since the long-term nature of 
some of their liabilities allows them to operate and avoid default, at least in the short- 
tenn 
. 
As in any structural model, the firm's default probability depends mainly on three 
variables; the asset value, the volatility of the assets and the default boundary. The 
default boundary can be extracted from the firm's financial statements, while the 
value and the volatility of the assets are unknown and have to be estimated. 34 
Using the estimated values of the value and the volatility of assets, the distance-to- 
default (DD) measure is estimated. The distance-to-default denotes how many 
standard deviations is the market value of assets away from the default barrier. Hence, 
the higher a firm's distance to default measure, the lower is the firm's probability of 
default. 
The formula used for the calculation of DD measure is the following: 
In 
-ýa +U 
07a 
p2 
DD 
=- 
07a NrT 
[5.5] 
where u denotes the expected return on the firm's assets and it is used to derive the 
default probability under the true probability measure. 35 Note that the formula for DD 
is the same as that previously given for the risk-neutral default probability d2 except 
that the risk-free rate in the previous formula is replaced by the expected return on the 
finn's assets. 
The main difference between Merton and MKMV models is on the final calculation 
of Expected Default Frequencies (EDFs). In Merton case it is calculated as N(-DD). 
This approach is based on the assumption that the firm's asset returns are normally 
distributed, which for the calculation of default probabilities is not so appropriate. The 
. 
34 Techniques on how the value and volatility of assets are estimated will be analyzed In Section 5.2.2. 
35 Note that for the calculation of DD, the risk-free rate r can be used instead of P. In this case, the 
default probability is computed under the risk neutral measure. 
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most important reason is that the default point is random. Since ex ante it is not 
possible to examine the behavior of the liabilities, MKMV tries to 64 correct" the bias 
in the EDFs caused by the use of the normal distribution, by mapping the distance to 
default measure to an EDF measure. Using a database of over 250,000 company-years 
observations with over 4,700 incidents of default, the model extracts a frequency table 
which relates the probability of default to different levels of distance to default. For 
instance, if the calculated distance to default for a firrn is 5, then the corresponding 
EDF for I year horizon is calculated as the ratio of the firms with DD 5 that defaulted 
over I year time period to the total number of firms with DD 5.36 
A principal attraction of the Merton/MKMV model is that information from the equity 
markets is used so as to predict the credit quality changes. Efficient market theory 
suggests that investors are rational and all publicly available information should be 
reflected on the equity prices. Hence, the information on the ability of a firm to repay 
its debts is reflected on the fluctuation and the level of its equity price. Assuming that 
the structural model is correctly specified, then equity market data can then be used so 
as to compute two unobserved variables: the market value of assets and the volatility 
of the bank's assets. In this way, equity data can be used for the calculation of default 
probabilities in a more timely fashion compared to the traditional accounting models, 
since distance-to-default and hence EDFs can be continuously updated. 
5.2.2. Estimation of market implied ratings from equity data 
(Merton/MKMV model) 
The purpose of MKMV model is to produce an EDF for each firm which can be 
continuously updated. Each firm's EDF can subsequently be mapped to a rating. This 
subsection describes the calculation used in this study for computing distance to 
default and implied ratings from the Merton/MKMV model. 
For the calculation of firm's DD, two unknown variables need to be estimated, the 
value and the volatility of assets. In this paper, we follow the work by Vassalou and 
Xing (2004) and Du & Suo (2003) for the estimation of market value and volatility of 
a firrn's asset who use a similar approach as MKMV. 
36 This adjustment is described in Peter M. Crosbie (2000) "Modelling Default Risk" chapter 9 of 
SatJa it Das (ed) Credit Derivatives and Credit Linked Notes, 2 nd ed., John'Wiley and Sons. pp 369- Yi 
410. 
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We use an iterative procedure to extract the value and volatility of a fin-n's asset. We 
use one year estimation window of stock prices to estimate the value and volatilit', of 
a firm's assets. Using the value of the firm's equity volatility as an initial guess of the 
value of asset volatility, we solve equation 5.1 and a set of asset values is determined. 
Then for the second iteration we set the asset volatility equal to the annualized 
volatility of the set of asset returns derived from the first iteration. This iteration 
generates a new set of asset values and so on. The procedure continues until it 
converges. Using the derived value, volatility and expected return on assets, MKMV 
produces the distance-to-default measure as described above. 
Alternatively, the value and the volatility of assets can be detennined by solving the 
following equation together with equation 5.1. From Ito's lemma, we can extract a 
fonnula that connects volatility of equity to the volatility of assets: 
ce = 07 
a* 
Vý 
* 
ýVe 
[5.6] Ve 0 Vý 
where Ue is the equity volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of finn's 
returns and 
OVe 
- 
N(dj). In this case, the equations 5.1 and 5.6 are solved 0 Va 
simultaneously to obtain the estimation of value and volatility of assets. 37 
While our methodology of computing the value and volatility of assets is the same as 
followed by MKMV, for the calculation of distance to default measure, we use the 
risk free rate instead of p, which is the expected return on firm's assets. Hence, the 
distance to default measure is calculated as follows: 
ln(ýa +r- 47a 
2T 
p2 
DD= 
UaVT 
[5.7] 
The main advantage of this approach, as pointed out by Vassalou and Xing (2005), Is 
that we avoid induced estimation errors arising from the need to estimatep. 38 
37 Since for the estimation of the MKMV ratings it is the magnitude that counts instead of the absolute 
value of DD, we do not expect the final results to change much by estimating the value and the 
volatility of assets using equations 5.1 and 5.6. 
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As pointed out before, MKMV maps the distance to default measure to historical 
default data to determine the corresponding default probability credit ratings. 'Ve use 
instead an econometric model to related distance to default to the observed credit rates 
in our sample. In this case the dependent variable 
- 
the credit rating 
-- 
is both discrete 
and associated with a number (in our case the rating categories) of ordered outcomes. 
Hence, an appropriate estimation technique is the ordered probit model. 39 
Then for N firms (i=l,.... N) the ordered probit model can be represented as follows: 
Yt 
=a+ DDit [5.8] 
where Yj is an integer ordinal variable that can be associated with the different credit 
rating categories, such that ý. =I if the bank has low credit quality, etc and belongs 
to 11,2,3,4,5,61. 
Estimating the ordered probit model, the probability that a particular rating will be 
assigned to a particular issuer can be derived. We take as the model implied rating to 
be the one with the highest assigned probability given by the model. 
5.2.3. BARRA model 
The use of the equity market data for the quantification of credit risk has its pitfalls, 
since equity markets are highly volatile. Moreover, behavioral finance offers several 
reasons for investor overreaction and helps explain the bubbles observed in the equity 
market. This generates some doubts as to whether equity market is the best available 
method for the prediction of credit rating changes. 
An alternative is the use of debt market information in the estimation of credit risk, 
which may be more informative since bond spreads directly reflect the compensation 
required by investors for the risk due to credit rating changes and default. There are a 
number of theoretical models 
- 
both structural and reduced form 
- 
that can be used to 
obtain estimates of default probabilities from bond market data. We focus on one of 
the most widely used, the proprietary model of BARRA that derives market implied 
rating using the infori-nation from bond spreads. 
38 Vassalou and Xing (2005) show that their results remain relatively the same by using ýt measure 
instead of the risk free rate. 39 Ordered probit or logit models are more efficient for the modelling of multiple rating categories than 
the multinomial probit or logit models, commonly used for modelling multiple discrete outcomes. 
Multinomial probit or logit should be used only when there is no inherent ordering of the different 
choices. Chapter 4, Section 4.3 provides a detailed description of the ordered probit model. 
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This model is based on the assumption that on average the agency ratings are 
informative. It develops a mapping between observed bond spreads and ratings. From 
this mapping it can then identify those issuers with implied ratings that differ 
markedly from their actual agency rating. This then leads to predictions of rating 
changes. The main advantage of this model, as in MKMV model, is that the ratings 
can be derived on a continuous basis and are taking advantage of the information 
regarding the credit quality of the firm that is already reflected in bond prices. 
The BARRA model uses option-adjusted spreads for the derivation of market implied 
rating. 40 Moreover, it uses issuers rather than individual bond issues. The spread of an 
issuer is computed as the average of the spreads of the issuer's outstanding bonds. 
Then, using the average spread per issuer, a distribution of the average issuer spreads 
over different rating categories is constructed. 
As our data confirms, the resulting distribution of issuer average spreads exhibits 
large overlaps between individual ratings sub-distributions, observing a wide range of 
different ratings for the same average spread. The BARRA model does not try to 
explain these differences, rather it tries to use them to develop an implied 
classification and hence predict future ratings changes. The main estimation challenge 
in computing the implied ratings is to determine a sequence of spreads bAAA/AA, 
bAA/A, bA/BBB 
etc. that correspond to the boundaries between rating classes. Thus for 
example any issuer with an average spread sj that lies between bAAA/AAand bAA/A Will 
have an implied rating of AA; any issuer with an average spread bAA/Aand bA/BBB Will 
have an implied rating of A; etc. 
More formally we can write these thresholds for the implied ratings as the vector 
b which can be represented as follows: 
b= (b', b', b', b', b', b' 012345 
= 
(b, b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 
= 
(bAAAIAA, bAAIA, bAlBBB, bBBBIBB, bBBIB, bBICCC) 
40 Option-adjusted spreads (OAS) is a method of making spreads from dfferent bonds more 
comparable. Hence, it is useful for comparing bonds with different characteristics on a more equal 
basis. More precisely, OAS is a measure of a bond's extra return over the return of a comparable 
Treasury bond net of the cost of any embedded options (refer to Cavallo and Valenzuela (2007)). We 
use the OAS analysis from Bloomberg. 
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To determine the vector b, the model minimises a penalty function that measures the 
gap between the observed spread sj and the rating class boundaries, for any issuer j 
whose implied classification is different from its actual agency classification. The 
penalty function can be represented as below: 
P(b) 
= 
l[wj 
* 
(sj 
- 
bi+(j) )+ + wj (b, -. (j) - sj 
)+ 
i 
where: 
agency rating index of issuer 
Sj : spread of issuer 
bj- : lower threshold for implied rating index I 
bl' : upper threshold for implied rating index I 
N total number of issuers in the universe 
NI number of issuers with rating I 
N 
weight which is chosen to equalize the contribution of each rating bucket wi Ni(j) 
to the total penalty function. 
The "plus" signs at the end of each parenthesis mean that the term is taken into 
account if and only if it is positive, i. e. only if the observed credit spread is 
respectively above or below the range of spreads consistent with the agency rating io) 
ofissuerj. 
The values of vector b that minimize the penalty function are the implied 
classification thresholds. 
The main drawback of BARRA model is that it assumes a flat credit spread yield 
curve. However, they address the issue and show that even if one splits the sample for 
similar maturity bonds or for bonds in the same industry the results do not change. In 
this chapter we estimate the market implied ratings as suggested by BARRA. 
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5.3. Data and summary statistics 
For the purpose of this chapter, we have collected data for a sample of 4594 bonds 
issued by 447 firms from US for a period of 3 years, from January 2000 to December 
2002. We have used daily option adjusted spreads from the 4594 bonds. 
Credit ratings of each firm or issuer have been collected for the period between 
January 2000 and December 2002 ftom Bloomberg. We restrict credit rating changes 
to those announced by three major credit rating agencies: Moody's, S&P and Fitch. 
We use the issuer rating or senior unsecured debt rating, which is used frequently as a 
proxy of the issuer rating. Mainly, Moody's has been used for the reporting of the 
credit ratings and credit rating changes, while information from S&P and Fitch has 
been employed when Moody's did not provide the required rating. Credit ratings are 
grouped into 6 broad categories: AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B or less. In our sample we 
have 151 credit rating downgrades and 42 rating upgrades. Table 1, presents the 
frequency of each rating category in our sample while Table 2 shows the number of 
upgrades or downgrades to each rating category. We observe that rating categories A 
and BBB have the highest number of observations. 
Figures 1,2, and 3 show the relationship between the credit rating and average issuer 
spreads. For all years (2000-2003) we observe that on average the higher the spreads 
the lower the credit rating. There is however a considerable overlap between different 
credit ratings, it is common to observe both high spreads are found for low ratings and 
low spreads for high ratings. Table 3, presents the descriptive statistics for the credit 
spreads. The results of the percentiles confirm that on average the higher the spread 
the lower the rating but the relationship is not close because of these overlaps. 
Regarding the MKMV model, for the calculation of distance-to-default measure, as 
mentioned before, there are five variables that are necessary for the estimation of the 
unobserved value and volatility of assets: the default barrier, market capitalization or 
6'value of equity", equity volatility, time horizon and risk free interest rate. 
We calculate the default barrier using COMPUSTAT database to extract information 
from firms' financial statements. We use the "Debt in one Year" and "Long Term 
Debt" COMPUSTAT data items as the firms' short-term and long-term liabilities 
respectively. 
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For the calculation of value of equity, data on the number of outstanding shares and 
have been collected from COMPUSTAT database for the same period of time. Daily 
equity price data have also been collected from Bloomberg for the period between 
1999 and 2003. The reason for collecting one additional year of equity data is due to 
the fact that we use a 12-month window in equity volatility calculations using the 
standard deviation of equity returns. Note that we could use a GARCH type model for 
the calculation of equity volatility or an exponentially weighted average. 
Nevertheless, we use a 12 month window since this is the most widespread approach 
in the literature and our analysis in Chapter 3 suggested that this approach and the 
exponentially weighted average yield similar results. 
A number of the 447 bond-issuing firms are not found in the COMPUSTAT database; 
while even for those that are included, in some cases equity price data is not available 
as far back as January 1999. For this reason the size of the sample for which we can 
compute MKMV predicted ratings is a good deal smaller than that for which we can 
compute BARRA predicted ratings. This means that for the estimation of 
Merton/MKMV model the number of firms used is reduced to 306 due to non 
availability of either equity or financial data and the number of daily observations 
falls from 381,188 to 273,416. 
Following Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Du and Suo (2003) we use the monthly one 
year constant maturity Treasury bill rates as a proxy for the risk-interest rate. The data 
for this variable has been derived from the US Federal Reserve Bank. 
The time horizon T is set to I year, which is used in the literature as benchmark. 
To calculate the Distance-to-Default measure, the value and the volatility of assets are 
estimated using the iterative process described in Section 5.2.2. 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of the distance to default per rating category. 
As expected the average distance to default falls as the rating quality decreases. 
Nevertheless once again the relationship is far from close. The correlation between 
credit rating and distance to default is 
-0.4344.41 As Figure 4 shows, just as with credit 
spreads, there is considerable overlap of distance to default in different ratings 
41 Note that the minus sign suggests that the higher the rating the higher the distance to default. The 
minus sign is due to the fact that in our analysis a higher rating is represented by a lower number, i. e. I 
is rating AAA while 6 denoted rating B or below. 
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categories. There is also some indication in Figure 4 of a non-linear relationship 
between the credit rating and the distance to default. 
5.4. Empirical results 
This section provides estimation results and compares BARRA and Merton/MKMV 
models in terms of their ability to predict ratings and rating changes. 
As mentioned before, for the BARRA model the prediction of model implied ratings 
comes directly from the estimation of the model. For the prediction of model implied 
ratings using Merton/MKMV model we must use the further ordered probit model, 
specified in Section 5.2.2. 
Table 5 presents the results from the estimation of ordered probit model, where 
distance to default measure is the only independent variable. The results confirrn the 
relation between distance to default and credit ratings; the higher the distance to 
default measure the higher the credit rating. 42 We find that the distance to default 
measure is statistically highly significantly related to the credit rating with a very high 
value of the Z-statistic (195.84) and a p-value effectively equal to zero. As far the 
model's explanatory power, since logistic regression does not have an equivalent of 
R-squared, the test statistics used should be treated carefully. We report the Prob>chi2 
and McFadden's pseudo R-squared. The Prob>ch12 (or p-value) is the probability of 
getting a likelihood ratio test statistic as extreme as the one observed under the null 
hypothesis where we assume that all of the regression coefficients of the model are 
equal to zero. Although we reject the null hypothesis (Prob>chi2 is equal to zero), the 
low reported value of McFadden's pseudo R-squared may indicate that the predictive 
ability of the model is low and that other variables, including possibly bond spreads, 
could help with the prediction of credit transitions. 
As explained in Section 2, using the ordered probit model we compute the predicted 
probability of each firm falling in each rating category. The model implied rating 
from Merton/MKMV is assigned to be the rating with the highest predicted 
probability. 
Tables 6 and 7 report respectively the BARRA and Merton/MKMV implied ratings 
compared to the Moody's rating. In both cases the relationship between the market 
42 Note that in this case only, a higher rating is represented by a higher number, i. e. 6s rating AAA 
w1ille I denoted rating B or below. 
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implied and actual Moody's rating is a weak one. Both models tend to allocate ratings 
towards the middle ratings banks, allocating many more companies to ratings 
categories 3 and 4 (A and BBB) than the actual Moody's ratings, and far less 
companies to ratings categories I and 2 (AAA and AA) or 5 and 6 (BB or B and 
below). 
This tendency to re-allocate to central ratings is especially pronounced for Moody's 
KMV. For this reason the Merton-MKMV model produces an even weaker 
relationship with the actual rating than does BARRA. As indicated in Table 7, the 
Merton-KMV model hardly ever allocates an implied rating in either categories 1-2 
(AAA and AA), even though these account for more than 5 per cent of the daily firm- 
observations. In fact, in Tables 6a and 7a it is shown that BARRA model allocates 
half of the observations to A and BBB ratings while Merton/Moody's KMV allocates 
around 99% of the observations to these rating categories. 
For this reason the BARRA implied ratings seam to be somewhat more in line with 
Moody's ratings compared to the Merton/MKMV implied ratings. This is confin-ned 
by Spearman's correlation measure between the BARRA and Moody's ratings is 
0.767, while the corresponding correlation between Merton/MKMV and Moody's 
ratings is 0.361. The reason for the higher Spearman correlation between BARRA and 
Moody's ratings can be due to the fundamental differences between BARRA and 
Merton/MKMV model. BARRA model is calibrated to fit ratings thus it is an 
empirically originated model, conceptually different from the MKMV approach that 
is based on the structural model approach. 
This "centralization" of credit ratings reflects the fact (documented in Figures 1-4) 
that the market data (credit spreads or distances to default) overlap considerably 
between different credit ratings. As a result both the direct estimation of market 
implied ratings boundaries in BARRA and in the ordered probit estimation from 
MKMV, the errors in rating classification are minimized by allocating a relatively 
large proportion of companies to the central ratings categories. The consequence of 
this tendency to "centralization" is that both models, but especially the KMV model, 
tend to predict movement towards the central ratings bands 3 and 4 (A and BBB) 
There are relatively few downgrade predictions from banks 3 and 4 into 5 and 6 or 
upgrades from 3 and 4 into I and 2. 
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We next test whether the models successfully predict Moody's rating I month. 3 
months and 6 months prior the reported Moody's rating. These results are presented 
for BARRA in Tables 8,9 and 10. These tables present the BARRA predicted credit 
ratings I month, 3 month and 6 months prior to the reported Moody's ratings using 
the entire sample. We find that, using the estimated BARRA boundaries, the model 
correctly predicts a large proportion of both downgrades (81 out of 138) and upgrades 
(19 out of 40) at a one month horizon. These proportions remain fairly high even at 
longer horizons, with correct predictions of 69 out of 138 downgrades at the three 
month horizon and 55 out of 134 at the six month horizons. Upgrade prediction 
actually improves slightly to 20 out of 40 at both three and six month horizons. 43 
However in all cases there are a very high number of false predictions of a rating 
change, in excess of 99.9% for both upgrades and downgrades at all time horizons. 
This indicates that the BARRA model cannot be used with the estimated boundaries 
as a practical forecasting tool, but that the sensitivity levels must be sharply reduced 
so that it makes fewer upgrade and downgrade predictions. 
Similar results for predictive ability are obtained for the MKMV model downgrade 
predictions (Tables 11 
- 
13) which correctly predicts 42 out of 106 downgrades at one 
month horizon, 37 out of 106 at the three month horizon and 35 out of 102 at the six 
month horizon. There are very small numbers of observed upgrades, but the majority 
of these are predicted by the model. However as with the BARRA model, there are 
very high levels, now in excess of 99.95%, of false predictions of upgrade and of 
downgrade at all time horizons. 
As a next step we compare the predictive power of BARRA and MKMV models 
using the same sample i. e. those observations for which both BARRA and MKMV 
implied ratings are available. The constraint we face is that for some of our firms we 
do not have equity pricing information, therefore to make this comparison we must 
restrict our BARRA results to the same subset of observations as for which we have 
observations on MKMV implied ratings. These are reported in Tables 14,15 and 16, 
once again reporting the predictive performance of BARRA implied ratings I month, 
3 months and 6 months prior the reported Moody's ratings. BARRA achieves slightly 
better performance than MKMV, with a greater proportion of correctly predicted 
43 The number of downgrades and upgrades is reduced for the 6 month period compared to the I and 3 
month prediction period due to the fact that a bigger prediction window is chosen. 
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downgrades (eg 64 instead of 42 out of 106 at one month) and slightly lower but still 
unacceptably high level of false predictions (e. g. 99.86% at one month compared with 
99-93% for MKMV) 
Comparing the two models, we conclude that while there is some evidence that the 
BARRA model performs better at the prediction of downgrades while 
Merton/MKMV model performs better in the case of upgrades, nevertheless the main 
problem for both models is the high number of cases where they give a false signal. 
Although, BARRA model correctly predicted the majority of cases when there was 
actually a downgrade (most successfully I month prior to the downgrade by Moody's) 
well over 99% of the cases that the model predicted a downgrade proved to be a false 
alarm since there was not a change in the credit rating. The same stands for 
Merton/MKMV model. 
One of the main drawbacks of the above comparison of BARRA and Merton/MKMV 
model is that while BARRA market implied ratings are estimated on a dally basis, for 
the Merton/MKMV data we used the full sample for the estimation of the ordered 
probit model. Hence, in the above estimations Merton/MKMV model uses more 
information than the BARRA model. To overcome this problem, we also estimate the 
Merton/MKMV implied ratings on a daily basis (i. e. by running the ordered probit 
model daily and estimating daily thresholds). In Tables 17,18 and 19 we report the 
predictive performance of Merton/MKMV implied ratings I month, 3 months and 6 
months prior the reported Moody's ratings, when the implied ratings are calculated on 
a daily basis. We show that the results stay almost the same and the conclusions on 
the comparison of the two models remain unchanged. 
This problem of excessive false prediction of rating transition indicates that it is 
necessary to compare the models not at their estimated sensitivity levels, but by 
altering sensitivity levels to vary the number of predictions and therefore alter the 
relative frequency of Type I and Type 11 errors. This comparison can be made using 
ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curves. The main advantage of using ROC 
curves for the evaluation of models is their ability to discriminate between two states, 
while altering the sensitivity of predictions. Thus we can control the level of false 
predictions of a credit change at a reasonable level and then compare the models. 
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The ROC curve is constructed as follows. For all possible cut-off values the true 
positive rate (the proportion of rating transitions that have been correctly predicted) 
and the false negative rate (the proportion of all observations where no transition 
takes place, but which were predicted to transit). The ROC curve thus represents the 
tradeoff between Type I errors (one minus the vertical position of each point on the 
curve) and Type 11 errors (the horizontal position of each point on the curve). As the 
sensitivity of the cut-off point is increased we move up and to the right on the ROC 
curve with fewer Type I errors but more Type 11 errors. In principle the higher the 
area under the curve the better is the model performance. A purely random model 
would yield a curve close to the 45 degree line and would have an area under the 
curve of 0.5. A very powerful model that predicts most states with few false 
predictions would yield a curve close to the left-hand vertical and upper-horizontal 
axes, and have an area under the curve close to 1. Satchell and Xia (2006) and De 
Servigny and Renault (Chapter 3) offer a more detailed study of the ROC curves and 
their application to credit rating model validation. 
Figures 5 and 6 show the ROC curves for BARRA and MKMV models in case of a 
downgrade. 44 To be able to compare the results we use only the cases where data 
exists both for BARRA spreads and distance to default measure. 45 We find that both 
models perform better than a random model. The most notable finding is that MKMV 
performs slightly better that BARRA model for the estimation of downgrades at 
reasonable levels of sensitivity the lower left part of the two curves (keeping the 
number of false positives to less than 50%). At these sensitivity levels MKMV clearly 
generates a higher rate of successful predictions than BARRA. This contrasts with our 
conclusions when using the estimated ratings boundaries, but recall that these 
estimated boundaries are associated with very high levels of Type 11 errors, since they 
often predict rating transitions that do not take place. Both models are more useful 
when the sensitivity is reduced so that they yield fewer predictions of rating changes. 
The ROC comparison shows that in this situation MKMV clearly perfori-ris better at 
predicting downgrades in our sample than BARRA. 
44 For the estimation of ROC curve, the STATA econometric program has been used. STATA has 
predetermined commands for the derivation of a ROC curve as well as the calculation of areas below 
the ROC curve. 
45 Note that to construct the ROC curve for MKMV model , ve use -DD instead of DD. This is due to 
the fact that in order to construct the ROC curve we need to use an ordinal variable where higher values 
represent higher risk. 
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Only when sensitivity is increased to very high levels, the upper right portion of the 
curves when the false positive reaches in excess of 90% or more, then BARRA 
outperforms MKMV. This is the portion of the curves consistent with the results 
reported in Tables I 1- 16. 
Figures 7 to 8 present the ROC curves for BARRA and MKMV models in case of 
upgrade. Here we find that while neither model performs well, the BARRA model 
performs better than MKMV model. In fact it is appears that the MKMV model does 
not perform better than a random model in the case of upgrades. 
It is notable that using the ROC curve analysis we conclude that MKMV model is 
slightly better predictor of downgrades compared to BARRA model, while at the 
beginning it has been shown that BARRA model performs better in the prediction of 
downgrades. This is due to the fact that ROC curves are constructed for different cut 
off points. Hence, in the first part of the analysis we compare the two models' 
predictions based on the model produced cut off points while using the ROC curves a 
comparison of the models can be done for different cut off points. 
5.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we compared two of the most widely used models for obtaining 
market-implied ratings, the MKMV model based on equity prices and the BARRA 
model based on credit spreads. It has estimated these models on a sample of 4594 
bonds issued by 447 firms from US for a period of 3 years, from January 2000 to 
December 2002. In the case of BARRA the model estimation procedure itself 
allocates these companies to different "market implied" ratings categories. In the case 
of MKMV we use ordered probit estimation to obtain these implied ratings from the 
model estimated distances to default. 
We find that credit spreads and MKMV distance to default are not closely related to 
the actual agency ratings recorded by Moody's. There are considerable overlaps in the 
distribution of both market measures of credit quality between ratings classes. As a 
result using these market measures of credit quality to obtain market implied ratings, 
we find that a relatively large proportion of companies are allocated to central ratings 
categories 3 (A) and 4 (Baa). 
136 
This centralization also means that, when the ratings models are used to predict 
ratings changes, based on their estimated ratings boundaries, then they yield excessive 
false predictions of ratings changes. More than 99% of predicted rating transitions 
over one-month, three-month, or six-month horizons proving to be false i. e. no rating 
transition in fact takes place. 
We report ROC curves as a method of comparing the predictive ability of these 
models for capturing ratings changes at lower levels of sensitivity. These indicate that 
both models have some power for predicting downgrades but that, controlling for 
sensitivity to maintain a reasonable level of false positives MKMV is more successful 
than BARRA in predicting ratings downgrades. Perhaps due to the relatively small 
number of upgrades in this data sample, neither model is particularly good at 
predicting upgrades. In fact MKMV does not better than a random model while 
BARRA does only a little bit better. 
Our main conclusion is a negative one 
- 
neither bond nor equity market information 
seems to be particularly helpful in overcoming the problem of a large number of false 
alarms i. e. predictions of rating changes that do not in fact take place. The data set 
contains relatively few actual transitions. Clearly it would help if the study could be 
extended, for example to a larger data set covering more years and companies from 
other markets than the US. This is not easy to do, particularly because of the 
inconvenience of collecting the required option-adjusted bond spreads. Moreover, 
since we show that none of the models captures all the information relevant to 
assessing corporate credit quality, it would be useful to examine the predictive power 
of the models by estimating, for each rating class, individual sensitivity barriers for 
MKMV and BARRA models. The choice of the barriers would aim to balance Type I 
and Type 11 errors. 
Furthen-nore, there is evidence that ratings are serially correlated (refer to Bangia et al 
(2002)). By adding lagged ratings into the ordered probit model may help us to 
investigate how this would affect the predictive ability of the models. 
Other model specifications could be entertained. For example it would also be 
worthwhile to examine how successfully equity price data can be used for modeling 
and predicting ratings changes in more reduced form framework than MKM. V or the 
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two sources of data, from equity and bond markets, might be combined in altemative 
structural or reduced-form models. 
Nonetheless, on the basis of our limited data, we can conclude that neither MKMV 
nor BARRA are especially useful tools for the modeling and prediction of credit 
upgrades and downgrades. Neither model is close to capturing all the information 
relevant to assessing corporate credit quality. They would appear to be best used as 
one of a range of tools of credit risk analysis. 
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Tables and flEures 
Table 1: Frequency of each ratin2 cate2orv in the data 
Rating 
class Actual Rating Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
I AAA 1,630 0.38 0.38 
2 AA 23,682 5.56 
3 A 134,383 31.57 37.51 
4 BBB 1591554 37.48 75 
5 BB 70ý287 16.51 91.51 
6 B or below 36J53 8.49 100 
Total 425,689 loo F Note: The total number ot-425,689 observations refers to the number of daily observations 
Table 2: Number of upgrades and downgrades to each rating category 
Actual Rating 
Number of 
downgrades 
Number of 
upgrades 
Rating 
1 AAA 0 0 
2 AA 1 10 
3 A 1 9 
4 BBB 50 12 
5 BB 57 11 
6 B or below 32 0 
This table presents the total number of upgrades and downgrades per rating class. Data on the credit 
ratings has been collected from Bloomberg. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of credit spreads 
Descri tive statistics of spreads 
Rating 
Actual 
ratinq 
Number of 
observations Mean 
25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
(median) 
75th 
percentile 
I AAA 1,158 92.16 59.02 97.65 123.79 
2 AA 169014 118.53 97.76 118.75 142.64 
3 A 86,487 164.02 131.37 157.57 189.55 
4 BBB 98ý514 259.86 188.07 225.93 305.61 
5 BB 41,820 422.19 308.25 379.9 479.21 
6 
B or 
below 
- 
720,613 
586.88 404.06 516.37 1 670.78 
This table presents the descnptive statistics of credit spreads. It shows the number of observations per 
rating class as well as the mean value of spreads (expressed in basis points). We present the 25 1h ,5 Oth 
and 75thpercentile as well. 
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Table 4: Average distance to defaidt ner rnfinu enti-cmru 
Descriptive statistics of distance to de fault 
Rating 
Actual 
rating 
Number of 
observations Mean 
25th 
percentile 
- 
50th 
percentile 
(median) 
75th 
percentile 
1 AAA 1 ý065 7.37 5.74 6.72 9.07 
2 AA 7,573 6.29 4.64 5.82 7.49 
3 A 51,344 4.86 3.59 4.81 6.23 
4 BBB 7105 3.96 2.88 3.93 5.05 
5 BB 369272 3.25 2.4 3.22 4.14 
6 B or below 17,462 2.531 1.50 2.38 3.43 
i nis tame presents ine aescriptive statistics ot distance to detault. It shows the number of observations 
per rating class as well as the mean value of distance to default (a measure that denotes how many 
standard deviati th 
5 olh 
ions the asset value of a firm is away from the default boundary). We present the 25 
and 75th percentile as well. 
Table 5: Estimates of ordered probit model for panel data, 2000-2003 
Parameter Coefficient z value p value 
Distance to default 0.255 195.84 0 
Number of obs 185381 
Log Likelihood 
-244439.73 
LR ch12 39454.16 
d. f I 
Prob>chi2 0 
Pseudo R2 0.074 
Cut-off points 
Cut 1 
-0.438 
Cut 2 0.407 
Cut 3 1.537 
Cut 4 2.945 
Cut 5 3.939 
Note: these estimates are for the ordered probit model using daily DD data from beginning of 
2000 to the end of 2002. The plus sign on the coefficient shows that the higher the distance to 
default the higher the credit rating (note that although throughout this Chapter it is not the 
case, for the estimation of ordered probit model, higher ratings are represented by higher 
numbers, i. e. 6 in this case denotes the higher rating category). 
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Table 6: BARRA implied rating versus Moody's rating 
Moody's rating 
BARRA 
implied 
rating 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
1 1 ý353 85266 10,130 655 402 32 20,838 2 253 81064 26ý377 1,775 319 73 36,861 
3 24 5,876 56,930 33ý756 743 426 97,755 
4 0 299 26,818 74,920 13,489 2,039 117,565 
5 0 0 2ý031 22,985 29,343 6,915 61,274 
6 0 0 168 7,823 16,644 22,260 1 46,895 
Total 1,630 1 22,505 122,454 141,914 60,940 1 31,745 1 381,188 
I his table summarizes the number ot observations that occur for each possible combination of BARRA 
implied rating and Moody's credit rating. 
Table 6a: BARRA implied rating versus Moody's rating (as a percentage of total 
observations) 
Moody's rating 
BARRA 
implied 
rating 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
1 0.35% 2.17% 2.66% 0.17% 0.11% 0.01% 5.47% 
2 0.07% 2.12% 6.92% 0.47% 0.08% 0.02% 9.67% 
3 0.01% 1.54% 14.93% 8.86% 0.19% 0.11% 25.64% 
4 0.00% 0.08% 7.04% 19.65% 3.54% 0.53% 30.84% 
5 0.00% 0.00% 0.53% 6.03% 7.70% 1.81% 16.07% 
6 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 2.05%. 4.37% 5.84% 12.30% 
Total 0.43% 5.90% 32.12% 37.23% 15.99% 8.33% 100% 
This table summarizes the number of observations, expressed as a percentage of total observations, that 
occur for each possible combination of BARRA implied rating and Moody's credit rating. 
Tnhip 7- N4prfnn[MKN4V imnlit-d ratinfy versus Moodv's rating 
Moody's rating 
Merton/MKM 
V implied 
ratinq AAA AA A BBB BB 
B or 
below Total 
AAA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AA 0 0 54 0 0 0 54 
A 1,275 6,130 26,751 16,481 2,212 992 53,841 
BBB 285 4,902 47,028 88,974 49,469 21,908 212,566 
BB 0 0 8 457 1,248 1,839 3,552 
B or below 0 0 1,585 668 478 672 3,403 
jotal 1,560 11,032 75,426 106,580 53,407 25,411 273,416 
This table summarizes the number of observations tnat occur ior eacn possime Coinumatwil U1 
Merton/MKMV implied rating and Moody's credit rating. 
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Table 7a: Merton/MKMV implied rating versus Moody's rating (as a percentage of total 
observations) 
Moody's rating 
Merton/MKMV 
implied rating AAA AA A BBB BB B or below Total 
AAA 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
AA 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 
A 0.47% 2.24% 9.78% 6.03% 0.81% 0.36% 19.69% 
BBB 0.10% 1.79% 17.20% 32.54% 18.09% 8.01% _ 77.74% 
BB 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.17% 0.46% 0.67% 1.30% 
B or below 0.00% 0.00% 0.58% 0.24% 0.17% 0.25% 1.24%_ 
Total 
1 
0.57% 4.03% 27.59% 38.98% 19.53% 9.29% 100-00% 
This table summarizes the number of observations, expressed as a percentage of total observations, that 
occur for each possible combination of Merton/MKMV implied rating and Moody's credit rating. 
Tnhip. R- BARRA imnlied rating nrediction 30 davs nrior to Moodv's rating 
Moody's rating Total Mo dy's rating 
BARRA 
rating Downgrade 
Same 
rating Upgrade Total Downgrade 
Same 
rating Upgrade 
Downgrade 81 79763 2 79846 0.10% 99.90% 0.00% 
Same 
rating 44 187145 19 187208 0.02% 99.97% 0.01% 
Upgrade 1 13 1 103557 19 103589 0.01% 99.97% 0.02% 
This table summarizes the number of observations that occur tor each possible combination 01 LSAKN-A 
implied rating change (downgrade, same rating, and upgrade) and Moody's credit rating change. In this 
table we investigate how well BARRA model predicts rating changes 30 days prior to Moody's rating 
changes. 
qr-11,1- 0. ID A OID A S-aClinfir Iniradiid-finin (M dnvQ nrior M Moodv's rating 
Moody's rating Total Mo dy's rating 
BARRA Same Same 
rating Downgrade rating Upgrade Total Downgrade rating Upgrade 
Downgrade 69 73946 3 74018 0.09% 99-90% 0.00% 
Same 
rating 52 175452 17 175521 0.03% 99.96% 0.01% 
Upgrade i ''I'll II ý', P 20 1 100499 0.02% 1 1 99.96% 0.02% 7-1 An T) A 
This table summarizes the number ot observations inai occur ivi rat.; n punbiuu-, kumuniauvii vL "l-"- x 
implied rating change (downgrade, same rating, and upgrade) and Moody's credit rating change. In this 
table we investigate how well BARRA model predicts rating changes 90 days prior to 
Moody's rating 
changes. 
Table 10: BARRA implied rating prediction 180 days prior to Moody's rati 
Mood s rain Total Mo dy's ratino 
BARRA Same Same 
rating Doýýýradýe_ a! týL_ Upgrade Total Downgrade rating Upgrade 
__ýa Downarade 55 66061 3 66119 0.08% 99.91% 0.00% 
Same 
rating 52 156690 17 156759 0.03% 99.96% 
0.01% 
Upgrade 27 95627 15 
_ 
95669 0.03% 99.96% 0.02% 
This table summarizes the number of observations that occur for each possible combination of 
BARRA 
tý is implied rating change (downgrade, same rating, and upgrade) and Moody's credit rating change. In thi 
table we investigate how well BARRA model predicts rating changes 180 days prior to 
Moody's rating 
changes. 
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Table 11: Merton[MKMV implied ratinp- prediction 30 daVS Drior to Nlood%, Is ratino 
Moody's ratin Total Moody's rating 
MKMV 
rating Downgrade 
Same 
rating Upgrade Total Downgrade 
Same 
ratinq Upgrade 
Downgrade 42 56819 0 56861 0.07% 
_ 
99.93% 0.00% 
Same 
rating 48 104478 3 104529 0.05% 99.95% 0.00% 
Upgrade 16 79755 15 79786 0.02% 1 99.96% 0.02% 
This table summarizes the number of observations that occur for each possible combination of 
Merton/MKMV implied rating change (downgrade. same rating, and upgrade) and Moody's credit 
rating change. In this table we investigate how well Merton/MKMV model predicts rating changes 30 
days prior to Moody's rating changes. 
Table 12: Merton/MKMV implied ratin2 prediction 90 davs prior to Moodv's ratin2 
Moody's rating Total Moody's ratinq 
MKMV 
rating Downgrade 
Same 
rating Upgrade Total Downgrade 
Same 
rating Upgrade 
Downgrade 37 53111 1 53149 0.07% 99.93% 0.00% 
Same 
rating 52 97892 2 97946 0.05% 99.94% 0.00% 
Upgrade 17 76282 15 76314 0.02% 99.96% 0.02% 
This table summarizes the number of observations that occur for each possible combination of 
Merton/MKMV implied rating change (downgrade, same rating, and upgrade) and Moody's credit 
rating change. In this table we investigate how well Merton/MKMV model predicts rating changes 90 
days prior to Moody's rating changes. 
'r. t. l. I'l. 1%4, %w-+, mw2/1%4Wl%4V imniii-cl rntincr nreffiction I RO daVS Drior to Moodv's ratini! 
Moody's rating Total Moody's rating 
MKMV 
rating Downgrade 
Same 
ratinq Upgrade Total Downgrade 
Same 
rating 
_ 
Upgrade 
Downgrade 35 47206 0 47241 0.07% 99.93% 0.00% 
Same 
rating 47 87211 3 87261 0.05% 99.94% 0.00% 
Upgrade 20 69758 14 69792 0.03% 99.95% 1 0.02% 
This table summarizes the number ot ooservalions inat mcui ivi caw, pvzz!, 1u1V- -, L 
Merton/MKMV implied rating change (downgrade, same rating, and upgrade) and Moody's credit 
rating change. In this table we investigate how well Merton/MKMV model predicts rating changes 
180 
days prior to Moody's rating changes. 
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Table 14: BARRA implied rating prediction 30 days prior to Moody's rating, same 
observations as in MKMV are considered 
Moody's ratin Total Moody's ratinq 
BARRA 
implied 
rating Downgrade 
Same 
rating Upgrade Total Downgrade 
Same 
ratinq Upgr de 
Downgrade 64 46625 1 46690 0.14% 99.86% 0.00% 
Same 
rating 33 119475 7 119515 0.03% 99.97% 0.01% 
Upgrade 9 74952 10 74971 0.01% 99.97% 0.01% 
i nis tawe summarizes Me number ot observations that occur t-or each possible combination of BARRA 
implied rating change (downgrade, same rating, and upgrade) and Moody's credi in is it rat' g change. In thi 
table we investigate how well BARRA model predicts rating changes 30 days prior to Moody's rating 
changes. For these calculations, only those observations for which both BARRA and Merton/MKMV 
implied ratings are available are used. 
Table 15: BARRA implied rating prediction 90 days prior to Moody's rating, same 
observations as in MKMV are considered 
Moody's rating Total Moody's rating 
BARRA 
implied 
rating Downgrade 
Same 
rating Upgrade Total Downgrade 
Same 
de 
Downgrade 54 42225 1 42280 0.13% 99.87% 0.00% 
Same 
rating 41 112427 7 112475 0.04% 99.96% 0.01% 
Upgrade 11 72633 10 72654 0.02% 99.97% 0.01% 
This table summarizes the number of observations that occur for each possible combination of BARRA 
implied rating change (downgrade, same rating, and upgrade) and Moody's credit rating change. In this 
table we investigate how well BARRA model predicts rating changes 90 days prior to Moody's rating 
changes. For these calculations, only those observations for which both BARRA and Merton/MKMV 
implied ratings are available are used. 
Table 16: BARRA implied rating prediction 180 days prior to Moody's rating, same 
nhu-rvntinnr. nc in 1%41CN4V firp. enneddered 
Moody's rating Total Moody's rating 
BARRA 
implied 
rating Downgrade 
Same 
rating Upgrade Total Downgrade 
Same 
rating Upgrade 
Downgrade 42 35737 2 35781 0.12% 99.88% 0.01% 
Same 
rating 41 99677 5 99723 0.04% 99.95% 0.01% 
Upgrade 19 68761 10 68790 0.03% 99.96% 0.01% 
This table summarizes the number of observations tfiat occur tor eacn possirne comoination oi rýtxmnljA 
implied rating change (downgrade, same rating, and upgrade) and Moody's credit rating change. In this 
table we investigate how well BARRA model predicts rating changes 180 days prior to Moody's rating 
changes. For these calculations, only those observations for which both BARRA and Merton MKMV 
implied ratings are available are used. 
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Table 17: Merton/MKMV implied rating prediction 30 days prior to Moody's rating, 
dailv estimation 
Moody's rating Total Mo dy's rating 
MKMV 
rating Downgrade 
Same 
rating Upgrade Total Downgrade 
Same 
rating Upgrade 
Downgrade 45 56827 0 56872 0.08% 99.92% 0.00% 
Same 
rating 49 108711 3 108763 0.05% 99.95% 0.00% 
Upgrade 12 75344 15 75371 0.02% 99.96% 0.02% 
This table summarizes the number of observations that occur for each possible combination of 
Merton/MKMV implied rating change (downgrade, same rating, and upgrade) and Moody's credit 
rating change. In this table we investigate how well Merton/MKMV model predicts rating changes 30 
days prior to Moody's rating changes. For these calculations, the Merton/MKMV model has been 
estimated on a daily basis. 
Table 18: Merton/MKMV implied rating prediction 90 days prior to Moody's rating, 
dailv estimation 
Moody's rating Total Moody's rating 
MKMV 
rating Downgrade 
Same 
rating Upgrade Total Downgrade 
Same 
rating Upgrade 
Downgrad= 43 52088 0 52131 0.08% 99.92% 0.00% 
Same 
rating 48 102170 3 102221 0.05% 99-95% 0.00% 
Upgrade 15 72821 15 72851 0.02% 99.96% 0.02% 
This table summarizes the number of observations that occur tor each poSSibie comomation oi 
Merton/MK-MV implied rating change (downgrade, same rating, and upgrade) and Moody's credit 
rating change. In this table we investigate how well Merton/MKMV model predicts rating changes 90 
days prior to Moody's rating changes. For these calculations, the Merton/MKMV model has been 
estimated on a daily basis. 
Table 19: Merton/MKMV implied rating prediction 180 days prior to Moody's rating, 
""RA. 7 ýOWAA - A- 
Moody's rating Total Moody's rating 
MKMV Same Same 
rating Downgrade rating Upgrade Total Downgrade rating Upgrade 
Downgrade 38 44467 0 44505 0.09% 99.91% 0.. 00% 
Same 
rating 43 90998 3 91044 0.05% 99.95% 0.00% 
Upgrade 21 68499 1 14 1- 68534 1 0.03% 1 99.95% 0.02% 
This table summarizes the number oi or)servaL1Q11S Uldt Vt, 1, U1 1VL ý, Ctý, Ll FN-10OLU-1 
Merton/MKMV implied rating change (downgrade, same rating, and upgrade) and Moody's credit 
rating change. In this table we investigate how well Merton/MKMV model predicts rating changes 
180 
days prior to Moody's rating changes. For these calculations, the MertonMKMV model 
has been 
estimated on a daily basis. 
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Figure 1: Relationship between issuer average spreads and credit rating, year 2000 
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Figure 2: Relationship between issuer average spreads and credit rating, year 2001 
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Figure 3: Relationship between issuer average spreads and credit rating, year 2002 
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Figure 4: Relationship between issuer credit rating and distance to default 
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Figure 5: BARRA ROC curve using average option adjusted spreads (downgrade) 
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Figure 6: MKMV ROC curve using DD variable (downgrade) 
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Figure 7: BARRA ROC curve using average option adjusted spreads (upgrade) 
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Figure 8: MKMV ROC curve using DD variable (upgrade) 
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CHAPTER 6: Conclusion 
Abstract of Chapter 6 
This chapter provides a review of the main findings of this thesis. We present again 
the three main studies and restate the contribution of each study to the current 
literature. 
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6.1. Main conclusions 
As outlined in the general introduction the research reported in this thesis investigates 
the use of structural credit risk models for the prediction of default and credit rating 
transitions. It aims to examine both how different specifications of structural credit 
risk models affect default predictions and the empirical performance of the most 
widely used structural credit risk model, that of Moody's KMV, in relation to other 
models using accounting and bond market data. 
The objective of the first research study is to examine the differences in real default 
probabilities produced by different structural models; Merton model, Longstaff and 
Schwartz model and Leland and Toft model. We find that none of the models can 
accurately predict the default probabilities in all cases. Longstaff and Schwartz model 
produces default predictions in line with observed data for time horizons of over three 
years in some cases but at the same time tends to overestimate the default 
probabilities of riskier bonds as well as the default probabilities of bonds with the 
same rating but higher equity volatility. On the other hand, Merton and Leland and 
Toft model tend to underpredict the default probabilities in almost all cases. 
One of the main contributions of this study is the finding that structural models, 
especially Longstaff and Schwartz model, are sensitive to changes in the equity 
volatility. This is an important result since it suggests that banks should be cautious 
on the use of structural models for the calculation of their regulatory capital. The high 
sensitivity of the models to changes in the equity volatility will result on a high 
volatile assessment of the regulatory capital. Moreover, we conclude that structural 
models have difficulty, especially at short time horizons, in predicting default rates 
that are similar to the observed ones. This finding is in line with the earlier literature 
showing that structural models are not adequate for explaining observed credit 
spreads. While previous studies showed that observed credit spreads might be 
explained by special features such as taxes and liquidity. these alternative 
explanations cannot explain the poor performance of structural models in predicting 
real default probabilities. 
Given these findings, for future research, the inclusion of another structural model, 
that assumes jumps in the asset values. would be useful in order to examine whether 
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the inclusion of jumps in the asset values improves the perfon-nance of structural 
models in the prediction of expected default frequencies. Moreover, the inclusion of a 
structural model with stochastic volatility would enable us to investigate ýNhether the 
inclusion of stochastic volatility can correct the high sensitivity of structural models to 
changes in the equity volatility. 
The objective of the second study is to empirically determine whether information 
from equity markets, as summarized in the distance-to-default measure derived from 
Merton and similar to the one proposed by Moody's KMV Credit Monitor, provides 
useful additional information over accounting variables for the modelling and 
prediction of bank ratings and rating transitions. 
Our study extends work by Gropp et al (2006) who have found that the distance to 
default measure based on equity price is a useful predictor of bank fragility when used 
on its own, as well as in the context of an accounting model. The main contribution 
of our study lies on the investigation of whether distance to default is a useful 
indicator of changes in banks' credit quality. Our results indicate that distance to 
default, while it may be a useful summary statistic for bank supervisors and others, 
monitoring financial sector stability, certainly does not supplant more traditional 
approaches to credit analysis when used for the prediction of credit quality of banks. 
We find that the most important variable both for the prediction and the modeling of 
ratings is the size, as measured by the log of total assets. We find that distance to 
default is statistically significant only for small banks, for modeling current ratings, or 
predicting credit rating changes over a 6-month or 12-month horizon and we find no 
evidence that changes in distance-to-default have additional explanatory power for 
predicting rating category, either for small or large banks. Hence, we conclude that for 
smaller institutions distance to default appears to be most useful for monitoring 
smaller banks, while for larger banks, at least within the countries covered by our 
data, distance to default appears to be, at best, one of a range of indicators helpful to 
supervisors. 
For future research, our comparisons could be extended to a larger data set covering 
more years and companies from EU. Moreover, the investigation of whether the 
inclusion of lagged ratings or year dummies would affect the predictiN'C power of 
distance to default would be beneficial. 
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In our third research study, we empirically compare the predictive ability for credit 
rating changes of two leading proprietary models currently used by many financial 
institutions, Moody's KMV and BARRA models. We find that credit spreads and 
MKMV distance to default are not closely related to the actual agency ratings 
recorded by Moody's since there are considerable overlaps in the distribution of both 
market measures of credit quality between ratings classes. As a result using these 
market measures of credit quality to obtain market implied ratings, we find that a 
relatively large proportion of companies are allocated to central ratings categories A 
and BBB. This centralization also means that, when the ratings models are used to 
predict ratings changes, based on their estimated ratings boundaries, they yield 
excessive false predictions of ratings changes. We report ROC curves as a method of 
comparing the predictive ability of these models for capturing ratings changes at 
lower levels of sensitivity. These indicate that both models have some power for 
predicting downgrades but that, controlling for sensitivity to maintain a reasonable 
level of false positives MKMV is more successful than BARRA in predicting ratings 
downgrades. Perhaps due to the relatively small number of upgrades in this data 
sample, neither model is particularly good at predicting upgrades. In fact MKMV 
does not better than a random model while BARRA does only a little bit better. 
The contribution of this third research study is twofold. First, it demonstrates that 
market-implied ratings derived from equity prices are not more accurate compared to 
those derived from bond prices and vice versa. Second, we demonstrate that 
practitioners should be cautious when they use these rating models to predict ratings 
changes, since they yield excessive false predictions of ratings changes. 
For future research, our comparisons could be extended to a larger data set covering 
more years and companies from other markets than the US. Moreover, since we show 
that none of the models captures all the information relevant to assessing corporate 
credit quality, it would be useful to examine the predictive power of the models by 
estimating, for each rating class, individual sensitivity barriers for MKMV and 
BARRA models. The choice of the barriers would aim to balance Type I and Type 11 
errors. What is more, it is interesting to assess the predictive ability of a model that 
combines both distance to default and spreads and to investigate whether a 
"combined" model would work better than the individual models. 
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To summarize, from the three studies conducted in this thesis we can conclude that 
structural models, although they are useful tools of credit risk, they are far from close 
to capturing all the information relevant to assessing the credit quality of corporates or 
banks. Our findings suggest that practitioners and supervisors should use structural 
models as one of a range of tools of credit risk analysis. 
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